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METAPHOR AND MADNESS, LAW AND LIBERTY
Herbert A. Eastman*
A reign of doctors will be inaugurated and in the name of science new clas-
ses will be added, even races may be brought within such regulation, and the
worst forms of tyranny practiced. In the place of constitutional government
of the fathers we shall have set up Plato's Republic.'
[I]t is diseases thought to be multi-determined (that is, mysterious) that
have the widest possibilities as metaphors for what is felt to be socially or
morally wrong.2
INTRODUCTION
A series of Supreme Court decisions, most notably Youngberg v. Romeo,8
Parham v. J.R.,' and last Term, Washington v. Harper,' has fundamentally
eroded due process protections of certain individuals. As a result of these deci-
sions, psychiatrists are now left to make critical judgments which affect the
liberty and well-being of persons labeled by those psychiatrists as "mental pa-
tients." Neither the logic of doctrine nor the discovered realities of mental
illness drive this erosion of due process. Rather, history demonstrates that the
courts' changing articulations of the legal status of mental patients reflect con-
temporary social and professional perceptions of mental illness. These percep-
* Herbert A. Eastman, J.D., 1976, University of Notre Dame. Assistant Professor of Law at
Saint Louis University School of Law. The author expresses his heartfelt appreciation to his col-
leagues Professors Sandra Henneken Johnson of Saint Louis University School of Law and Clark
Cunningham of Washington University School of Law for their valuable critiques of earlier drafts
and Mark Peterson of Lewis and Clark College of Law for sharing in the author's initial experi-
ence of these issues in the commitment courts.
1. From the argument of plaintiffs' counsel summarized preceding the Court's opinion in Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1927) (describing consequences of upholding a state law which
would allow sterilization of the insane). In Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court was faced with a
challenge to a state statute which authorized the state to sterilize insane men and women. Id. at
205. the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Holmes, upheld the statute. Id. at 207. Justice
Holmes reasoned that society should not be burdened with andther generation of "incompetence."
Id.; see infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
2. S. SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR 61 (1978).
3. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
4. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
5. 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
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tions derive from a larger social and political agenda, an agenda aimed at
redemption in some eras, social control in others.
These sociopolitical agendas are expressed in popularly communicated and
embraced metaphors. Historically, insanity has served as a metaphor for our
nation's fears of its own craziness. That is, the way society has reacted to, and
dealt with, mental illness chronicles the evolving social challenges of our na-
tion's historical eras, such as civilization,6 social dislocation following war, 7
corruption through reproduction and immigration of defectives, 8 social disloca-
tion following a depression, 9 stagnation and social unrest,' 0 and finally, failure
from ill-advised government adventures that interfered with the natural com-
petitive order of nature." As eras came and passed on, the nature of the meta-
phors changed as well: alternating between explanations of insanity as an indi-
vidual phenomenon and a social phenomenon, a medical problem and a
political or economic problem.
These popular professional metaphors led to shifts in policy directions. The
courts followed closely behind with their endorsement. Jacksonian courts ex-
tended the parens patriae doctrine12  and committed people to asylums
designed to redeem the patients and society.' Post-Jacksonian courts tolerated
abuses in the asylum because society needed the asylums for its protection.' 4
Progressive courts at first shuddered at the abuses previously tolerated, then
acquiesced in the state hospital's persistence as a quarantine against social and
moral corruption.' During the same time, the courts approved of sterilization
as a public health measure to protect the nation's bloodline.' 6 Courts of the
mid-twentieth century expressed the preference for individual freedom. These
courts took over the remaining institutions as part of the general effort to cor-
6. This was the view of the Jacksonians. See infra text accompanying notes 25-41.
7. This was the prevailing view during the post-Jacksonian era. See infra text accompanying
notes 48-52.
8. This was the view of the Progressives and their contemporaries, the nativists. See infra text
accompanying notes 80-111.
9. This was the prevailing view during the early part of this century (1900-1940). See infra
text accompanying notes 116-37.
10. This was the prevailing view during the New Frontier and the Great Society periods (1945-
1970). See infra text accompanying notes 164-80.
11. This was the prevailing view in the period after the Great Society era (1970-1980). See
infra text accompanying notes 216-40.
12. Literally, parens patriae means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003
(5th ed. 1979). The parens patriae doctrine refers to the government's role as guardian of the
legally incompetent. Id.; see also Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally
11, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1190, 1207-09 (1974) [hereinafter Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill]
("The parens patriae function can thus be viewed as a power which the members of the commu-
nity have granted the state for the protection of [the incompetent's] well-being."). For an exhaus-
tive discussion of the development and use of the parens patriae doctrine, see Curtis, The Check-
ered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895 (1976).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 42-47.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 72-79.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 112-15, 138-54.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 155-62.
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rect America's problems, including mental illness.17 More recently, along with
much of the country, the courts have given up on the fix, seemingly convinced
that our problems are beyond government's capacity to fix.1 8
What was true of our history remains true of our present. Under the pre-
vailing medical metaphor, the courts entrust to psychiatrists the due process
analysis of competing liberty and state interests. The correctness of the psychi-
atrists' treatment and custody decisions is presumed, and their decisions are
insulated from any meaningful judicial review. Current develop-
ments-psychiatry's pursuit of new explanations for insanity and other medi-
calized behaviors, the seemingly intractable dilemma of homelessness, the re-
cent trend toward privatizing social problems, and the courts' weariness with
the thankless task of resolving social problems-are expected to converge. This
convergence may push the courts past these recent Supreme Court decisions to
an even greater delegation to psychiatric authority over people's lives, or, at
least, over the lives of certain people.
The likely result of such judicial deference is that feared by plaintiff's coun-
sel in Buck v. Bell: excessive delegation of authority to psychiatrists at the
expense of liberty.19 No more so than in the past, neither doctrine nor fact
demand this result. On the contrary, this delegation represents the abandon-
ment of legal doctrine. Further, this result becomes possible only through judi-
cial tunnel vision in which only a small portion of the world remains visible to
the courts. This vision omits the underlying and surrounding realities of
mental illness and psychiatry. Courts persist in their tunnel vision to further
the larger social and political agenda of this time in our history, hidden within
metaphors about mental illness.
This Article argues that current legal doctrine concerning the rights of
mental patients and the authority of psychiatrists has not been defined by the
logic of doctrine or the realities of mental illness. Rather, history demonstrates
that the evolution of this law has been shaped by social and political events,
the agendas resulting from those events, and the metaphors society uses to
explain them. These powerful metaphors, including the medical model of to-
day, have historically operated to justify twists in doctrine which cannot be
supported by precedent or evidence.
Section I begins with a history of the courts and mental health law, describ-
ing the three great reforms of mental health policy-Jacksonian asylums, Pro-
gressive civic medicine, and the Community Mental Health Movement-and
the failures of those reforms. That section explains, for each era, how the sur-
rounding social and political context gave rise to public agendas unique to
each era, such as redemption, social control, and so forth. It further explains
how these contexts and their agendas gave rise to popular and professional
metaphors about insanity which were used to explain the fears and hopes be-
hind the agendas, for example, insanity as the price of civilization, as the cor-
17. See infra text accompanying notes 193-215.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 241-60.
19. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1927); see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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ruption of America, and so forth. Finally, Section I argues that the courts
have embraced and changed the law to be consistent with those metaphors.
Section II analyzes the current state of the law and the latest reform, priva-
tization in its social and political context (including psychiatry's medicaliza-
tion of behavior). It examines how the currently prevailing medical metaphor
shapes that reform and the courts' endorsement of it: by delegating to psychia-
trists the power to decide critical liberty issues, such as civil commitment,
treatment and its refusal, without any review by the courts. Section III criti-
ques the privatization reform, arguing that judicial decisionmaking by meta-
phor ignores the realities of mental illness and psychiatry as well as the logic
and precedent of doctrine.
Section IV further examines the power and function of metaphors in law
and psychiatry. Section V argues for the traditional role of the courts and the
adversary system as a check upon both the power of psychiatrists and the in-
fluence of metaphor.
I. MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE COURTS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF REFORM
The current judicial deference to psychiatry emerged from a historical con-
text. Through history, development of our conceptions of mental illness and
the rights of those called mentally ill have moved not in a straight line, but
have flowed in twists and turns, often repeating courses already travelled. This
course is marked by three great reforms in mental health policy. Each reform
found its origins in social changes which then shaped popular fears and hopes
for the country. These hopes and fears resulted in particular policies and found
expression in particular metaphors, shaping judicial decisions.
A. The Nation's Beginning.- The Individual's Moral Stain to be Accepted
and Hidden
During the time the American colonies strained toward and achieved inde-
pendence, the rights and needs of the mentally ill had yet to find a place on
the public agenda. This invisibility was not due simply to the press of other
issues, such as revolution. Rather, eighteenth century Americans saw human-
kind as essentially flawed and deviant. Human society could not hope to cure
lunacy." Rarely did the members of those communities resort to confining the
mentally ill; rather, families cared for their own. 1 Families could commit rela-
tives with "the greatest of ease.""2 Hence, little in the way of litigation pre-
ceded or followed the commitment. Still, families were reluctant to air their
20. D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE
NEW REPUBLIC 17 (1971).
21. Workhouses and poorhouses were the only "institutions" and they housed the stranger and
the vagabond, those whose deviance was outside the web of the community's relationships. Id. at
25.
22. A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 420 (1949) (observing that no special laws
safeguarding the personal liberty of the mentally ill were enacted until the late 1820s).
1991]
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family problems in public, and so few were ever confined.23 The few "hospi-
tals" that admitted the insane rarely filled their beds."'
B. Jacksonian America and the First Reform: The Social Price of
Civilization to be Treated
After the turn of the century, as the new nation began to focus on its own
development, the family problem of mental illness came to be seen as a prob-
lem for the new society as well. The insight of the Enlightenment was that
society could improve. This insight, together with the growing popular sense
that mental illness was increasing, offered a possible remedy to mental ill-
ness." Jacksonian physicians agreed that brain lesions caused mental illness.
Nevertheless, perhaps frustrated by the limited reach of their crude profession,
they located the operative causes of mental illness outside the body and within
the community."' The "price" of a new bustling civilization, marked by the
stresses of mobility, complexity, and competition, was lunacy. 27
I In this way, the Jacksonians' view of mental illness reflected the larger cri-
tique of the society's ill health.29 The problem was not medical, and neither
was the solution. 9 If society were to blame for mental illness, then the solution
seemed clear. While few doubted that American society could be restabilized
to its quieter past, the social obligation to "heal the wound it inflict[ed]"
seemed apparent.2 0 If society destabilized the orderly life of its citizens, then
the remedy was to reform a community in which order was restored.3 1 This
community would eliminate the cause of mental illness. Perhaps, this commu-
nity would help reform society by reminding America of the virtues of order
23. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 15-16, 19.
24. N. DAIN, THE DISORDERED MIND 26 (1971).
25. N. DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1865, at 11 (1964); D.
ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 109-10; P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 73 (1982).
26. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 110-11.
27. G. GROB, EDWARD JARVIS AND THE MEDICAL WORLD OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
119 (1978) (quoting Jarvis, On the Supposed Increase of Insanity, 8 AM. J. INSANITY 333
(1852)); D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 112 (quoting Dorothea Dix advising the Pennsylvania
legislature that the causes of mental disorder were to be found in "the habits, the customs, the
temptations of civilized life and society").
28. G. GROB, supra note 27, at 118-19; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 113; P. STARR, supra
note 25, at 73.
29. Democratic impulses early in the nation's history retarded the growth of a physician profes-
sional class generally, as Americans viewed medicine with a skeptical eye. P. STARR, supra note
25, at 55-57.
30. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 128 (quoting E. JARVIS, ON THE SUPPOSED INCREASE OF
INSANITY 21 (1852) (pamphlet reprinted from the American Journal of Insanity)) (explaining
that since society caused mental illness, society had an obligation to cure it).
31. N. DAIN, supra note 25, at 15. The author stated that Benjamin Rush, the father of modern
psychiatry, "believed that good health depended upon social, political, and economic as well as




These new communities were the insane asylums.12 During the early 1800s
and up to the Civil War, most states erected these new little Jerusalems33 to
cure both individuals and society of lunacy. The asylums isolated individuals
and society, protecting one from the other. Physicians diagnosed insanity
freely from a wide variety of symptoms commonly demonstrated by much of
the community."4 Institutionalization became the first, not the last resort. Con-
sistent with the new country's optimism and desire to impress its European
parents, the asylums were dedicated to no less than the cure of insanity. 5 The
mode of cure was "moral treatment," which consisted of isolation from the
community and its harmful effects, insistence on quiet and discipline to curb
the socially induced excesses of the mentally ill, 38 and kind treatment.37 The
cure lay not in medicine but in the setting and its administration, hence the
early title of psychiatrist as a "medical superintendent."39 To facilitate the
cure, family visits were discouraged; commitment procedures were simple and
accessible.39 In fact, the common and easily completed requirement of two
physicians' certificates drew the criticism of medical superintendents as cum-
bersome.40 Still, the medical superintendents found the asylum walls an effec-
tive protection for the unopposed exercise of their authority.' 1
Like the rest of society, the American courts cooperated with the cure. The
doctrine of parens patriae, imported with the common law from England and
originally devised to protect the estates of incompetents, 2 was first used dur-
ing this period by a Massachusetts court to authorize the confinement of the
mentally ill to effect their cure.' 3
The courts endorsed the medical superintendents' warning that mental ill-
ness was common and easily succumbed to: "no man can reckon on the contin-
uance of his perfect reason. Disease may weaken, accident may disturb, anxi-
ety may impair it . . . . 44 The courts also approved the efficacy of "moral
and intellectual treatment of the insane. . .. 9,4" Similarly, the courts con-
32. D. ROTIMAN, supra note 20, at 129.
33. Id. at 130.
34. For example, physicians considered reticence or impulsiveness symptoms of insanity. Id. at
122-23.
35. Id. at 132.
36. N. DAIN, supra note 24, at 77, 92-93; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 133, 137-38.
37. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 149.
38. Id. at 134; P. STARR, supra note 25, at 73.
39. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 143.
40. Id.
41. P. STARR, supra note 25, at 73.
42. Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 12, at 1209.
43. In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 122 (Mass. 1845), cited in Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
supra note 12, at 1209. Deutsch noted that "[t]his was probably the first time that the therapeutic
justification for [institutionalization] was explicitly handed down by an American court." A.
DEUTSCH, supra note 22, at 423.
44. Colby v. Jackson, 12 N.H. 526, 533 (1842).
45. Id. at 531.
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demned the "private madhouses" of England with their "nameless and
unimaginable horrors. '' 46 Convinced of the need to cure society of lunacy, the
courts approved the new asylums:
The object of discharging the prisoner under this statute was to provide
for his care, maintenance and recovery; and this was to be effected by re-
moving him to the asylum. This is to be inferred not only from the title of
the act but from its other provisions, for the erection of extensive buildings
for the reception of insane patients, containing accommodations for their
comfort, and physicians, nurses and attendance [sic] for their treatment and
cure.4
C. The Incurable Danger to be Controlled: the Failure of the First
Reform
Even during the early years of the first reform, before the Civil War, the
reality of this reform hardly meshed well with the objectives of the asylums."8
Still, most believed the asylums to be superior to the jails and workhouses." '
However, the Civil War and its aftermath dramatically affected the nature
and operation of the asylum. First, critically needed funds were diverted away
from mental health services for the war and the subsequent post-war rebuild-
ing effort. Second, society suffered major dislocation following a war fought on
America's own territory. 0 The Civil War, Reconstruction, sectionalism, and
other national issues crowded the public's agenda. The problem of deviancy
became relatively less significant, and therefore, less entitled to public atten-
tion and dollars. 61 The result was overcrowded, underfunded institutions.52
The asylums filled past the brim with the chronically mentally ill: both those
who were forced into the institutions because they disrupted the social system,
and those who worsened while confined in the failing asylum. As a result, the
more treatable cases lost the competition for scarce bed space.53 Optimism
about the future of moral treatment surrendered to the overwhelming realities
of the asylums.5' Professional consensus announced the failure of the asylum
46. Id. at 532.
47. Bush v. Pettibone, 4 N.Y. 300, 302 (1850).
48. Too few staff resulted in increased regimentation, application of mechanical restraints, and
occasionally bizarre punishments, such as submersing the patient in hot, then cold water. Also,
overcrowding and unsanitary conditions undercut the asylum's utopian aspirations. D. ROTHMAN,
supra note 20, at 149-51.
49. Id. at 151.
50. Id. at 237-38.
51. Id. at 252.
52. G. GROB, MENTAL ILLNESS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1845-1940, at 26-27 (1983) (describ-
ing the chaotic state of mental hospitals after the Civil War); D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 238.
53. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 271.
54. David Rothman wrote:
The custodial qualities of the post-1850 asylums are easily described. The first and
most common element was overcrowding and in its train came the breakdown of clas-
sification systems, the demise of work therapy, and an increase in the use of mechani-
[Vol. 40:281
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to cure insanity.55 In fact, medical superintendents and neurologists were
among the most critical of the asylum's failures. Neurologist William Ham-
mond wrote:
[T]he system of inspection of such institutions, when there is any at all, is so
inefficient that the greatest abuses may spring up, and the world be none the
wiser, till some day an exposure takes place; and then it is discovered that
an asylum which has been the pride of the community is in reality a hot-bed
of neglect and cruelty."6
Medical superintendent Pliny Earle spoke for the profession and the public
when he attributed moral treatment's failure to cure mental illness to the fact
that it was "really becoming more and more an incurable disease."57
While the still new mental health profession stood ready to abandon the
asylum, the country remained committed to institutionalization." The reasons
for this are not difficult to discern. In the aftermath of the war, American
society experienced further dislocation due to the rural exodus to the cities 9
and the wave of Irish immigration, which actually began just before the war in
the wake of the potato famine."0 This dislocation challenged the more stable
social order that had settled in after the Revolution. The incentive to control
these forces, especially to control the poor and immigrant classes, found a
ready device in the institutions, such as prisons and asylums, built before the
war for other purposes.6" The new immigrants found themselves constituting
pluralities and even majorities of patient counts.6" Similarly, the new urban
poor, both immigrant and native born, dominated the asylums after the war.68
The available statistics suggest that institutionalization was often motivated by
bias and the power of nativism; only forty-three percent of the native-born
cal restraints and harsh punishments to maintain order .... Visitors to state and
municipal institutions told of seeing beds strewn about the hallways, because the
space in the dormitories had long since been exhausted....
•.. The raving and the furiously insane usually mixed freely with the more peace-
able and well-behaved patients.
d. at 265-66.
55. Id. at 268; see G. GROB, supra note 52, at 59-62.
56. W. HAMMOND, A TREATISE ON INSANITY IN ITS MEDICAL RELATIONS 721 (1883), quoted
in D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 269.
57. P. EARLE, CURABILITY OF INSANITY 58 (1886), quoted in D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at
268; see also G. GROB, supra note 27, at 121 (survey by Edward Jarvis indicated that an over-
whelming majority of physicians and hospital superintendents believed that most mentally ill pa-
tients were incurable).
58. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 269. Construction of new institutions continued during this
period. G. GROB, supra note 52, at 75 (reporting that 35 new institutions were built from 1850-
1867, and 59 more were built from 1870-1890).
59. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 240.
60. Id. at 254.
61. Even just prior to the Civil War, the foreign-born made up a majority of the patient popu-
lation. Id. at 273. This was true of prisons as well. Id. at 254.
62. Id. at 283.
63. Id. at 283-84.
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poor identified as insane were institutionalized, whereas almost every foreigner
identified as insane was confined.6"
The country told itself a number of things to justify this state of affairs. The
medical superintendent of a Massachusetts asylum opined that the Irish were
more susceptible to insanity, blaming them for the apparent failure of moral
treatment:
The want of forethought in them to save their earnings for the day of sick-
ness, the indulgence of their appetites for stimulating drinks . . . and their
strong love for their native land . . . are the fruitful causes of insanity
among them. As a class, we are not so successful in our treatment of them
as with the native population of New England. It is difficult to obtain their
confidence, for they seem to be jealous of our motives.16
Other medical superintendents warned of the imminence of danger from the
unpredictable insane and the futility of any alternative except confinement for
the safety of the patient and the community.66
By the 1870s, the reason for the asylum's existence had substantially shifted
from the impossibility of cure to the convenience of custody.67 Mental institu-
tions evolved into "comfortable prisons"68 rather than utopian communities.
Nonetheless, even the seemingly cynical preeminence of custody as the pri-
mary purpose of asylums was wrapped in reform phraseology. While conced-
ing that his institution was "little more than a retreat for incurables,"69 one
superintendent boasted that "[t]he filthy, ragged and disgusting objects
brought here, from gloomy prisons and cheerless poorhouses would scarcely be
recognized after a few days residence in the asylum. '70 The middle class and
native social structure found a ready protection from the ill effects of foreign-
ers. Not only that, but the public had a weapon against the lunacy of their
neighbors, and even within their families.7 1
64. Id. at 283.
65. WORCHESTER LUNATIC HOSPITAL, FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 33 (1848) (statement by
George Chandler, medical superintendent of Worchester State Hospital, in annual report for
1847), quoted in D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 284. Norman Dain also expressed this wide-
spread view. He stated that "[t]he middle class Protestant asylum superintendents, disillusioned,
frustrated, and ineffective in obtaining more funds, tended to blame the patients themselves for
their failure to recover, the urban poor and the allegedly unassimilable immigrants being particu-
larly culpable. ... N. DAIN. supra note 24, at 113; see N. DAIN, supra note 25, at 99-100.
Interestingly, the immigrant Germans were seen as much healthier, id. at 100, but. northern Afri-
can-Americans were seen as prone to mental illness as the Irish. Id. at 104. Indeed, free African
Americans were seen as ten times more likely to become insane as slaves. Id.
66. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 286. ,
67. Id. at 273; see G. GROB, supra note 52, at 15.
68. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 277 (quoting KENTUCKY EASTERN LUNATIC ASYLUM, AN-
NUAL REPORT FOR 1845, at 24 (1846)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. At least one study has concluded that the postwar years saw many American families using
the asylums to resolve family problems by committing wayward children or spouses. J. HUGHES,
ALABAMA'S FAMILIES AND INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF THE INSANE, 1861-1900: NEW SOLU-
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In the face of this public acquiescence in, and even enthusiasm for, custody,
the courts deferred. 7" Gone were the references in court opinions to moral
treatment as the reason for institutionalization. Instead, in dispensing with
procedural protections,"7 the courts adopted the argument of the medical su-
perintendents that at least commitment was not prison. Courts explicitly held
that commitment of a mental patient was for "the safety of himself and the
public,"'1 4 and that mental patients needed the "protection and restraints of an
asylum." 75
The lunatic, once endowed with the rights of citizenship, "ceased to be a
man" through the onset of insanity.76 Courts typically described the insane
before them as "incurable" and "dangerous. 717 Additionally, the courts, much
like the public, heeded the medical superintendents' alarm as to the risk posed
by the volatile and erratic lunatic. During a time when the new republic felt
threatened by immigration and the aftermath of war, the courts warned soci-
ety as well:
[H]is condition is one . . . which may be said to oscillate between insanity
and imperfect sanity, for any disturbance of health may cause him to cross
the boundary ...
His life may be said to have been cast in the borderland of insanity. But
as no chart has yet been made of the shadowy land that lies between the
boundaries of sanity and insanity, we know nothing positively of its extent or
the fluctuations which its area at times undergoes. A little more or a little
less on this side or that may change the entire character of an individual,
and convert him from a responsible into an irresponsible being. Like the
limits of riparian ownership on turbulent streams, the borders of sanity may
be encroached upon by every flood of passion without yet producing mental
aberration; or again, they may be undermined by bodily disease inherited or
acquired, until they finally crumble and are swept into the torrent of
disorder.78
TIONS TO OLD PROBLEMS, passim (Institute for Legal Studies Working Paper Series 2, 1987).
72. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at, 282.
73. Procedural obstacles were enacted by state legislatures just after the Civil War in response
to notorious cases of "railroading" sane relatives into asylums for financial gain, A. DEUTSCH,
supra note 22, at 425, but were relaxed again by the legislatures in the 1880s and 1890s. Id. at
432; see also R. SIMON, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 175-76 (1987) (following the Civil
War, the decision to commit shifted from the family and physicians to the courts; however, from
1900-1920, the physicians recaptured some of their lost influence).
74. In re Approval of Medical Certificates of Insanity, 7 N.Y.S. 671, 672 (City Ct. 1889)
(ruling that the two physicians' certificates need not be executed on the same day); Inhabitants of
-Amherst v. Inhabitants of Sherburne, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 107, 109 (1858) ("no illegality or
irregularity" in the commitment of lunatic, even where commitment order not in writing or filed
in court); Armstrong County v. Overseers of the Poor, Pittsburgh L.J., Aug. 25, 1875, at 86 col. I
(Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 1875) ("Mere informalities and harmless errors must be disregarded.").
75. Ayer's Case, 3 Abb. N. Cas. 218, 222 (N.Y. State Comm'r in Lunacy 1877).
76. Howard v. Howard, 87 Ky. 616, 623, 9 S.W. 411, 413 (1888).
77. Ayer's Case, 3 Abb. N. Cas. at 221.
78. Brush's Case, 3 Abb. N. Cas. 225, 227 (N.Y. State Comm'r in Lunacy 1877). The court
also spoke of "insuperable obstacles" appearing "at every stage of progress toward convalescence."
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It is no wonder at all that the courts felt safer with the dangerous lunatic
easily committed behind the walls of the asylum.
The courts expected that, even with the original purpose of treatment aban-
doned, the asylums would still be able to meet the medical superintendents'
new standard; that is, the asylums provided better custodial care than the pris-
ons. In a false imprisonment case, one court appeared willing to live with a lot
of abuse:
The asylums were to be retreats for proper instruction and treatment, and
not in any sense prisons or bedlams ...
That the system has worked well thus far is demonstrated by the fact that
this is the first instance in which complaint of it appears in our records.
Nevertheless there are possibilities in it which must not and cannot be over-
looked. . . . Indeed when we admit that such things are possible, we con-
cede that other things still more dreadful are also possible; but we shall not
stop to contemplate, or even to suggest them. If the law permits this, we
must take it with all its possible evils and abuses. 9
The abandonment of treatment and of the mentally ill continued until the age
of reform, the Progressive Era.
D. The Progressive Era and the Second Reform: The Individual's
Corruption to be Prevented
The Progressives of the 1890s sought to reform much of the perceived cor-
ruption in American life.80 This reform movement included an attempt to con-
quer diseases which corrupted the human body through large scale vaccination
and quarantine efforts."'
As the war against corrupting diseases eventually expanded to insanity, the
overcrowded, understaffed, and purely custodial asylums again became an en-
emy. Once again, the community made a commitment to cure insanity, but on
a case-by-case basis. The Progressives critiqued the Jacksonians' reform as too
simplistic in assuming that all insanity could best be treated through utopian
Id.
79. Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90, 125 (1879). Other courts also forgot the warning
of William Hammond of the horrors waiting behind the model asylum's walls. In People ex rel.
Norton v. New York Hosp., 3 Abb. N. Cas. 229 (N.Y. State Comm'r in Lunacy 1876), a man
sued over his wife's mistreatment at the hands of asylum staff. The court entertained a "presump-
tion derived from time[] and the history of that institution" that no one else had been mistreated,
since no one had complained. Id. at 241. Also, while acknowledging that the traditional distrust of
a lunatic's testimony needed re-evaluation in the age of asylums, id. at 248, the wife's testimony
about intentional abuse was not credited. Id. at 255-56. Still, the court found some independent
evidence of negligence and ordered daily record keeping and the employment of a supervisor of
overworked attendants. Id. at 272-73.
80. See generally R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955) (discussing the political reform
movement of the Progressives).
81. Merritt, The Constitutional Balance Between Health and Liberty, 16 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Dec. Supp. 1986, at 2, 3.
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communities. From the Progressive perspective, some insanity was best cured
within the community. 2 Such an individualistic approach to deviancy re-
quired, in turn, broad discretion on the part of those deciding whether to insti-
tutionalize the individual, and a concomitant expansion of government and
professional power.83 The problem with the asylums, from the Progressive
viewpoint, lay not in their existence, but in their uniformity and their
repressiveness."'
As 1890 approached, institutional care continued to decline. Overcrowding,
beds filled with the chronic mentally ill, and violence among patients and be-
tween patients and staff were all relatively commonplace.8 Custody and safety
were the only governing rationale.
This state of affairs, unacceptable under most circumstances, continued
without significant challenge for a number of reasons. These cruel warehouses
confined the poor and alien. By 1890, in Illinois, half of the patient population
was foreign-born; in one New York asylum, immigrants claimed eighty-six
percent of the patient beds.88 Most of these patients were unskilled or semi-
skilled laborers, farmers or domestics; in Connecticut, ninety-four percent of
the patients were considered paupers.8 Moreover, the cost of these asylums,
especially unsanitary and understaffed ones, stayed relatively low. 88
Even with all the faults associated with the asylum, mental health reformers
continued to defend the insane asylum as superior to the prison or the poor-
house. 9 However, those most vociferous in their criticisms of the asylum, the
neurologists, only wanted better institutions and proposed no alternatives."0
The reality of the asylum, as known by the professionals,"1 along with the
public image of the asylums as cruel refuges,9 brought the insanity issue to
the Progressive agenda. Sharing the optimism and missionary zeal of Progres-
sivism, the new psychiatrists hoped to conquer insanity, and therefore tired of
82. D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE, THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 5 (1980).
83. Id. at 8. The close of the Jacksonian era also saw popular acceptance of the medical profes-
sion. P. STARR, supra note 25, at 80-82.
84. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 12.
85. Id. at 21-22.
86. Id. at 24.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 27.
89. Id. at 29.
90. Id. This was true, even though the neurologists recognized the harmful effects of institu-
tionalization. William Hammond wrote that the asylum's protectors "fail entirely to appreciate
the strength of the passion for liberty which is in the human heart. . . .All the comforts which
the insane person has in his captivity are but a miserable compensation for his entire loss of
liberty .. .the mighty suffering of lifelong imprisonment." W. HAMMOND. THE NON-ASYLUM
TREATMENT OF THE INSANE 2, 7-12 (1879), quoted in D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 38.
91. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 294.
92. See, e.g., C. BEERS, A MIND THAT FOUND ITSELF (1917) (an autobiography of a patient,
Clifford W. Beers).
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the dominance of the failing asylums. 3
This bond between Progressives and physicians stemmed in part from the
emergence of the physicians' status and power.9" For example, the profession
triumphed over patent medicine as an alernative, nonprofessional treatment
for illness.96 The physicians' improved status also reflected a popular belief in
science and the inaccessibility of knowledge to the lay person,96 particularly
knowledge of the complexities of medical science.97 "The assumptions of radi-
cals, reformers and conservatives reflected the more general decline of confi-
dence in the ability of the laymen to deal with their own physical and personal
problems." 98 Some of the most impressive victories of the medical profession
occurred in the regulation of public hygiene. 99 The medical profession's new
position of influence is suggested by the physicians' assumption of the power of
"gatekeeper," deciding who could and could not qualify for military service. 100
Similarly, psychiatrists medicalized and professionalized insanity. Mental ill-
ness was transformed from the Jacksonian's price of social dislocation to an
individual malady treatable by a doctor, like any other malady.
Well-intentioned proposals to upgrade the asylum tended to be haphazard
and vague. The proposals lacked any governing treatment principle until the
mental hygiene movement and Adolf Meyer.101 Meyer emphasized the facts of
each individual case of insanity.102 He shifted away from biological explana-
tions in favor of a theory of "maladaptation": an examination of the highly
individual manner in which the patient adjusted to life's difficulties.0 Called
"civic medicine," Meyer's theory proposed to bring psychiatry out from behind
asylum walls and into the outside community.10 4 The psychiatrist focused on
both the particular facts of the individual patient and the patient's environ-
ment in hopes of eliminating mental illness through prevention and cure.105
Civic medicine took concrete form in a variety of ways. Proposals for new
outpatient clinics, new psychopathic hospitals for short-term confinement, new
after-care programs, new alternatives such as family and boarding care, new
professionals such as social workers, and a new community mental health edu-
93. G. GROB, supra note 52, at 110; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 293-94. The Progressives
gave psychiatrists the power they needed: "As ardent believers in the value of medical care and
the legitimate basis of professional authority, Progressive reformers had no basic quarrel with
physicians." P. STARR, supra note 25, at 246.
94. See P. STARR, supra note 25, at 128-29.
95. Id. at 128-33.
96. Id. at 134-35.
97. Id. at 142.
98. Id. at 141.
99. Id. at 135, 246.
100. Id. at 137.
101. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 306 ("Adolf Meyer not only coined the term 'mental
hygiene' but, more than any other single figure, defined and popularized its principles.").
102. Id. at 303.
103. Id. at 302-06; see G. GROB, supra note 52, at 112-15.




cational program were all aspects of civic medicine.10 6 Left in the equation
was the old asylum, which was now intended only for the incurable patient
who needed long-term or even lifetime care. 107 While the asylums had to be
made over into therapeutic places to further the reform agenda, the Progres-
sives even had a role for the warehouses, a eugenic purpose: to keep the incur-
able isolated and incapable of reproducing. 0 8
The Progressives were confident in science and the rightness of their cause.
To quickly accomplish their ends and overcome procedural obstacles, the
Progressives insisted upon simple and efficient commitment procedures.10 9 The
commitment courts cooperated by permitting those petitioning for the patient's
confinement to dispense with notice of the commitment proceeding if notice
would excite the patient." 0 Consistent with the Progressive vision, government
action in this arena was preferred over the less trustworthy acts of private
individuals; "[a] wise administration of government does not leave it to private
persons to decide when these restrictions [commitments] shall be exercised.""'
The courts could play little affirmative role in implementing the new compo-
nents of the civic medicine program. Nonetheless, the courts shared the Pro-
gressive psychiatrists' abhorrence of the asylum, their faith in the possibility of
cure, and their insistence upon careful review of the facts of each commitment
case. In issuing a writ of mandamus for the discharge of a patient in Statham
v. Blackford,"2 the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held:
Insane asylums are for the care and custody of the insane. There is no law-
ful place in them for the sane man. If, in such a case as this, an improving
patient has been released temporarily for her improvement, and she has
gone on to improve, as is conceded, and as is, moreover, distinctly proven in
this case, until she is blessed by a complete recovery and a perfect restora-
tion to health, ought this delicate lady, nearly three score and ten years old,
to be released entirely, or should she be carried back against her will withal
to the lunatic asylum before her just status can be recognized? We think, if
she is sane, she is entitled to her freedom."'
106. Id. at 309-19.
107. G. GROB, supra note 52, at 107; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 319-23.
108. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 320-23.
109. Id. at 327-28.
110. Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436 (1901); Brayman v. Grant, 130 A.D. 272, 274, 276,
114 N.Y.S. 336, 338-39 (1909); In re Andrews, 126 A.D. 794, 799, 111 N.Y.S. 417, 420 (1908);
Emmerich v. Thorley, 35 A.D. 452, 458, 54 N.Y.S. 791, 795 (1898); People ex rel. Sullivan v.
Wendel, 33 Misc. 496, 498, 68 N.Y.S. 948, 949 (Sup. Ct. 1900). This judicial response is consis-
tent with the general attitude of the courts toward the Progressive health agenda. Other courts
similarly approved reformers' programs of quarantine and vaccination. Merritt, supra note 81, at
3. One court proclaimed that these public health measures represent "the highest law of the
land," to which the Constitution must give way. Beeks v. Dickinson County, 131 Iowa 244, 248,
108 N.W. 311, 312 (1906).
111. Porter v. Ritch, 70 Conn. 235, 257, 39 A. 169, 176 (1898).
112. 89 Va. 771, 17 S.E. 233 (1893).
113. Id. at 776, 17 S.E. at 234.
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An appellate court in Rhode Island affirmed the exclusion of available evi-
dence that suggested insanity and also evidence of the propriety of commit-
ment in the institution; the patient assured the court that she would remain in
her sister's house and not go at large until cured.1 1'
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed a trial court verdict
for the purportedly insane plaintiff in a false imprisonment suit, writing elo-
quently of the facts of that case:
A sad, silent, and fragile little lady, now beyond middle life, wrongfully de-
clared a lunatic, and that of the most repulsive style, shut up in a mad
house, under the circumstances disclosed, and with a stigma branded upon
her name and character which verdicts of juries and judgments of courts
may never wholly efface, and with endurance of such shame, humiliation,
and crucifixion of soul as happily does not often fall to women's lot, has
appealed to the courts for redress of her wrongs, and we do not feel author-
ized to take from her the poor fruits of her victory.116
E. The Corruption to be Eliminated. The Failure of the Second Reform
The Progressive victories were short-lived. As David Rothman has observed,
"Nowhere was the gap between Progressive ambitions and day-to-day realities
greater than in the field of mental health." 16 Few of the planned new psycho-
pathic hospitals for the curable insane were even built, and those few served as
diagnostic centers for the state hospitals. Psychiatrists faced the limitations of
mental hygiene as a cure for the apparent maladaptations of actual patients
brought to their door.117 Psychopathic hospitals were reduced to mere process-
ing centers that offered only a transparent "milieu therapy." ' 8 Boarding care
and family care alternatives were quickly abandoned, 1 9 as were outpatient
clinics.120
As the First World War approached, the asylums, now called state hospi-
tals, remained entrenched, and even legitimized by the reformers' efforts. 2
Yet, nothing changed.1 22 The case histories, important to a fact-based and in-
dividual approach to treatment, fell victim to the large volume of patients and
the need to base treatment decisions on something more easily accessible, such
as the patient's behavior upon admission.1 23 Hospitals classified patients by
114. Senft v. Carpenter, 18 R.I. 545, 545, 28 A. 963, 964 (1894).
115. Bacon v. Bacon, 76 Miss. 458, 472-73, 24 So. 968, 971 (1899).
116. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 324.
117. Id. at 325-26.
118. Id. at 330.
119. Id. at 361-63.
120. Id. at 363-70.
121. Id. at 335.
122. P. STARR, supra note 25, at 146. At the same time, Progressive reformers had brought
hospitals to the mainstream of nonpsychiatric medical care. Id.
123. G. GROB, supra note 52, at 190-91 ("A significant proportion of the total institutionalized
population . . .were persons suffering from a variety of physical disabilities that also involved
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their ease of control, not their treatment needs.""4 The many patients milling
around the crowded wards received less treatment as their stays lengthened.12 5
Treatment, administered to groups of patients, consisted of irrelevancies such
as music therapy and a peonage system disguised as occupational therapy.1 26
After America passed through one world war and moved toward a second, the
state hospitals filled with those patients believed chronic and, increasingly, se-
nile. " ' As before the reforms, the state hospitals bulged at the seams with
patients. Meanwhile, construction of new hospitals crawled, and the new psy-
chopathic hospitals essentially never began. 128
The other side of the overcrowding equation, insufficient staffing, contrib-
uted to the continued decline of the state hospitals. The American Psychiatric
Association ("APA") issued standards that required one psychiatrist for every
150 patients, which, assuming ten patients seen per psychiatrist each day, re-
sulted in patient-psychiatrist contact once every three weeks. 2 ' Yet, few insti-
tutions met even that standard. During the period from 1900 to 1940, the
average physician to patient ratio was 1:250, with several institutions obviously
faring much worse.130 Turnover, low salaries, and poor working conditions
meant poorly qualified staff which, in turn, resulted in a custodial facility.'
Efficiency in managing the custody of troubled human beings can require cru-
elty, and the state hospitals were, in that sense, efficient.12
Much of the Progressive program failed because of community opposition to
mental patients in the neighborhoods. 38 These communities rejected the com-
munity treatment alternative because they apparently believed the Progres-
sives were going to protect them from physical and mental diseases by isola-
tion and cure, not by putting the patient next door."" The increasingly
powerful hospital superintendents also opposed the community treatment mea-
sures, insisting upon their share of staff and resources as well as patients.' s5
The state hospitals became even more formidable, as the alternatives failed,
and the state hospital bed count increased at five times the rate of growth in
the general population.'3
No realistic alternative to the state hospitals presented itself as the domi-
behavioral symptoms."); D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 338 ("What was relevant, what ...
determine[d] the responses of [the hospital] was the patient's behavior that very day, then and
there, in the institution.").
124. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 340; see G. GROB, supra note 52, at 191.
125. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 342.
126. Id. at 344-48.
127. Id. at 349; see G. GROB, supra note 52, at 180-82, 184, 197.
128. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 351.
129. Id. at 353.
130. Id.
131. G. GROB, supra note 52, at 199; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 353-55.
132. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 356.
133. G. GROB, supra note 52, at 180.
134. Merritt, supra note 81, at 4-5.
135. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 371.
136. Id. at 374.
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nant treatment for mental illness. The public accepted the continued domi-
nance of the state hospitals.
As before, the statistics on patient demography exhibited disturbing trends.
While the foreign-born patients' domination of the hospitals declined some-
what, fully one-third of the patients in 1920 were foreign-born-twice their
percentage of the national population. Further, most patients came from lower
economic classes.' Two world wars and the Depression had focused the at-
tention of Americans living outside the asylum walls on their own survival.
The state hospitals grew on their own without anyone to object and without a
therapeutic vision, only the necessity of some place to put the insane.
Once again, the courts embraced custody as the state hospital's governing
principle. One court explicitly added this purpose to the commitment statute:
"[A]lthough the word 'custody' is not mentioned in defining the purposes of
hospitals for the insane . . , it is common knowledge that one of the most
salient purposes of such institutions is custodial." '1 8 Interestingly, a Virginia
court insisted upon compliance with a statutory four-month limit on the dura-
tion of commitment to a private facility, since the purpose of such places was
to cure insanity.13 9 Still, the court accepted without comment the absence of
any such limit of commitment to a public mental hospital, "10 presumably be-
cause no such purpose defined the appropriate length of public commitment.
Security and protection, principles usually attendant to a custodial purpose,
became paramount once again. For example, in In re Harcourt,"' an appel-
late court affirmed a lower court commitment order even though the order
violated the state commitment statute. 42 The order premised confinement on
the finding that the lunatic "possibly" posed a danger to others." s The court
read the word "possibly" right out of the order because, "if allowed to remain
at large, he would, by reason of such mental condition, endanger life, person,
etc. or become a menace to the safety-of the public." 44
Consistent with the Progressives' lack of concern for procedural protections,
courts routinely followed the rule that "[1]unacy statutes should be liberally
construed to the effect that no insane person may be permitted at large if the
necessity of the case requires [that] they should be restrained. '" 5
137. Id. at 350-51. Many feared that foreign countries were dumping their insane on America's
shores, and so immigration restrictions resulted. G. GROB, supra note 52, at 168-71.
138. State ex rel. Bricker v. Griffith, 36 N.E.2d 489, 491, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 95, 97 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1941).
139. Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 924, 930, 172 S.E. 445, 447 (1934).
140. Id. at 929-30, 172 S.E. at 447.
141. 27 Cal. App. 642, 150 P. 1001 (1915).
142. Id. at 645-46, 150 P. at 1003 (the lower court's order stated that the insane party posed
only a possibility of danger to others, yet the appellate court conceded that the commitment
statute required more than a mere possibility of danger to others).
143. Id. at 645, 150 P. at 1003.
144. Id. at 646, 150 P. at 1003.
145. In re Cash, 313 I11. App. 281, 285, 40 N.E.2d 312, 313 (1942), affid, 383 Ill. 409, 50
N.E.2d 487 (1943), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cash v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 321 U.S. 747
(1944); see also Payne v. Arkebauer, 190 Ark. 614, 617-18, 80 S.W.2d 76, 77-78 (1935) (waiving
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On the other hand, the deteriorating conditions in the state hospitals did not
escape the courts' notice altogether. In a series of decisions, New York courts
entertained damages suits brought on behalf of confined patients harmed by
the dangerous environment of the state hospitals.14 6 The courts repeatedly crit-
icized the overcrowded conditions that resulted in poor attention from staff
and patient injuries. 147 The courts found no excuse in the drain of funds to
fight the Second World War." 8
Nonetheless, the courts did not attempt to reform the hospitals, although
they noted that "very little was done in the way of treatment for [patients']
mental condition," and they criticized the peonage system.149 Rather, in that
"age of enlightenment when humanitarian principles are supposed to govern
the State in its treatment of such unfortunates,"' 50 the courts defined the
state's duty solely in terms of "taking every reasonable precaution to protect
their patients from injury either self-inflicted or otherwise.""'
The courts shared the view of mental patients held by the rest of the coun-
try. Mental patients were "permanently insane"1 2 and "dangerous psychot-
ics"158 against whom the public was entitled to protection. 5 4 Given the atti-
tude of the nation's highest court toward the rights of the mentally ill, the
public obligation to protect hospital inmates from injury could scarcely expand
to include any duty to cure the insane.
During this period, the Supreme Court rendered the notorious decision of
Buck v. Bell.'55 In Buck v. Bell, Justice Holmes approved, almost enthusiasti-
the requirement that the lunatic be present during the commitment proceedings).
146. Luke v. State, 253 A.D. 783, 783-84, 1 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (1937); St. George v. State, 203
Misc. 340, 349-50, 118 N.Y.S.2d 596, 605 (Ct. Cl. 1953), rev'd, 283 A.D. 245, 127 N.Y.S.2d
147, rev'd, 308 N.Y. 681, 124 N.E.2d 320 (1954); Dowly v. State, 190 Misc. 16, 21, 68 N.Y.S.2d
573, 579 (Ct. Cl. 1947); Rossing v. State, 47 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (Ct. Cl. 1944); Shattuck v.
State, 166 Misc. 271, 273, 2 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (Ct. Cl.), affd, 254 A.D. 926, 5 N.Y.S.2d 812
(1938); Curley v. State, 148 Misc. 336, 338, 265 N.Y.S. 762, 764 (Ct. Cl. 1933). Just as false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution cases had dominated during the early Progressive era, so
these damage cases appeared as the most common context for court treatments of mental illness,
with the malicious prosecution and false imprisonment cases disappearing from the court digests.
147. Luke, 253 A.D. at 784, 1 N.Y.S.2d at 20; St. George, 203 Misc. at 349-50, 118 N.Y.S.2d
at 605; Dowly, 190 Misc. at 21, 68 N.Y.S.2d at 579; Rossing, 47 N.Y.S.2d at 263; Curley, 148
Misc. at 338, 265 N.Y.S. at 764.
148. E.g., Dowly v. State, 190 Misc. 16, 21, 68 N.Y.S.2d 573, 579 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
149. Shattuck v. State, 166 Misc. 271, 272, 2 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (Ct. CI.), afl'd, 254 A.D. 926,
5 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1938).
150. Id. at 272, 2 N.Y.S.2d at 354.
151. Id. at 273, 2 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
152. Luke v. State, 253 A.D. 783, 783, 1 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (1937) (referring to patients as
"permanently insane").
153. St. George v. State, 203 Misc. 340, 349, 118 N.Y.S.2d 596, 604 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (referring
to patients as "dangerous psychotics"), rev'd, 283 A.D. 245, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147, rev'd, 308 N.Y.
681, 124 N.E.2d 320 (1954).
154. Id. (speaking of the remission of illness, not recovery).
155. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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cally, the sterilization of "mental defectives." 156 Holmes claimed that "experi-
ence has shown that heredity plays an important part in the transmission of
insanity, imbecility, [etc.] ' '16 7 Invoking the doctrine of parens patriae,1 "1
Holmes held that society may sterilize those declared "manifestly unfit .. .
who already sap the strength of the State" 1 9 to prevent them from "continu-
ing their kind."1 60 The eugenic purpose of the state hospital included by the
Progressives in their package of reforms, 61 had taken its next logical step.
Society would eliminate insanity by eliminating the mentally ill. 62
F. Postwar America and the Third Reform: The Social Wrong to be
Righted
The state hospitals felt the effects of the Depression right along with the
rest of the country. Even before pressure for a new reform movement could
build, the state hospitals contemplated releasing patients to reduce operating
costs. " However, the reform did not define and implement itself until the end
of the Second World War. Psychiatrists returning to civilian life began their
practice and research in the post-war atmosphere of optimism and belief in the
power of technology. New therapeutic techniques were available, such as hyp-
nosis, drugs, and shock therapy.16 4 With the introduction of antipsychotic
medications, psychiatrists believed that mental illness could be cured outside
the state hospitals, and that the mentally ill could remain within the commu-
nity and have their symptoms controlled by medication. 66
While these psychiatrists found new support for their belief in science, they
emphasized the need for psychiatry to move "beyond its traditional one-to-one
156. Id. at 207.
157. Id. at 206.
158. See supra note 12.
159. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207.
160. Id. Justice Holmes stated:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens
for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the
strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices . . .in order to prevent our being
swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, soci-
ety can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind .... Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.
Id.
161. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 320-23.
162. Once again, these more extreme measures to deal with obstinate insanity parallel the more
aggressive government intervention to defeat disease generally. Merritt, supra note 81, at 6.
163. See Goldman & Morrissey, The Alchemy of Mental Health Policy: Homelessness and the
Fourth Cycle of Reform, 75 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 727, 728 (1985).
164. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 22, at 479-80, 497-502. The postwar era saw a renewal in the
popular belief in science and support for public financing of science. P. STARR. supra note 25, at
340.
165. National Institute of Mental Health Psychopharmacology Service Center, Phenothiazine
Treatment in Acute Schizophrenia, 10 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 246, 256 (1964); Goldman &
Morrissey supra note 163, at 728.
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therapy and its emphasis on individual adjustment"'166 left over from the
mental hygiene movement. They believed psychiatry ought to "concern itself
with large numbers of people and with the social conditions around them. 1 67
The reformers identified institutions as one of the causes of mental illness in
those confined in the institutions for extended periods of time.1 68 Popular ex-
pos6s and professional critiques convinced the public and the psychiatrists that
the state hospitals, once asylums and now snake pits,168 had to go. 170 Some
state hospitals implemented crisis intervention programs and aftercare service
to prevent initial commitment and to plan for the release of those commit-
ted.171 Yet, many psychiatrists were skeptical of the ability and motivation of
state hospital administrations to reform themselves.172
These community mental health reformers pressed for an end to institution-
alization and a new age of treatment in the community. The Joint Commission
on Mental Illness and Health published its report in 1961, Action for Mental
Health, which argued for federal leadership and financial support for mental
health reform.1 73 As part of the effort to get the country moving again to meet
the challenge of the post-war era, President Kennedy expressed the New Fron-
tier's technological optimism that "a concerted attack on mental disorder is
now both possible and practical."1 74
The flagship of this new community mental health movement was the Com-
munity Mental Health Centers Act 5 passed by Congress and signed by an
enthusiastic President Kennedy in 1963." The federal initiative defined five
essentials for a reform program: inpatient services, outpatient services, partial
hospitalization, emergency intervention, and consultation/education services.
These proposals were all designed to be integrated along a continuum of
care. 177 The acutely and the chronically mentally ill would all find treatment
somewhere in this continuum; each patient would be treated according to his
or her individual need, moving toward recovery and a full life as a member of
the community.
166. Musto, Whatever Happened to Community Mental Health?. 39 PuB. INTEREST 53, 54
(1975).
167. Id.
168. Goldman & Morrissey, supra note 163, at 728.
169. The term "snake pit" refers to the title of a popular novel of the time. P. STARR, supra
note 25, at 345 (discussing M. WARD, THE SNAKE PIT (1946)); see also Goldman & Morrissey,
supra note 163, at 728 (describing state mental hospitals as "snake pits").
170. Goldman & Morrissey, supra note 163, at 728.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.; Musto, supra note 166, at 61-62.
174. Musto, supra note 166, at 65 (quoting President Kennedy's message to Congress on Feb.
5, 1963). This technological optimism was true of reforms in health care generally. P. STARR,
supra note 25, at 367-69.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2689 (1976), repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.
97-35, § 902(e)(2)(B), 95 Stat. 560 (1981).
176. Goldman & Morrissey, supra note 163, at 728.
177. Id.
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. In the years right after the Community Mental Health Centers Act, a range
of problems connected to deviancy-poverty, crime, and delinquency-were
believed to be rooted in unjust social conditions such as discrimination and
inequality. 17  The resulting War on Poverty 17 9 followed the lead of the Com-
munity Mental Health Centers Act in acknowledging the primary role to be
played by the federal government in correcting those injustices.180
Predictably, the courts took note of the shift in attitude toward mental ill-
ness. Protection and safety were joined by a third institutional objective, the
once familiar purpose of curing mental illness:
The state has frequently been held liable for the consequences of its
breach of duty to protect others from the acts of the mentally ill confined to
State institutions. In such cases, where the confinement is not in the nature
of punishment, but rather of restraint and, where possible, cure, there is
both a duty to the inmate to provide him with reasonable rehabilitational
conditions under the circumstances and to the outside public to restrain the
dangerous, or potentially dangerous, so that they may not harm others.181
In the long series of damages cases brought on behalf of mental patients in-
jured in New York state hospitals, the court enunciated the "policy of the
State to care for and protect mentally ill persons and, if possible, to cure them
of disease." ' 2 This line of cases did not cite the many cases decided during
the 1930s which spoke only of the obligation to protect from injury. Rather,
they skipped over those to the earlier Progressive era decision in Sporza v.
German Savings Bank,1 83 which dealt with a different problem but proclaimed
178. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 35-38 (1967).
179. The War on Poverty began in 1964 when President Johnson signed the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act of 1964 for the purpose of eliminating poverty in the inner-cities. Ferman, Foreword to
385 ANNALS ix. (1969) (The entire volume, titled Evaluating the War on Poverty, is devoted to
the War on Poverty.). The Economic Opportunity Act provided $350 million to community action
programs. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD. REGULATING THE POOR 257 (1971). These programs "would
'call on all resources available to the community-Federal and state, local and private, human and
material' to strike at poverty at its source, in the streets of the cities." Id. (quoting President
Johnson). Other programs were developed in the 1960s to supplement existing welfare legislation.
Ferman, supra, at ix. One commentator called the War on Poverty "creative federalism" because
it relied on the joint efforts of federal and state governments to effectuate its purpose. Davidson,
The War on Poverty: Experiment in Federalism, 385 ANNALS 1, 2 (1969). The War on Poverty
grasped the news media's attention and became a major public issue. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD,
supra, at 258 n.7.
180. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RE-
TURNING THE MENTALLY DISABLED TO THE COMMUNITY: GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO DO MORE,
HRD-76-152, at 2, 4 (1977) (hereinafter COMPTROLLER]; Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and
Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 248-51 (1978).
181. Williams v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 554-55, 127 N.E.2d 545, 549 (1955) (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
182. People ex rel. Anonymous v. La Burt, 14 A.D.2d 560, 560, 218 N.Y.S.2d 738, 739
(1961); accord Anonymous v. State, 17 A.D.2d 495, 497, 236 N.Y.S.2d 88, 90 (1963).
183. 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (1908).
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that the state had an objective of curing insanity.184
Only fifteen years earlier, the Illinois Supreme Court decided In re Cash. 8'
Like other decisions of its time, Cash broadly interpreted commitment statutes
to guarantee that no insane person needing confinement failed to receive it. 186
In sharp contrast, the courts of the third reform movement insisted upon a
preferential option for liberty. The court in In re J.W. stated that "[e]ven the
mentally abnormal have the right to personal freedom . . . .Where the right
of liberty is involved, a reasonable doubt as to the applicability of the statute
to the facts presented should be resolved in favor of the subject." '187 Other
courts also selected a "reasonable doubt" standard.1 88 A decision by an Ohio
court declared that "one should be saved from restraint and incarceration with
the accompanying stigma until some basis for such drastic procedure is rea-
sonably apparent.""8 9 This opinion shared more with the 1899 Mississippi Su-
preme Court decision in Bacon v. Bacon,'90 and its worry over the stigma of
inappropriate institutionalization, than with more contemporary cases. Simi-
larly, another Ohio decision91' signaled the completion of the 180-degree turn
begun by the Jacksonians for whom the asylum was the treatment of first
resort. The court, in discussing the legislature's enactment of a commitment
statute, stated that "[t]he purpose and intent of the legislature in enacting this
Chapter was to make hospitalization of the mentally ill by court commitment
a difficult and complex procedure to be used only as a last resort when all
other means of getting the individual's illness treated have been exhausted."' '
Commitment procedures bore tough scrutiny by courts concerned about the
deprivation of individual rights.
The visible leadership role played by the federal government in enacting the
Community Mental Health Centers Act was reflected as well in the newly
active federal courts. The courts' new role was to protect federal constitutional
and statutory rights against state encroachment. 193 The civil rights move-
ment's invocation of the courts spread to the rights of prisoners. The next logi-
184. Id. at 19, 22, 84 N.E. at 410-11 (holding that an incompetent can waive a right to a jury
trial).
185. 313 Ill. App. 281, 40 N.E.2d 312 (1942), afd, 383 Ill. 409, 50 N.E.2d 487 (1943), ap-
peal dismissed sub nom. Cash v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 321 U.S. 747 (1944).
186. Id. at 285, 40 N.E.2d at 313.
187. In re J.W., 44 N.J. Super. 216, 226, 130 A.2d 64, 69 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), certification
denied, 24 N.J. 465, 132 A.2d 558 (1957).
188. See In re Pickles, 170 So. 2d 603, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) ("A person under
restraint of his liberty is entitled to liberation where reasonable doubt exists as to his mental
condition.").
189. State ex rel. Bles v. Merrick, 2 Ohio St. 2d 13, 16, 205 N.E.2d 924, 926 (1965).
190. 76 Miss. 458, 472-73, 24 So. 968, 971 (1899) (citing the stigma of institutionalization as a
justification for the plaintiff's damage award).
191. In re Leitner, 180 N.E.2d 438, 87 Ohio L. Abs. 467 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1961).
192. Id. at 439, 87 Ohio L. Abs. at 469 (expressing a preference for voluntary admission to the
hospital.).
193. See generally J. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1978) (discuss-
ing the attempts of social movements to use court action to achieve change).
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cal step was to protect the rights of those civilly confined.1 94 The law invoked
by the courts went beyond ancient doctrines of parens patriae, the provisions
of state statutes, or the policies of protection or treatment. The courts turned
to the Constitution.
The Supreme Court joined the reform movement by reviewing claims of
mentally ill individuals who were generally considered the more dangerous of
the mentally ill: addicts, criminal defendants, and convicted felons. In 1962,
the Supreme Court held that states may not, under the eighth amendment of
the Constitution, punish the status of narcotics addiction. 9 ' In dicta, the
Court extended this protection to mental illness as well. 196 Four years later,
the Court invalidated a commitment procedure for convicts on equal protec-
tion grounds, where the commitment procedure differed from that used for
civil commitment.197 Five years later, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote, for a
majority of the Court, that civil commitment of a sex offender was a "massive
curtailment of liberty."' 98 That same year, the Court forbade a state to com-
mit indefinitely someone initially confined for an evaluation of the person's
competency to stand trial:
[The individual] was not afforded any "formal commitment proceedings ad-
dressed to [his] ability to function in society," or to society's interest in his
restraint, or to the State's ability to aid him in attaining competency
through custodial care or compulsory treatment, the ostensible purpose of
the commitment. At the least, due process requires that the nature and du-
ration of commitment bear some reasonable relationship to the purpose for
which the individual is committed.' 99
By 1975, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutional liberty interests of
one civilly committed as a mental patient, not as a criminal defendant. In
O'Connor v. Donaldson,20" Chief Justice Burger noted the emptiness of the
milieu therapy provided in the state hospital: "a simple regime of enforced
custodial care, not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed ill-
ness." 0' 1 Nonetheless, Burger sidestepped the difficult right-to-treatment is-
sues. In so doing, he expressed the rights of the mental patient in terms appli-
cable to all members of society: "As we view it, this case raises a single,
relatively simple, but nonetheless important question concerning every man's
194. The first federal courts to consider the constitutional rights of the mentally handicapped,
in protecting the educational rights of mentally retarded children, cited the equal protection anal-
ysis of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as precedent. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348
F. Supp. 866, 874-75 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,
343 F. Supp. 279, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
195. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
196. Id. ("It is unlikely that any state at this moment in history would attempt to make it a
criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill.").
197. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114-15 (1966).
198. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
199. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
200. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
201. Id. at 569.
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constitutional right to liberty.1202
Burger rejected both the state commitment statute and the committing
court's initial order as justifications for the patient's commitment.2 03  The
Court also rejected anything implicit in the concept of mental illness that
would justify the indefinite commitment of a patient:
May the State confine the mentally ill merely to ensure them a living
standard superior to that they enjoy in the private community? That the
State has a proper interest in providing care and assistance to the unfortu-
nate goes without saying. But the mere presence of mental illness does not
disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of an institu-
tion. Moreover, while the State may arguably confine a person to save him
from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising
the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their
own or with the help of family or friends.20,
Burger limited his opinion by finding only that a state could not hold "without
more, a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom
by himself' 20 5 or with the help of his family and friends. Still, Donaldson
represented the Supreme Court's acceptance of the lessons of the third re-
form-integration into the community and the irrelevance of the asylum-and
the reform's metaphor of social justice.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the federal courts actively intervened in the
state mental health systems. The courts required strict observance of proce-
dural due process before commitment.20 6 They also enacted complex standards
for the treatment of those committed.20 7 On the other side of that issue, a few
federal courts found a right to refuse unwanted treatment, such as psycho-
tropic medication.20
8
The state courts followed the federal lead, requiring proof of dangerousness
202. Id. at 573.
203. Id. at 574.
204. Id. at 575 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960)).
205. Id. at 576.
206. Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1086 (1st Cir. 1973) (requiring right to counsel);
Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968) (same); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F.
Supp. 1113, 1127 (D. Haw. 1976) (requiring notice of commitment proceedings and the proce-
dural rights available); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (requiring
adequate hearings before commitment), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
207. Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1219 (E.D. La. 1976) (determining that the
proper standard varies with each child based on the child's own attributes and needs); Welsch v.
Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 491 (D. Minn. 1974) ("Whether such commitment gives rise to a con-
stitutional right to treatment is a difficult question, involving complex legal, medical, and 'politi-
cal' considerations."); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (ordering
mental health facility to establish a committee that would oversee the treatment procedures of the
facility).
208. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 843 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on
remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); see
Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding right to refuse succinylcholine
which is a "breath-stopping and paralyzing 'fright drug' ").
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prior to commitment 0 9 and periodic judicial review to determine the necessity
of continued confinem.ent. 10 Significantly, the courts began applying the less
restrictive alternative principle2" to the civil commitment process. This princi-
ple demanded that courts determine prior to permitting commitment that
there were no alternatives in the community which would serve the state's
purposes of treating the patient. 12
These litigated reforms culminated in the fateful decision, Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School and Hospital (Pennhurst 1).218 Pennhurst I dealt with
the rights of the mentally retarded and attacked institutionalization itself. The
federal district court in Pennhurst I ordered the phase out of the institution
and the placement of its mentally retarded residents back in the community."
Other courts have also ordered state mental health departments to develop
community alternatives to institutions.2 15
G. The Failure to be Dumped: The Failure of the Third Reform
The reality, since nearer in history, is familiar. Since the 1960s, the "dump-
ing" of mental patients back into the community has drawn criticism from all
quarters, including psychiatrists 16 and the popular press.2 17
At first blush, the numbers cannot fail to impress. In the thirty-year period
following 1950, the state hospital census dropped by seventy-five percent, from
over half a million to less than 140,000 nationally.2 18 Outpatient services in-
creased significantly.2 19 More than 700 community mental health centers were
209. E.g., People v. Sansone, 18 I1. App. 3d 315, 323, 309 N.E.2d 733, 739 (1974).
210. E.g., Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473, 476-77, 378 A.2d 553, 555 (1977).
211. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 489 (1960).
212. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1965);
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
213. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd in part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.
1979) (en banc) (the appellate court substantially affirmed on the merits), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1
(1981).
214. Id. at 1326. The court was critical of institutionalization itself. Id. at 1313.
215. E.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 500 (D. Minn. 1974). The court stated:
These cases demonstrate the widespread acceptance by the courts of a constitu-
tional duty on the part of State officials to explore and provide the least stringent
practicable alternatives to confinement of noncriminals. As applied to involuntary civil
commitment these options [range] from placement of the committed person in the
custody of a friend or relative to disposition within a private facility.
Id. (citing Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 386 (M.D. Ala. 1972)).
216. Bassuk & Gerson, Deinstitutionalization and Mental Health Services. 238 Sci. AM., Feb.
1978, at 46, 49 ("[C]hronic patients are being discharged to a lonely existence in hostile commu-
nities without adequate care.").
217. Koenig, The Problem That Can't Be Tranquilized. 40,000 Mental Patients Dumped in
City Neighborhoods, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1978, § 6 (Magazine), at 14, 17.
218. Goldman & Morrissey, supra note 163, at 728; see also Musto, supra note 166, at 69
(average census dropped from 557,000 in 1957- to 249,000 in 1973).
219. Goldman & Morrissey, supra note 163, at 728.
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developed."'
However, there are other, less appealing, statistics. Over this same period,
700,000 chronically mentally ill persons took up long-term residence in nurs-
ing homes.2"1 A "revolving door" phenomenon doubled the number of annual
admissions to state hospitals. 2 2 Only half of.the planned community mental
health centers were funded.22  Those mental health centers that were estab-
lished found future funding uncertain.2 24
The new services available in the community tended to serve those already
living in the community and in need of counseling or occasional acute care; the
chronically mentally ill found their needs unmet. 25 The "continuum" of ser-
vices was fragmented and poorly managed, in part because the services oper-
ated without any coordination with the state hospitals.2 6
Although there is ample evidence that a carefully constructed community
care program can successfully treat the mentally ill,2 27 well-run programs were
not available to the vast majority of released patients. 228 One psychiatrist de-
scribed one view of deinstitutionalization visible to the rest of the community:
"Patients often live under conditions of minimum supervision and poor drug
management, so that they often may be over-drugged, heavily sedated, stupor-
ous, or dulled. Their limited ability for social interaction means they often
wander the streets or sit aimlessly looking at television. ' 2 9 Exacerbating the
problem, communities in which the mental patients found themselves did not
welcome them.230
The antipsychotic wonder drugs also failed to deliver on their original prom-
ise. While some drugs demonstrated utility in controlling the symptoms of
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Musto, supra note 166, at 70 (annual admissions rose from 200,000 in 1956 to 400,000 in
1972).
223. COMPTROLLER, supra note 180, at 68.
224. Id. at 75; Goldman & Morrissey, supra note 163, at 728 (Mental "[i]nstitutions ... were
a major item in state budgets."); Musto, supra note 166, at 71 (as of September of 1974, 591
centers had been funded, and 443 were actually operating).
225. COMPTROLLER, supra note 180, at 69.
226. Id. at 23-25, 72.
227. Braun, Kochansky, Shapiro, Greenberg, Gudeman, Johnson & Shore, Overview: Deinstitu-
tionalization of Psychiatric Patients, A Critical Review of Outcome Studies, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 736, 747 (1981) [hereinafter Braun]; Searight & Handal, Psychiatric Deinstitutionalization
and Social Policy: Implications for Adult Foster Care, 1 ADULT FOSTER CARE J. 7, 7 (1987);
Searight & Handal, Psychiatric Deinstitutionalization: The Possibilities and the Reality, 58 Psy-
CHIATRIC Q. 153, 153 (1986).
228. COMPTROLLER. supra note 180, at 68.
229. Klerman, Better but not Well: Social and Ethical Issues in the Deinstitutionalization of
the Mentally Ill, 3 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 617, 628 (1977).
230. Most employers would refuse to hire any ex-patients, except for undesirable jobs. Farina,
Felner & Boudreau, Reactions of Workers to Male and Female Mental Patient Job Applicants,
41 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 363, 370-71 (1972); Olshawsky, Grob & Malamud,
Employers' Attitudes and Practices in Hiring of Ex-Mental Patients, 42 MENTAL HYGIENE 391,
393-94 (1958).
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schizophrenia,231 the profession remained uncertain as to which drug to pre-
scribe for which symptoms and in which dosage.2 3 2 Also, harmful and perma-
nent effects resulting from prolonged use of antipsychotic drugs, such as invol-
untary muscle movements of tardive dyskinesia, became evident.
2 33
Perhaps more disturbing, psychiatrists publicly challenged the authoritative-
ness of their own science. Thomas Szasz, the most controversial of the anti-
psychiatry psychiatrists, posed the critical question and supplied the notorious
answer: "Let us launch our inquiry by asking, somewhat rhetorically, whether
there is such a thing as mental illness. My reply is that there is not."123 4 In any
event, psychiatry failed to have any observable effect on reducing the rising
social unrest in the country. This failure cast doubt on the previously made
argument that social conditions and mental illness were related. 85 This crisis
of confidence was not confined to psychiatry, but undercut the medical profes-
sion generally.ase
As one might expect, the state hospitals did not disappear. For all the move-
ment of patients back into the community, the new community mental health
centers had little impact on institutional populations. 23 7 Even before the Com-
munity Mental Health Centers Act, the hospitals began lowering their popula-
231. National Institute of Mental Health Psychopharmacology Service Center, supra note 165,
at 253.
232. E.g., Davis & Bethesda, Efficacy of Tranquilizing and Antidepressant Drugs, 13
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 552, 561-62 (1965); Hollister, Clinical Use of Psychotherapeutic
Drugs: Current Status, 10 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 170, 171-72 (1969)
("The old adage that the lack of single effective treatment encourages multiple treatments is no-
where more evident."); National Institute of Mental Psychopharmacology Research Branch Col-
laborative Study Group, Differences in Clinical Effects of Three Phenothiazines in "Acute"
Schizophrenia, 28 DISEASES & NERVOUS SYSTEM 369, 381 (1967).
233. See Gardos & Cole, Overview: Public Health Issues in Tardive Dyskinesia, 137 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 776, 777-79 (1980) (summarizing medical literature on Tardive Dyskinesia); Opler,
Katz, Kobayashi & Ruiz, Tardive Dyskinesia and Institutional Practice: Current Issues and
Guidelines, 31 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 239, 240 (1980) (same).
234. T. SZASz. LAW. LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 11 (1963). The author argues that the notion
of mental illness is a myth. Id. at 16-17. He calls mental illness a metaphor, which mistakenly has
been treated as a fact. Id. at 17.
We call people physically ill when their body-functioning violates certain anatomical
and physiological norms; similarly, we call people mentally ill when their personal
conduct violates certain ethical, political, and social norms. This explains why many
historical figures, from Jesus to Castro, and from Job to Hitler, have been diagnosed
as suffering from this or that psychiatric malady.
Id.; see also Temerlin & Trousdale, The Social Psychology of Clinical Diagnosis, 6 PSYCHO-
THERAPY: THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 24, 28-29 (1969) (agreeing with Szasz that "psychiatric diagno-
sis is a process of labeling social behavior").
235. Musto, supra note 166, at 71. Conservative critics lambasted the social welfare programs
"embodying the arrogance of social engineering by euphoric experts." Id. at 55. Radicals attacked
psychiatry as repressive of those exercising a right to be different. P. STARR, supra note 25, at 409
("Radicals ...charged that ...medical care ...was basically a form of social control.").
236. P. STARR, supra note 25, at 378 (describing the lack of cohesiveness of the medical
profession).
237. COMPTROLLER, supra note 180, at 69.
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tion counts for their own purposes." 8 The development of the community
mental health centers did not mean that the state hospitals were used less28 9
and, in fact, admissions for inpatient confinement increased substantially after
1950, even though the total population on any given day dropped.240
The courts eventually stepped back from their initial commitment to reform.
As part of a larger tendency for the federal courts to slow their judicial activ-
ism, 24 1 courts considering claims of mental patients constructed procedural
barriers to institutional reform. The most notable example was the second Su-
preme Court decision in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman
(Pennhurst II),242 which overturned decades of precedent by reinterpreting the
eleventh amendment.
The Supreme Court also called a halt to further reform of civil commitment
procedures. In Addington v. Texas,243 the Court refused to demand proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt to support a commitment order.2 4  The Court found
sufficient basis to commit in proof that was clear and convincing. 24 The Court
based its decision, in part, upon the inability of psychiatry to diagnose with
certainty. 6 This uncertainty could not satisfy a reasonable doubt standard.14
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger identified the issues un-
derlying the civil commitment process:
The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in provid-
ing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care
for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect
the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally
ill.248
Burger did not even mention the word "cure." On the contrary, Burger wrote
of the unrestrained mental patient: "One who is suffering from a debilitating
mental illness and in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of
stigma. 249
In other decisions, the Supreme Court declined to review the merits of the
right-to-refuse-treatment cases, but did imply some reservations about the via-
238. Id.; Goldman & Morrissey, supra note 163, at 728.
239. Goldman & Morrissey, supra note 163, at 728.
240. Id.; Musto, supra note 166, at 70.
241. See C. BULLOCK III & C. LAMB, IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 49-50, 61,
157 (1984) (describing the Supreme Court's lack of judicial activism when implementing civil
rights policies).
242. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
243. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
244. Id. at 427-31.
245. Id. at 431-32.
246. Id. at 430.
247. Id. at 429.
248. Id. at 426.
249. Id. at 429 (citing Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill,
133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 496, 498 (1976); Schwartz, Myers & Astrachan, Psychiatric Labelling
and the Rehabilitation of the Mental Patient, 31 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 329, 334 (1974)).
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bility of the right.25 The Supreme Court also sent a subtle message to the
lower courts that the less restrictive alternative principle" 1 had no place in
mental health law; the court dismissed for want of a federal question a case
posing that very issue.2 52 The lower federal courts got the message.2 5 Some
federal courts did find the less restrictive alternative test applicable to the
mental health context;25' nonetheless, unlike earlier cases which ordered the
development of new alternatives to the institution,255 those courts limited the
remedy to placement in whatever alternatives already existed. 5 6
Courts ruling on the commitment of individuals to the institutions also re-
treated from the previous preference for the community over the asylum. A
recent and famous case arising from the New York City policy of confining
"street people" serves as an apt example. After the trial court considered the
conflicting testimony about the involuntary hospitalization of Billie Boggs, it
ordered her released. 5 7 The appellate court read the same evidence but con-
cluded as follows:
In summary, less than two years ago, Ms. Boggs was a productive mem-
ber of society, who had a continuous work history of almost a decade, in
which she had been employed in responsible positions . . . . [B]esides a job,
she had a home and a family; however, in 1985, she suffered a "severe psy-
chosis," which resulted in her admission to East Orange, where, inter alia,
she was placed in four-point restraints, and treated with large doses of
Thorazine; thereafter, we find the clear and convincing evidence indicates
that, while living in the streets for the past year, Ms. Boggs' mental condi-
tion has deteriorated to the point where she was in danger of doing serious
harm to herself, when . . . she was involuntarily admitted to respondent
Bellevue for treatment .... "58
250. Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982) (directing reconsideration in light of Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)), vacating 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
251. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
252. Sanchez v. New Mexico, 396 U.S. 276 (1970) (per curiam).
253. E.g., Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1251 (5th Cir. 1987) (concluding that "the fed-
eral constitution does not confer on these [mentally ill patients] a right to habilitation in the least
restrictive environment"); Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239,
1249 (2d Cir. 1984) (after Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), the focus is not on the
"least restrictive environment," but rather on the community center's professional judgment); As-
sociation for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 486 (D.N.D. 1982) (recognizing that
after Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), patients no longer have a constitutional right to
the least restrictive method of care).
254. Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216-17 (E.D. La. 1976).
255. See supra notes 213-15.
256. Gary W., 437 F. Supp. at 1217-18.
257. In re Boggs, 136 Misc. 2d 1082, 1091, 522 N.Y.S.2d 407, 413 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd sub nom.
Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1987),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Anonymous v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 70 N.Y.2d
972, 520 N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988).
258. Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 366, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71,
87 (1987), appeal dismissed sub nom. Anonymous v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 70
N.Y.2d 972, 520 N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988).
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The decision does not mention the word or concept "cure," either in the hospi-
tal or in the community. Boggs was committed,6 9 not because the hospital
could treat her or because community treatment had failed, but because the
court believed it had no alternative but to commit her.260
II. ON THE BRINK OF THE FOURTH REFORM
A. The Unlikely Reform: Community Support
Some quarters of psychiatry propose a new reform of.mental health policy.
This group diagnoses the problem of deinstitutionalization as the failure to
provide community support." 1 The so-called "Community Support Move-
ment" would offer a range of supportive services, including housing, employ-
ment, social services, and case management to the deinstitutionalized popula-
tion receiving outpatient psychiatric services. 62 These reformers build upon
the conclusions of a successful pilot project of the National Institute of Mental
Health.262 Indeed, such projects have produced persuasive evidence that the
deinstitutionalized mental patient can survive in the community with adequate
support services.2 ' In addition, these reformers attempt to learn the lessons of
past failures, by focusing on the usually ignored chronically ill.2 6 5
Without the perspective of time, these reformers understandably feel uncer-
tain of the true nature of their proposals.
In some respects, the community support movement has been only a mid-
course correction in the community mental health movement, an administra-
tive fix for the problems of deinstitutionalization. However, the community
support movement may be viewed as a fourth cycle of reform in that it
advocates a new approach to treatment, in this case, a whole system of
care.
26 6
Perhaps they have learned the most important lesson, missed by their prede-
cessors: the folly of using mental health policy as a device to resolve other
social problems.2 6 7
259. Id.
260. Id. at 365-66, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 86-87.
261. Goldman & Morrissey, supra note 163, at 729.
262. Turner & TenHoor, The NIMH Community Support Program: Pilot Approach to a
Needed Social Reform, 4 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 319, 338 (1978).
263. Id.
264. See Searight & Handal, Psychiatric Deinstitutionalization: The Possibilities and the Re-
ality, 58 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 153, 153 (1986) ("There is a substantial research data base which
indicates that the majority of the chronically mentally ill can function outside of institutional
settings.").
265. Goldman & Morrissey, supra note 163, at 729.
266. Id. (citation omitted).
267. The Jacksonians developed the asylum to help save the country from disorder, first by
creating a utopia, later by controlling the Irish and the dangerously lunatic poor. See supra text
accompanying notes 25-79. The Progressives introduced civic medicine to eliminate mental illness
partially as a response to the popular fear of its growth through reproduction and immigration.
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In a sense, the advocates of community suports [sic] have recognized that
the problem of chronic mental illness is first and foremost a social welfare
problem. They do not recommend mental health solutions to social
problems; instead, they propose social welfare solutions to mental health
problems. A community support system includes health and mental health
services but also recognizes entitlement programs, income supports, trans-
portation, and housing as critical elements.268
However, the truth of this lesson will help deliver this reform stillborn. To
succeed, in the sense of proposals adopted and implemented, a reform requires
certain preconditions. One of those preconditions is a popular perception that
mental health policy reform necessarily furthers the solution of some other
problem. The preceding history of reform demonstrates that in the competition
for scarce space on the public's agenda and for scarce public resources, the
mentally ill have not fared well. Other issues have dominated the popular
mind: independence from England, civil war, world war. Only when tied meta-
phorically to the preservation of public peace and order from various
threats-civilization, immigration, urbanization, the breakdown of race and
class barriers--do mental health reforms find support among the general pop-
ulation and the policymakers.
While homelessness looms as a social problem and much of the public main-
tains an image of the homeless as a group of discharged mental patients, the
public response to the homeless differs depending upon how the homeless are
defined, as families or as the mentally ill.26 9 And even to the extent that some
quarters of society consider homelessness a crisis, 70 no major reform in the
direction of community support is likely to emerge. A community support re-
form is unlikely for four principal reasons. First, the durability of the asylum
through all waves of reform means any proposal which undermines the status
and power of the institution will ultimately fail. 2 7 1 Second, the community
support reformers will not likely win popular support for a mere "administra-
See supra text accompanying notes 80-111. The Community Mental Health Movement, allied
with the War on Poverty, hoped to address social unrest through community mental health pro-
grams. See supra text accompanying notes 164-80.
268. Goldman & Morrissey, supra note 163, at 730.
269. Compare Economic Recovery Not Helping Urban Poor, Homeless, Survey Finds, Daily
Report for Executives (BNA), at L-2 (Dec. 19, 1986) (discussing a recent survey by the U.S.
Conference of Mayors which found increases in a portion of the homeless population consisting of
families) with Krauthammer, For the Homeless: Asylum, Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 1985, at A15, col. I
(stating that the "safety net" of social welfare and voluntary charity would be adequate if cities
were not overwhelmed by the mentally ill, and advocating that the mentally ill homeless should be
put in asylums if they cannot adequately care for themselves regardless of dangerousness to
others).
270. Appleby & Desai, Documenting the Relationship Between Homelessness and Psychiatric
Hospitalization. 36 Hose. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 732, 732-33 (1985).
271. Rothman argues that the fatal flaw in the Progressive reform package was the continued
existence of the asylum. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 82, at 373. For a similar history of correctional
reform, see Eastman, Triumph of the Prison: The True Limits of Prison Reform Litigation, 20 U.
TOL. L. REV. 69 (1988) (discussing literature on correction reform).
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tive fix," especially such a costly one.""2 Reformers achieved success, as mea-
sured in terms of proposals adopted and implemented, by crusading against
social evils, not administrative difficulties.
Third, the public resources needed to solve the problem of homelessness, or
even homelessness of the mentally ill, are not available, or at least, not per-
ceived to be available. The community support reformers recognize the diffi-
culty of advocating reform at a time when
[riecent fiscal policy and resource restraints have threatened the community
support reform movement: the repeal of the Mental Health Systems Act,
the termination of disability benefits to tens of thousands of mentally ill •
beneficiaries of [Supplemental Security Income and Social Security Disabil-
ity Income], and prospective payments systems that may increase admis-
sions to state mental hospitals have all compromised the care of the chronic
mentally ill in the community. In addition, the Community Support Pro-
gram, each year, struggles to maintain its appropriation. 173
Meanwhile, the budget deficit has surpassed most other social problems in the
minds of the populace and on the agendas of government. 7 4
Fourth, as subsequent sections of this Article will argue, the metaphor of
the time is a medical one, finding defect in the individual, without social impli-
cations. At such a time, a proposed reform which contradicts the prevailing
metaphor stands little chance of success.
B. The Preconditions for the Likely Fourth Reform
Trends in society and the response of government to social problems, psychi-
atry, and the courts and legal profession converge to form the preconditions
for a shift in mental health policy.
1. Society and Government
The wars against poverty, racism, and social injustice have worn weary on
the homefront, in other words, the middle class. American society lacks any
consensus on a commitment to remove social inequities . 7 This failure of con-
272. For the homeless mentally ill population in one community alone, St. Louis, the cost of a
comprehensive community service project approached one million dollars. MALCOLM BLISS
MENTAL HEALTH CENTER, ST. Louis STATE HOSPITAL & METRO COMPREHENSIVE MENTAL
HEALTH CENTER, A PROPOSAL TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY SERVICE PROGRAM
FOR THE SERIOUSLY AND CHRONICALLY MENTALLY ILL IN THE CITY OF ST. Louis (1987) (ab-
stract) (proposal submitted to the Mental Health Services Development Program of the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation).
273. Goldman & Morrissey, supra note 163, at 729 (citation omitted).
274. Rauch, The Invisible Issue, 18 NAT'L J. 2050, passim (1986); Voters Found Doubtful of
'86 Deficit Decline, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, § 1, Part 1, at 30, col. 1 (reporting that the
general public did not believe that the federal budget deficit would decline).
275. See Fear of Military Threats Plummets but Nation Worries About Japan: Most in U.S.
Favor Pentagon Cuts, Poll Finds, L.A. Times, Mar. 9, 1989, Part 1, at 18, col. 1 (describing
continual stalemate on important economic policy questions); Regan, Domenici Urge Curtailment
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sensus extends to health policy as well.276 The phenomenon of blaming the
victim, a much criticized corollary of some earlier government programs, re-
tains its power today.2 " An editor of the New Republic has blamed the failure
of the Reagan "safety net" on the homeless mentally ill: "Were our cities not
overwhelmed by the mentally ill, the traditional safety nets of social welfare
and voluntary charity would be adequate to handle the relatively small num-
ber of 'new poor' cases."2"8 A new social syndrome has emerged: the NIMBY
("Not In My Back Yard") syndrome. The syndrome reflects community oppo-
sition to residential facilities for the mentally ill and other groups, such as
paroled convicts.179
Cynical about the government's ability to solve social problems, Reagan era
governments, both state and federal, have turned to deregulation of social in-
justice by seeking answers in the marketplace.2 80 The privatization approach
includes selling housing projects to tenant-run management companies, issuing
housing vouchers instead of building publicly operated housing,281 and con-
tracting with profit-making corporations to run prisons. 82 Both major political
of Entitlements, Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 1981, § 1, at Al, col. 4 (discussing need to curtail welfare
programs to reduce budget deficit).
276. P. STARR, supra note 25, at 416. ("By the end of the 1970s, equal access to health care
was no longer a governing concern for those who governed.").
277. See generally W. RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM (1971) (discussing society's proclivity for
blaming the victims of societal problems instead of the conditions that exist in society itself).
For example, today's society points away from discrimination or economic conditions as a cause
of social injustice. Instead, society blames alleged deficiencies in the African-American family as
the cause of racial differences in economic prosperity and poverty. Id. at 63-85. See generally
Scapegoating the Black Family: A Special Issue, 249 NATION, July 24/31 1989 (discussing how
racial discrimination in America places the blame on African-American families for their pov-
erty). The War on Poverty was perceived as a frustrating failure to eradicate social injustice. In
this environment of frustration, Ronald Reagan could claim a mandate for his impressive assault
on the Great Society programs. See generally F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR
(1982) (discussing how the attempts by the upper class to eliminate state programs aiding the
poor have caused friction among the classes).
278. Krauthammer, supra note 269, at A15, col. 1.
279. English, Neighbors Fears Stall New Homes for Mentally Ill, Boston Globe, Apr. 11,
1989, (Metro/Region), at 22, col. 5; English, The NIMBY Syndrome, Boston Globe, Nov. 16,
1988, (Metro/Region), at 25, col. 1. See generally Salsich, Group Homes, Shelters and Congre-
gate Housing: De-institutionalization Policies and the NIMBY Syndrome, 21 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 413 (1986) (discussing the role of zoning in solving social tensions around the location of
group homes for deinstitutionalized mental patients).
280. Paul Starr explained society's attitude as follows:
Although the public did not exactly understand, much less endorse, the larger pro-
gram of reprivatization, much of the public-a majority in 1980-clearly shared a
general antipathy to government. Inflation gave arguments against deficit spending a
seemingly urgent rationale, and interventionist liberal social policies, such as affirma-
tive action and school busing for desegregation, had burned up much of the good will
[that] liberalism had inherited from the New Deal.
P. STARR, supra note 25, at 418.
281. Abolish HUD, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 21, 1989, at 7-8, col. 1.




parties seek remedies in the marketplace and heavily rely on privatization to
solve old social problems.2 8  Privatization has arrived in health policy as
well. 8' The Bush Administration's response to homelessness, aside from sup-
port for the patchwork of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance
Act, 285 to this point consists of calls for volunteerism from the private sector,
churches and charities.2 "8 The seemingly overwhelming budget deficit makes
new federal initiatives unlikely regardless of which major political party holds
power.2 87
If there is a climate for reform, it blows in this direction. Ronald Reagan
identified the popular belief that big government limited America's growth.
Far from a program of despair, his deregulation of American life promised a
brighter future. In a 1984 campaign speech, Mr. Reagan pronounced that
"[o]ur optimism has once again been turned loose. And all of us recognize
that those people who keep talking about limits are really talking about their
own limitations, not America's. ' 288 The theme of the Reagan administration
was that if the government cannot help resolve social problems, it should not
try. Such big government efforts pervert the natural order of things. If people
are limited (by whatever impediment, presumably including mental illness),
then those are the appropriate limits on social justice.
2. Psychiatry
Psychiatrists did not respond warmly to the due process revolution in the
law of mental health. Protecting the legal rights of mental patients limited and
impeded the exercise of the psychiatrists' professional judgment. "Rotting with
their rights on" became a popular slogan among psychiatrists.289 The slogan
reflected the psychiatrists' frustration with being forced to withhold treatment
that they deemed necessary, in order to respect the rights of patients to a
283. See Parties Reassess Role of Government in Prelude to '88 Vote, L.A. Times, Sept. 8,
1986, Part 1, at 16, col. 1 (citing various examples of successful privatization reforms).
284. P. STARR, supra note 25, at 417-20 (discussing the shift in burden of medical care from
the government to private individuals in the late 1970s).
285. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11301-11472 (West Supp. 1990).
286. Bush Sets Budget Talk with Congress; Senate, House Leaders Invited to Discuss Spend-
ing Cuts at White House Meeting, L.A. Times, Feb. 17, 1989, Part A, at 2, col. 5 (late final desk
ed.).
Today's address also stressed volunteerism in the private sector-one of Bush's pet
themes. "My friends, from now on in America any definition of a successful life must
include serving others," he said, "in a child-care center, in the corporate board room,
at the Rotary, at Little League, or a tutoring program, and in a church or
synagogue."
Id. (quoting President Bush).
287. Reagan Debt Legacy: His Trap for Democrats?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1988, § B, at 7, col.
1.
288. P. ERICKSON, REAGAN SPEAKS: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN MYTH 100 (1985) (quot-
ing a 1984 Ronald Reagan campaign speech).
289. Gutheil, In Search of True Freedom: Drug Refusal, Involuntary Medication, and "Rot-
ting With Your Rights On," 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 327, 327 (1980) (editorial).
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hearing before commitment and to refuse treatment.290 In the mid-1970s, the
APA proposed guidelines for a reformed civil commitment process. The guide-
lines would relax the rigor with which courts guarded a patient's legal rights
at the expense of treatment.2 1 Several states adopted the guidelines, at least
in part. 22
Despite the iconoclastic opinions of psychiatrists such as Thomas Szasz,"
most psychiatrists still regard mental illness as a medical problem, not simply
as a behavioral adjustment or social justice issue. Research continues to search
for, and occasionally finds, tentative biological explanations for mental
illness.29 '
3. The Courts and the Legal Profession
The courts and the legal profession share the executive branch's frustration
with governmental efforts to solve social problems. The frustration of some
segments of the legal community stems from the apparent "success" of judi-
cial activism and its perceived negative consequences of "chilling" the deci-
sionmaking process of the other two branches of government.2 9 5 On the other
side of the issue, others feel the frustration of those who share the litigation's
objective, but see the lawsuits fall short of fulfilling them.29 6
The Supreme Court has also called for greater restraint by the courts as
they act as social engineers. This was evidenced most dramatically in the
prison litigation context. In Atiyeh v. Capps,2 7 a prison overcrowding case,
290. Id.
291. American Psychiatry Association, Guidelines for Legislation on the Psychiatric Hospitali-
zation of Adults, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 672 (1983).
292. See R. SIMON, supra note 73, at 176-77, 180-81.
293. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
294. For example, explanations for the cause of schizophrenia have identified the blood or the
brain's structure. Mesulam, Schizophrenia and the Brain, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 842, 842-43
(1990) (editorial) (concluding that at least some schizophrenics have abnormalities of the brain);
Wagemaker & Cade, The Use of Hemodialysis in Chronic Schizophrenia, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 684, 684-85 (1977) (noting the efficacy of hemodialysis in decreasing the symptoms of schizo-
phrenia). Contra Malek-Ahmadi, Davis, Sorkin & Callen, Effect of Hemodialysis on Hallucina-
tions, 73 S. MED. J. 520 (1980) (concluding that hemodialysis has no effect on decreasing the
symptoms of schizophrenia). Dr. Peele reports that the effect of hemodialysis remains to be con-
clusively proven. Peele, Report of the Speaker-Elect, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1348, 1351 (1986).
Still, the popular press has reported the positive finding. Pennisi, Complete Change of Blood is
Lifesaver for Some, L.A. Times, Apr. 21, 1985, Part 2, (Metro), at 9, col. I (adv. desk ed.).
295. Williamson, Judicial Activism: Section 1983 and Antitrust Liability Chills Decision
Making by State and Local Officials, 6 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 149, 149 (1983) ("When the
courts preempt [the legislature], accountability is lost-not only between the citizens and their
elected officials, but also between the federal government and the states, and the states and their
subdivisions. Whether intentional or not, this infringement has created an unhealthy imbalance in
our federal system.").
296. D. MONTI, A SEMBLANCE OF JUSTICE (1985) (chronicling the failures of school desegrega-
tion litigation).
297. 449 U.S. 1312 (1981).
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Justice Rehnquist wrote that "nobody promised them a rose garden. ' 298 From
affirming the power of the federal courts to draft broad remedies overhauling
unconstitutional prisons in 1978299 the Court shifted three years later to in-
structing the lower federal courts to defer to the discretion of prison officials in
general prison management questions.300 Tired of persistent demands for fed-
eral courts to reform prisons and other social institutions, the Court has also
formulated a variety of limitations on the reach of civil rights litigation.301
To fully appreciate how courts have intentionally limited their own reach,
the metaphors surrounding this phenomena deserve attention as well. Accord-
ing to one metaphor, the courts function as the independent arbiters of truth.
They fearlessly examine the facts and base their decision on the law.8 2 The
courts utilize a metaphor to define the scope of their concern: the marketplace
of individual actors, individuals contracting with and committing torts against
one another as individuals. These metaphors permit and even encourage the
cynical manipulation of doctrine and concealment of facts to further the social
and political agendas at the root of the metaphors.
A notorious historical example illustrates this point. In the midst of the last
century's rapid economic growth, particularly in the rail industry,302 the New
York Court of Appeals decided Ryan v. New York Central Railroad.04 The
court held a railroad, whose employees had negligently started a fire, liable
only to the owner of a razed home immediately adjacent to the railroad. The
court relieved the railroad of liability to the owners of neighboring homes also
destroyed by the spreading fire.303 The court invoked the accepted language of
causation in torts, drawing a bright line between the damages proximately
caused, the first house, and those more remote, the second house.306
Nonetheless, practically every contemporary court and scholar has rejected
the Ryan decision as a distortion of tort causation doctrine.307 The decision
298. Id. at 1315-16.
299. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1978).
300. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 361-62 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
301. See generally Eastman, Draining the Swamp: An Examination of Judicial and Congres-
sional Policies Designed to Limit Prisoner Litigation, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 61 (1988)
(describing the Supreme Court's various limitations on civil rights suits brought by prisoners).
302. Certainly, most in our profession claim a healthy skepticism about the metaphor. That
does not rob the metaphor of its significance. On the contrary, that we continue to use the meta-
phor, by invoking or critiquing it, demonstrates its continuing power. Even while we claim to see
past it, we still measure the reality we see by the metaphor.
303. In the years following the Depression of 1857, the railroad industry played a "crucial role"
in the development of the American economy. C. HESSION & H. SARDY, ASCENT TO AFFLUENCE,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 278 (1969). The postwar years, in particu-
lar, witnessed massive capital formation in manufacturing and in the railroads, as the rails knit
the country's economy together. Id. at 417, 436-37.
304. 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
305. Id. at 212-13.
306. Id. at 213.
307. Shearman and Redfield remarked that this decision had been "overruled everywhere else."
I T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 30 (4th ed. 1888);
see also 2 T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, supra, § 666 (listing cases in other states contrary to
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ignored not only doctrine but reality as well. Nothing in the case suggested
that anything stood in the way of the fire's spread from the first house to the
second house."08
This was not the first time a court made a mistake. But the reason for the
mistake matters more than the mistake itself. Not only have critics and de-
fenders of the decision agreed that the Ryan court decided the issues to fur-
ther the growth of capitalism, but the court itself explicitly admitted to this
agenda.800 As the Ryan court itself conceded, a contrary result "would . . .
Ryan). They reaffirmed the "true doctrine" as holding a defendant responsible for "even ex-
traordinary damage, if it is the result of his negligence, operating in a natural and continuous
sequence." I T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, supra, § 30. Cooley agreed that Ryan differed from
the law of most states in the union. 1 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 117-18 (3d
ed. 1906).
308. As Cooley also observed, the Ryan court's decision ignored the seemingly self-evident fact
that "[p]roximity of cause has no necessary connection with contiguity of space or nearness in
time." I T. COOLEY, supra note 307, at 118. However, Francis Wharton disagreed. Wharton
imagined the facts which might justify the bright line drawn by the Ryan court between one house
and another: "If a house is properly built, if it is properly watched, if a proper fire apparatus is in
operation, it can be prevented, when a fire approaches from a neighboring detached house, from
catching the fire." F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 150, at 125 (2d ed.
1878). In fairness to Wharton, he did not attribute these facts to the Ryan case, but did argue
that the railroad was properly relieved of liability since the fire had to travel a considerable dis-
tance and the causes of the spread were atmospheric conditions and the flammability of materials
in between the railroad and the plaintiff's home. Id. § 151, at 127-28.
Wharton earlier had written:
A locomotive engine. . . drops a spark on a mass of rubbish which the recklessness of
a wood-cutter has left on a field over which the railroad company has no control. The
fire thus kindled, under an unprecedently high wind, is whirled off some hundred feet,
and a frame building, partially built, and surrounded by shavings, on the outskirts of
a city, is consumed. From this building the fire readily passes to a block of houses
whose owners ultimately sue the railroad for the damages.
Wharton, The Liability of Railroad Companies for Causing Fires, I S.L. REv. 729, 743-44
(1878) [hereinafter Wharton, Liability of Railroad Companies]. Wharton and the Ryan court, in
essence, would blame the plaintiff or the plaintiff's neighbor nearer the railroad for the fire which
destroyed the plaintiff's home. The only real object between the two homes was a distortion of
doctrine.
309. Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210, 216 (1866). Wharton wrote that the ques-
tion of "[w]hether a railroad company is to be liable for all fires of which its locomotives are the
occasion, is a question . . . important to the industrial interests of the land. ... Wharton,
Liability of Railroad Companies, supra note 308, at 729. Wharton answered the question:
The very fact that when a suit for damages is brought, I [the owner of adjacent
property] am skipped over, and the rich corporation behind me is attacked, while it
assures me, if I am poor, a position of irresponsibility, increases the recklessness of
myself and other non-capitalists, and thus increases the risks by which the capitalist,
who is alone held liable, is beset.
Capital, by this process, is either destroyed, or is compelled to shrink from entering
into those large operations by which the trade of a nation is built up.
Id. at 730. Cooley, although unlike Wharton, a critic of Ryan, also noted the agenda promoted by
the court: "[T]he court [was] apparently[] more influenced in this decision by the fact that the
opposite doctrine 'would subject to a liability against which no prudence could guard, and to meet
which no private fortune would be adequate' than by a strict regard to the logic of cause and
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create a liability which would be the destruction of all civilized society. '810
While Ryan is considered bad law in every jurisdiction, 1 ' tort law still suc-
cumbs to the same tendency to draw tight little circles around a problem.
When courts circumscribe an issue, they exclude material facts and manipu-
late legal doctrine to maintain the tightness of the circle. For example, courts
faced with automobile accident claims draw that circle around the litigants.
Their analysis is limited to facts within that circle, despite the general ac-
knowledgement that factors other than the behavior of individual drivers sig-
nificantly affect the frequency and extent of highway injuries.8 12
Saying that another driver's negligence caused a driver's death on the high-
ways of this country is a little like saying Ahab died of defectively designed
harpoon ropes. Our culture and ideology may command that analysis, but we
should not pretend to rely upon the imperatives of law or logic.
effect." T. COOLEY, supra note 307, at 115-17 (quoting Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y.
210, 216 (1866)). A more recent author put it more bluntly:
The decision in Ryan is one of many in the period after 1840 limiting the liability
of the agents of economic growth, especially the railroad. Yet, the typical judicial
strategies for extending entrepreneurial immunity had rarely dealt so cynically with
the idea of causation. While virtually all judges and jurists of the nineteenth century
had also promoted limiting entrepreneurial liability, the Ryan decision nevertheless
remained an outcast through the entire period.
Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 208 (D. Kairys ed.
1982). Much of the material discussed in this section is derived from the Horwitz article.
310. Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210, 213 (1866).
311. See supra note 307.
312. These factors include vehicle design, highway construction, and emergency services availa-
bility. D. KLEIN & J. WALLER, CAUSATION, CULPABILITY AND DETERRENCE IN HIGHWAY
CRASHES 209-10 (1970) (U.S. Department of Transportation Automobile Insurance and Compen-
sation Study). Looked at even more broadly, a trier of fact might consider the policy decision to
allocate resources into a highway system for private automobiles rather than a mass transportation
system. Within that circle, causation and responsibility are analyzed with limited results possi-
ble-blaming one of the drivers. The court either ignores the other forces at play or takes them as
given, with no analysis.
A recent symposium on causation in the Chicago-Kent Law Review presents a collection of
scholarly and thoughtful articles on causation issues. All these articles, whether from a libertarian,
corrective justice, or other school of thought, limit the causal possibilities by virtue of their shared
ideology-the liberal marketplace of atomized actors and separable, if not isolated, events. Sym-
posium on Causation in the Law of Torts, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 397 (1987). Robert Cooter's
contribution to the symposium is telling. Cooter, Torts As the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An
Essay on Causation, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 523 (1987). He illustrates causation principles by the
familiar nursery rhyme: "for want of a nail, the shoe was lost" leading up to the fall of the
kingdom. For Cooter, the lost horseshoe nail is not a cause, but a background condition for the fall
of a kingdom. Id. at 528-29. Richard Wright's criticism of Cooter's treatment of the nursery
rhyme analogy is even more revealing since he rejects Cooter's dismissal of the shoe as a cause of
the kingdom's demise as "absurd" only because it is, in the nursery rhyme, a cause without which
the kingdom would still stand. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility:
Unscientific Formalism and False Semantics, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 553, 555 (1987). Only in an
atomized universe does such a dialogue make sense. If the kingdom fell, it certainly did so in
response to powerful social and economic forces. The nursery rhyme draws a series of little circles
to further a logic which ignores facts.
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More recently, frustration with the limitations of the litigation process has
led many legal reformers to propose and implement alternative dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms. Mediation, arbitration, and the like are examples of this
trend to remove disputes from the courtroom. These devices aim to resolve
disputes with greater efficiency, harmony, and informality. This "informaliza-
tion" of justice looks for a place to resolve problems outside of the courts.818
4. Tumblers Falling into Place: The Medical Metaphor
The body politic feels pressure at two points: the embarrassing and annoying
rash of homeless people on the streets, many of them mentally ill; and the
pinch of a massive federal deficit combined with a weariness of government
solutions. After flirtation with a variety of remedies, from the strange and
untested814 to the more familiar,8 15 society will likely choose a medical solu-
tion. If government will not solve these problems, then the private sector will
try. Psychiatry wants dominion over mental illness, and hints that it has the
technology to deal with it. Society is accepting that what we have already
labeled as "mental illness" is just that-an individual's "illness," purely and
simply. It is no longer the price of civilization, a corruption, or the product of
social injustice. It is a medical illness. Therefore, there is no justification for
withholding the appropriate treatment: medical treatment. And the courts,
once again, are joining the reform.
III. THE FOURTH REFORM: THE INDIVIDUAL ILLNESS TO BE TREATED
A. Privatization
The likely fourth reform of mental health policy will delegate responsibility
and authority to define and treat mental illness to the private sector. The
mental health profession will debate whether dealing with mental illness
means treatment and prevention or confinement and control. To be sure, state
and federal governments will still decide what kind of care they will subsidize
through Medicaid.816 And, certainly, state governments will continue to oper-
ate some mental institutions.81 7 Finally, the state courts may still enter orders
313. C. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 34 (1986); Greenwald, Dispute Resolution Through
Mediation-An Alternative to Adjudication, 64 A.B.A. J. 1250 (1978).
314. H.R.A. Urges Using Ships as Shelters, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1987, at 33, col. 4 ("The
Koch administration announced yesterday that it was seeking proposals for 'floating shelters for
homeless adults' to be built on surplus troop ships, ocean liners, oil rigs or barges and moored at
waterfront piers.").
315. Krauthammer, supra note 269, at A15, col. I (referring to the asylum).
316. The Medicaid scheme demands a "presumption in favor of the medical judgment of the
attending physician," in determining what treatments are medically necessary and, therefore,
must be covered by Medicaid. Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1989).
317. See supra note 271 (discussing the durability of the institution). See generally F. PIVEN &




committing people to institutions, public and private. 18 All the privatization
proposals of the past few years leave some role for government, principally a
limited financing responsibility. Mental health policy will not differ in this
regard.
New public institutions will not be built. 19 Private institutions will admit
those who can pay; the few public institutions, nursing homes,320 boarding
homes, and the homeless shelters operated by charities will admit the rest on a
first-come-first-housed basis. Some of those shelters, running on shoestring
budgets and offering no therapy, will resemble the private madhouses of eight-
eenth-century England. 2' Those reinstitutionalized in public institutions can
expect custodial care, but little else. 822 Housing vouchers are of little help to
those who need far more than a roof.
B. The Privatization Reform and the Courts
As for the courts, the reform is likely to drastically curtail their involvement
as well, although mental health cases will still undoubtedly appear in the di-
gests. The nature of the causes of action should reflect the reform, as history
has shown true for previous reform eras. As the Jacksonian era closed, most of
the mental health decisions were concerned with the allocation of financial
responsibility between local governments for the cost of treatment of residents
of one jurisdiction who were confined in another jurisdiction.823 During the
early Progressive era, the cases tackled other subject matters including false
318. State commitment laws cover private institutions as well as public ones. E.g., Mo. REV.
STAT. § 632.005(11) (1986 & Supp. 11 1990).
319.. This remains true even despite the arguments of a few that new, improved state hospitals
can succeed. Gralnick, Build a Better State Hospital. Deinstitutionalization Has Failed, 36
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 738, 740 (1985). Costs are a certain consideration against
reinstitutionalization. Aside from the initial construction expense, the operating costs of state hos-
pitals should exceed the average of $11,250 per resident of a mental hospital incurred in 1974.
COMPTROLLER, supra note 180, at 5.
320. Most studies estimate that one-half of the chronically mentally ill population of the United
States resides in public mental hospitals or private nursing homes. MISSOURI ASSOCIATION FOR
SOCIAL WELFARE TASK FORCE REPORT. THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL IN MISSOURI 11 (1988).
321. As Krauthammer describes these shelters:
Revolving door shelters are not the answer. The care they provide is haphazard. As a
rule, they are open only at night. Their staffs are rarely trained to deal with severe,
disabling illness. Medical, let alone psychiatric, problems go untended. And since the
guests are free to drift in and out, no one can keep track of their care anyway.
Krauthammer, supra note 269, at A15, col. 2. The more knowledgeable shelter providers agree
that they cannot meet the treatment needs of these clients. Lauriat & Whittey, Implementing the
Recommendations: The Shelter Context, 8 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION J. 25, 26, 30 (1985)
(part of a symposium issue responding to the Recommendations of the American Psychiatric As-
sociation's Task Force on the Homeless Mentally I11).
322. In his proposal, Krauthammer can only imagine the minimum level of care for the home-
less mentally ill: "The idea of asylum is to provide protection and care. In some historical periods
(in the 19th century, in particular) the asylum offered just that. It cannot be beyond our wit to
redesign humane custodial institutions." Krauthammer, supra note 269, at Al5, col. 3.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
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imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and mandamus actions seeking re-
lease. .' In the first half of this century, personal injury actions dominated the
digests. 25 The community mental health years witnessed a shift to appeals
from civil commitment decisions, and civil rights challenges to treatment and
conditions."2 6
We can expect a continued retreat by the federal courts from civil rights
claims.121 While the state courts may keep their doors open to a variety of
claims, neither appeals from commitments nor challenges to treatment, even in
the form of tort actions, are likely to occupy much space on the dockets.1
28
This is for two reasons. First, legislation, recently enacted and proposed in the
various- states, permits the commitment of persons on the authority of mental
health professionals.2 9 This legislation provides for relaxed procedural safe-
guards and minimal oversight by the courts. Second, to the extent that courts
become involved, the judicial inclination to defer to psychiatrists in commit-
ment and treatment decisions means that courts will simply rubber-stamp de-
cisions already made.
1. Relaxed Legislative Standards
In 1982, the APA adopted its Guidelines for Legislation on the Psychiatric
Hospitalization of Adults.3 Psychiatrists had been sensitive to criticism that
they were blameworthy for the clutter of homeless mental patients on city
streets. 3 1 In response, the guidelines propose relaxation of several prevalent
procedural requirements for commitment and an enhancement of the role of
psychiatrists in the commitment process. First, in most states, an individual
may be taken into custody and transported to a mental hospital for emergency
detention and evaluation either after a warrant or order by a court, 3 2 by a
324. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 138-54.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 181-215.
327. Some federal courts continue to entertain claims under the civil rights statutes. Burch v.
Apalachee Community Mental Health Serv., 840 F.2d 797, 801 (11 th Cir. 1988) (finding that a
complaint of unlawful commitment stated due process claim).
328. State courts have recently been asked to perform the function previously served by federal
courts, that is, hearing broad-based claims of substandard treatment and conditions in the institu-
tions. E.g., Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984).
Also, state courts have entertained creative new tort theories such as "institutionalization syn-
drome" for those wrongfully confined. See Sherman, Paying for a Lost Lifetime, 11 NAT'L L.J. 41
(1989) (citing the unpublished 1989 Texas district court case, Petty v. Texas Dep't of Mental
Health & Mental Retardation, as a recent example).
329. See infra notes 330-56 and accompanying text.
330. American Psychiatric Association, Guidelines for Legislation on the Psychiatric Hospital-
ization of Adults, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 672 (1983) [hereinafter Guidelines].
331. Cohen & Marcos, Psychiatric Care of the Homeless Mentally Ill, 16 PSYCHIATRIC AN-
NALS 729 (1986).
332. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-41.2(b) (1981); see S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER. THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 101-05 (1985) [hereinafter S. BRAKEL] (presenting table
listing all the states' emergency detention procedures).
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police officer with probable cause to believe the individual poses a danger to
self or others,38 or on certification by a defined number of physicians-often
two-attesting that the individual poses a danger.8 34
Under the APA guidelines, a doctor may issue a certificate for emergency
commitment simply on the basis of the physician's belief that the individual
"lacks capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment" and ei-
ther poses a danger or is likely to "suffer substantial mental or physical deteri-
oration." 3 5 After the individual is in custody, the only check on the appropri-
ateness of the commitment is a determination by another psychiatrist.88
Second, most states require a judicial hearing within twenty-four to ninety-
six hours after the initial emergency admission.88 7 Conversely, the APA guide-
lines propose only that an informal hearing be held within five business
days. 3s8
Third, after a petition for a longer commitment is filed, some states require
that patients already hospitalized under emergency procedures receive a pre-
hearing examination by a psychiatrist8 ' 9 The APA adds an automatic outpa-
tient examination for those still in the community. 40
Fourth, while most states require dangerousness to self or others as the cri-
terion for commitment,- 1 the APA guidelines permit thirty-day commitments
without such a finding if the patient is likely "to suffer substantial mental or
physical deterioration." '42 The APA guidelines broaden the more common cri-
terion, "substantial inability to care for oneself, 8348 in its definition: "[The per-
son] . ..will if not treated suffer or continue to suffer severe and abnormal
mental, emotional, or physical distress, and this distress is associated with sig-
nificant impairment of judgment, reason, or behavior causing a substantial de-
terioration of his previous ability to function on his own."84'
Fifth, the commitment hearing is transformed from an adversary hearing
into an informal meeting. While the rules of evidence typically apply in com-
mitment proceedings, 45 the APA guidelines explicitly make hearsay 'admissi-
333. E.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 123, § 12(a) (1988 & Supp. 1990); see S. BRAKEL. supra note
332, at 101-05.
334. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-103(a) (1984 & Supp. 1990); see S. BRAKEL, supra note
332, at 101-05.
335. Guidelines, supra note 330, at 673.
336. Id. at 674.
337. See S. BRAKEL, supra note 332, at 101-05.
338. Guidelines, supra note 330, at 674.
339. E.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 27-5-2(b)(4), 27-5-4(0(1) (1986); see S. BRAKEL, supra note 332,
at 114-19 (presenting table listing all the states' prehearing procedures).
340. Guidelines, supra note 330, at 674.
341. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(12)(A) (1981 & Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 123, §
12(a) (1988 & Supp. 1990); see S. BRAKEL, supra note 332, at 101-05.
342. Guidelines, supra note 330, at 674.
343. See S. BRAKEL, supra note 332, at 101-05.
344. Guidelines, supra note 330, at 673.
345. S. BRAKEL, supra note 332, at 66.
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ble. " The guidelines omit mention of the right to independent psychiatric
examination, to subpoena witnesses, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to
remain silent.347 These rights are commonly protected by state commitment
laws.848
Under the guidelines, a psychiatrist may commit an individual for five busi-
ness days simply on the medical opinion that the individual is getting worse,
even though the patient does not concur with the doctor's opinion that treat-
ment is appropriate.4 ' A psychiatrist may then commit a patient for lengthier
periods for exactly the same reason. These guidelines have been criticized else-
where. 5 0 Still, pressure to relax commitment standards and procedures builds
as society tires of street people sleeping in cars and on the sidewalk."5 1 Other
proposals for change urge less laxity and less deference to psychiatrists.852 Per-
haps because of the nature of those proposals, the APA guidelines have earned
more attention.
The APA has continued to advocate adoption of their guidelines,3 53 using
the dilemma of the homeless mentally ill as a persuasive argument for their
necessity.35' Some among the legal profession have been persuaded. Samuel
Jan Brakel advocates a more informal process because "[t]he [current] proce-
dure is dysfunctional---overprotective and overly technical when observed, a
block to achieving generally desired results in some cases, mere wasteful and
empty ritual in others.13 5
Some of the states have adopted provisions consistent with many of the
346. Guidelines, supra note 330, at 675; see infra note 365 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the ineffectiveness of hearsay rules in commitment proceedings.
347. Guidelines, supra note 330, at 675.
348. S. BRAKEL, supra note 332, at 66-71.
349. Guidelines. supra note 330, at 674.
350. See Parry, Civil Commitment: Three Proposals for Change, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 334, 336 (1986); Rubenstein, The American Psychiatric Association's Pro-
posals on Civil Commitment, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 558, 558-59 (1983). Rubenstein says of
the compulsory pre-hearing examination: "The Supreme Court has held that more due process
than this is required to repossess a refrigerator." Id. at 559.
351. Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of Revisions in Proce-
dural, Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 83, 83-84 (1986); Parry, supra note 350, at 337.
352. E.g., National Center for State Courts, Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment, 10
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 409 (1986) (presenting guidelines which give the psy-
chiatrist less deference).
353. Roth, Official Actions: The Council on Psychiatry and Law, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 412,
412 (1985) (APA Council Report).
354. The recommendations of the APA's Task Force on the Homeless Mentally Ill argue that
"[i]nvoluntary commitment laws must be made more humane to permit prompt return to active
inpatient treatment for patients when acute exacerbations of their illnesses make their lives in the
community chaotic and unbearable." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON THE
HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL, THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL (1984), reprinted in Recommendations
of APA's Task Force on the Homeless Mentally Ill, 35 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 908,
909 (1984); see Lamb & Talbott, The Homeless Mentally Ill. The Perspective of the American
Psychiatric Association, 256 J. A.M.A. 498, 501 (1986).
355. S. BRAKEL, supra note 332, at 28.
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APA guidelines." 6 Failing the widespread adoption of the APA guidelines, the
APA has also proposed to extend the reach of psychiatrists to treat involun-
tarily those patients falling outside the ambit of the civil commitment laws
through outpatient commitment laws. The APA would allow courts to order
involuntary outpatient care where the patient will deteriorate without treat-
ment."6 7 Many states have complied with the APA proposals, but typically
have retained the traditional inpatient commitment criterion of dangerousness.
In these states, a new provision is crafted as another option for a court consid-
ering involuntary commitment. 58 A few states have enacted outpatient com-
mitment procedures bearing greater resemblance to the APA's suggestions.
These states have established a separate process for those who have been invol-
untarily committed in the past and experience difficulty living with their illness
in the community." Missouri has adopted legislation providing for involun-
tary outpatient commitment for those who initially entered the institutions vol-
untarily.3 60 Some might characterize Missouri's legislation as a "bait and
switch" since a patient agreeing to institutional care may find herself trapped
in coerced therapy.
Psychiatrists might insist that, under the due process regime still prevailing
in civil commitment,
[iut is extremely important for mental health professionals to understand
that they do not make long-term commitment decisions about patients.
Commitment is a judicial decision that will be made by a judge, jury, or
commission. Clinical decisions surrounding involuntary commitment are dif-
ficult enough without laboring under the illusion of having judicial responsi-
bility . . . . [I]n recent times, the psychiatrist's discretion in long-term civil
commitment has been abolished. " '
Nonetheless, a persuasive case can be made that despite whatever procedural
requirements are in place, the psychiatrist effectively makes the commitment
decision. Most studies of the conduct of counsel representing the patient con-
clude that lawyers typically follow the "passive best interest approach,"
wherein they conduct minimal cross-examination in hearings lasting but a few
minutes.3 6
356. See id. at 101-05, 110-12, 114-19.
357. Roth, Official Actions: The Council on Psychiatry and Law, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 411,
411-12 (1987) (APA Council Report).
358. Keilitz & Hall, State Statutes Governing Involuntary Outpatient Civil Commitment, 9
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 378, 378 (1985).
359. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-121 (1985). See generally J. OwENs, INVOLUNTARY OUT-
PATIENT COMMITMENT: AN EXPLORATION OF THE ISSUES AND ITS UTILIZATION IN FIVE STATES ii
(1985) (studying five states' involuntary commitment procedures).
360. Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.385 (1986 & Supp. 11 1990).
361. R. SIMON, supra note 73, at 178.
362. See D. HERMANN, REPRESENTING THE RESPONDENT IN CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
25-29 (American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility 1985); Hiday, The Attor-
ney's Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C.L. REV. 1027, 1030 (1982). Presumably,
Brakel would not object too strenuously to this passivity, as he argues for a non-adversarial model
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Even where lawyers act as patients' advocates, courts appear to adopt the
psychiatrists' recommendations regarding commitment in almost all cases.868
The persuasive power of psychiatric testimony is understandable, although
later sections of this Article will suggest that such judicial deference is inap-
propriate given the state of the psychiatric art and the realities of psychiatric
practice. The power of psychiatric testimony exceeds the expertise or authority
of the psychiatrist. In formulating their opinions, psychiatrists rely on patient
history derived from conversations with acquaintances of the patient and en-
tries in the patient's medical records. 36' This information would surely be
characterized as rank hearsay in most trials. Nonetheless, all of this evidence
becomes admissible in a commitment hearing as the basis for psychiatric
opinion.865
In recent years, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have ac-
corded such deference to psychiatric opinion that the opinion of the expert
usually becomes the decision of the court. The belief of patient counsel and the
commitment courts that "doctor knows best" is shared by the higher chambers
of our judiciary.
for lawyers representing mental patients in cases related to institutional conditions other than
commitment. Brakel, Legal Aid in Mental Hospitals, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 21, 78.
363. See Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A
Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43, 54-64 (1974); Badger. & Shore, Psychiatric
and Nonmedical Decisions on Commitment. 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 367, 368-69 (1980); Simon
& Cockerham, Civil Commitment, Burden of Proof and Dangerous Acts: A Comparison of the
Perspectives of Judges and Psychiatrists, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 571, 585 (1977); Wenger &
Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counsel on Admissions to a State Mental Hospital: A Confronta-
tion of Professions, 10 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 66, 68 (1969); Special Project, The Adminis-
tration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARiz. L. REV. 1, 60 (1971).
Some studies have concluded otherwise. Hiday, supra note 362, at 1045 (studying involuntary
commitment in North Carolina). In the experience of the author, courts vary substantially. In
some commitment courts, psychiatric testimony functions as a conveyor belt between court and
institution. In others, judges take seriously the responsibility to scrutinize expert testimony.
364. S. BRAKEL, supra note 332, at 66.
365. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in form-
ing opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 703. States have adopted similar rules. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 490.065 (1986 &
Supp. II 1990). The type of data reasonably relied upon in these cases includes patient history,
Sharkey v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 493 F.2d 685, 690 (2d Cir. 1974), statements made by the
respondent, United States v. Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Price v. Department of
Labor and Indus., 101 Wash. 2d 520, 528, 682 P.2d 307, 311 (1984); State v. Eaton, 30 Wash.
App. 288, 294-95, 633 P.2d 921, 924-25 (1981), statements made by third persons, Conservator-
ship of Isaac 0., 190 Cal. App. 3d 50, 56-57, 235 Cal. Rptr. 133, 136 (1987), and the reports of
other nontestifying psychiatrists, United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 517 (7th Cir. 1988)
(holding that psychiatric testimony based on reports by other non-testifying experts was not ex-
cluded from evidence on hearsay grounds, but was excluded on other grounds).
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2. The Supreme Court Sets the Stage
In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Addington v. Texas. " In Addington,
the Court specifically held that the appropriate standard of proof in civil com-
mitment proceedings is "clear and convincing proof." 6' The Court rejected
the preponderance of evidence 8" and reasonable doubts" standards because
the first standard would permit too many false positives,3 7 0 and the second
standard would lead to too many false negatives.8 7 1 One of the concerns under-
pinning the Court's holding was the inability of psychiatric testimony to sat-
isfy a reasonable doubt standard . 2
The potential impact of the Court's ruling on the appropriate standard of
proof in subsequent commitment hearings378 is not the primary focus of this
Article. The symbolic meaning of the ruling and its message about the value
the Court places on the individual liberty of mental patients are of concern
here. As the Court noted, "standards of proof are important for their symbolic
meaning as well as for their practical effect," 374 and "'[t]he standard of proof
[at a minimum] reflects the value society places on individual liberty.' -75 The
Court renewed its often expressed understanding that civil commitment both
"constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty," 76 and "can engender adverse
social consequences" 77 that can have a "significant impact."87 8 Also, the
Court observed that any person can demonstrate unusual behavior that might
implicate mental illness but does not warrant commitment. 79 The risk of an
unwarranted or "false positive" commitment decision should not fall dispro-
portionately on the individual.880
Nonetheless, the Court remained willing to accept an unknown number of
366. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
367. Id. at 432-33.
368. Id. at 426-27.
369. Id. at 427-31.
370. Id. at 426. A false positive is the risk that an individual who should not be committed is in
fact erroneously committed.
371. Id. at 428-29. A false negative is the risk that an individual who should be committed is
erroneously not committed. Thus, under the Supreme Court's view, the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard would allow commitment too frequently, and the reasonable doubt standard would
prevent commitment too frequently.
372. Id. at 429.
373. The Court noted that at the time of the decision, 13 states used the reasonable doubt
standard and approximately 25 states applied a variation of the clear and convincing standard. Id.
at 431-32.
374. Id. at 426.
375. Id. at 425 (second set of brackets by the Addington Court) (quoting Tippett v. Maryland,
436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting on part), cert.
dismissed sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972)).
376. Id.
377. Id. at 426.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 426-27.
380. Id. at 427.
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false positives, although it admitted that an "erroneous commitment is some-
times as undesirable as an erroneous conviction." ''8 The Court enunciated
three reasons for its willingness to accept false positives. First, individuals are
protected from unnecessary commitment by "layers of professional review and
observation" 382 as well as the concern of family and friends.388 No fact in evi-
dence or legal authority was cited for this proposition. Second, even if the
commitment is unnecessary, the mentally ill individual in the community is no
better off for his or her freedom. " ' For this proposition, the Court cited
neither facts in evidence about the plaintiff in Addington nor any principle of
law. As authority, the Court relied upon two articles written by psychiatrists
and published in psychiatric journals.88 Third, even acknowledging the "lack
of certainty and fallibility" of psychiatry, the Court was obliged to accept an
unknown number of false positives since only psychiatrists can interpret the
evidence for the judge or jury. 388
In the same Term, the Supreme Court decided Parham v. J.R.38' In
Parham, the Court decided that an adversary proceeding is not required for a
parent or guardian to commit "voluntarily" a child for whom the parent or
guardian is responsible.388 One of the Parham plaintiffs was admitted to a
hospital by his parents based on the admitting physician's acceptance of the
parents' claim that their child was previously diagnosed as emotionally dis-
turbed.888 Another of the Parham plaintiffs was admitted by a state agency on
the basis of a "complete sociomedical history." 8 ' The district court noted the
unreliability of such sources of information in overturning the statutory
scheme that permitted such commitments.38 ' The Supreme Court reversed the
district court and upheld the commitment proceedings.8"
381. Id. at 428.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 428-29.
384. The Court stated:
Moreover, it is not true that the release of a genuinely mentally ill person is no worse
for the individual than the failure to convict the guilty. One ivho is suffering from a
debilitating mental illness and in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor
free of stigma.
Id. at 429.
385. Id. (citing Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 496, 498 (1976); Schwartz, Myers & Astrachan, Psychiatric Labeling and the
Rehabilitation of the Mental Patient, 31 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 329, 334 (1974)). Paul
Chodoff admitted to a policy argument based upon "horror stories." Chodoff, supra, at 496, 500.
Schwartz, Myers, and Astrachan simply reviewed the stigma accompanying mental illness.
Schwartz, Myers & Astrachan, supra, at 333.
386. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429-30 (1979).
387. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
388. Id. at 587.
389. Id. at 589.
390. Id. at 590.
391. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 138 (1976), rev'd sub nom. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584 (1979).
392. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620-21 (1979).
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The Supreme Court, in its due process analysis, recognized the child's inter-
est in liberty and the avoidance of stigma. 898 Moreover, the Court abandoned
its initial insistence that the interests of parent and child were coterminous.
Citing only Addington, the Court took a step beyond Addington and posited
that "what is truly stigmatizing is the symptomatology of a mental or emo-
tional illness."839 Still, for purposes of analysis, the Court accepted that the
child had an interest in not being committed 8" and that the parents may, in
the rare case, act other than in the best interests of their child. 396
The Court distinguished commitment from the abortion context where a
parent.could not exercise an absolute veto over a child's abortion.397 The Court
focused on the one check on an otherwise absolute parental power to commit:
the exercise of independent professional judgment by the institution's admit-
ting psychiatrist.3 98 This admitting psychiatrist is the "neutral factfinder"
which satisfies due process limits on the deprivation of the child's liberty
interest.399
Due process has never been thought to require that the neutral and detached
trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer. Surely, this
is the case as to medical decisions, for "neither judges nor administrative
hearing officers are better qualified than psychiatrists to render psychiatric
judgments." Thus, a staff physician will suffice, so long as he or she is free
to evaluate independently the child's mental and emotional condition and
need for treatment. 400
The deprivation of a constitutional right to liberty has thus become a "psychi-
atric judgment" left to the discretion of the psychiatrist. Citing Addington, the
Parham Court reaffirmed its prior view that other facts surrounding the deci-
sion to commit an individual to a state hospital are meaningless without the
interpretation of the psychiatrist. '0 1
Parham expanded upon Addington in two critical respects. First, while
Addington looked to the family and psychiatrist as protection against false
positives,0 2 Parham relied upon the psychiatrist as the check on the family.
Moreover, Parham made clear the essential irrelevance of the family in its
view. The same psychiatrist enjoys the same decisionmaking power where the
committing agent is not the parent but a state agency; no family can check for
393. Id. at 600.
394. Id. at 601. The Court also cited to the same two journals supporting its decision in Add-
ington. See supra note 385.
395. Parham, 442 U.S. at 601.
396. Id. at 602-03.
397. Id. at 603-04.
398. Id. at 604.
399. Id. at 606-07.
400. Id. at 607 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 942, 569 P.2d
1286, 1299, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 311 (1977) (Clark, J., dissenting)).
401. Id. at 608.
402. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1979).
19911
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false positives.4 0
3
Second, the psychiatrist, the expert in Addington to whom the trier of fact
must turn, now becomes the trier of fact. In their "trial of the facts," psychia-
trists were freed by Parham to rely on "all sources of information that are
traditionally relied on by physicians and behavioral specialists .... o In the
Court's view, further formality of procedure would mean nothing because such
procedural formalities mean nothing in commitment trials where the hearings
typically last but a few moments.'0 5
In the next Term, the Court decided Vitek v. Jones'40  in which it held that
due process required an independent decisionmaker and other procedural
guarantees, such as adequate notice, opportunity for hearing, and the availa-
bility of appointed counsel before a convicted felon could be transferred to a
mental hospital.407 Some hoped that Vitek meant that some due process proce-
dures would have to be respected by the institution psychiatrists-for instance,
insistence upon a psychiatrist other than the treating psychiatrist as the inde-
pendent decisionmaker, despite the difficulty of asking one decisionmaker to
exercise independent scrutiny of a colleague's treatment decision.'08
At best, these hopes were postponed two years later when the Court decided
Youngberg v. Romeo.'09 Romeo was a mentally retarded but not mentally ill
individual. He did not challenge his commitment;' 10 rather, he sought vindica-
tion for a liberty interest in training or treatment.' 1 Writing for the Court,
Justice Powell found such a right, but limited the right to "minimally ade-
quate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue re-
straint."' 1 The majority declined to find a constitutional right to training suf-
403. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 619 (1979). The Court ruled that the trained psychiatrist
can discern the parent committing a child for improper motives: "It is unrealistic to believe that
trained psychiatrists, skilled in eliciting responses, sorting medically relevant facts, and sensing
motivational nuances will often be deceived about the family situation surrounding a child's emo-
tional disturbance." Id. at 611-12.
404. Id. at 608.
405. See id. at 609-10 & n.17.
406. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). In Vitek, a convicted felon challenged, on procedural due process
grounds, the constitutionality of a state statute which provided that if a physician found that a
prisoner with mental illness could not be given proper treatment in prison, he could be transferred
to a mental hospital. Id. at 483-84. The Supreme Court held that the convicted felon's due process
rights were violated because he did receive adequate notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Id.
at 491. Thus, the Court required the prison to give certain procedural protections to prisoners who
were involuntarily transferred because these prisoners were deprived of their liberty interests. Id.
at 495-96.
407. Id. at 491, 495-96.
408. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 868 n.1 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), vacated,
458 U.S. 1119.(1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
409. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). This case arose out of the same controversy that was the subject of
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 457 U.S. 1131 (1982).
410. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 315.
411. Id. Romeo also argued for a right to freedom from bodily restraint and safety, with which
the Court readily agreed. Id. at 315-16.
412. Id. at 319.
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ficient to warrant release from the institution or to rehabilitate Romeo.4 8 In
determining whether such training is provided, Powell instructed the lower
courts to "show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified profes-
sional. 1 414 Powell endorsed the language of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
that all the Constitution required was that "'professional judgment in fact
was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several
professionally acceptable choices should have been made.' ",411 From Romeo
onward, a treatment decision,
if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed
only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demon-
strate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such
a judgment.4 11
As authority for this limitation on the patient's rights, Powell cited only
Parham and the earlier prison cases, such as Rhodes v. Chapman,' 7 which
also called for a "hands off" policy for the courts."18 The justification for such
a deferential policy lay in its alleged necessity. The deferential policy "is nec-
essary to enable institutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may have to
make decisions with respect to a number of residents with widely varying
needs and problems in the course of a normal day."'109 Romeo extended
Parham and Addington past the admitting room of the institution. Without
doubt, these cases removed the Constitution and the courts from practically all
aspects of the operation of a mental institution, from admission, through treat-
ment, and all the way to discharge. The psychiatrist is the trier of fact, and his
or her decisions are presumptively correct.
3. Lower Courts Follow the Lead
The state and lower federal courts have acted correspondingly. Deference to
professional judgment means, of course, deference to the judgment of institu-
tion psychiatrists, since the courts will not decide between that judgment and
the competing opinions of psychiatrists retained by the mentally ill litigants. 20
413. Id.
414. Id. at 322.
415. Id. at 321 (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated, 457
U.S. 307 (1982)).
416. Id. at 323. It is important to realize that this decision, while in the context of a damages
case, applies to injunctive actions as well. In the context of damage cases, an additional protection
to the doctor is available through good faith immunity. Id.
417. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
418. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337 (1981)).
419. Id. at 324.
420. Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 815 F.2d 1034, 1036 (5th Cir. 1987); Doe v. Gaughan, 617 F. Supp.
1477, 1487 (D. Mass. 1985) (holding that the mere difference of opinion between psychiatric
1991]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:281
Still, a few courts have used the documented opinions of hospital psychiatrists
against the mentally ill to impose relief the doctors themselves have
designed."2"
Some courts have construed Romeo's silence on the least restrictive alterna-
tive analysis as its opinion that no such right exists. 42 2 Others have gone far-
ther to extend deference to psychiatrists beyond medical matters, finding that
freedom of movement can be restrained "to the extent [that] professional
judgment deems it necessary to assure security or to provide needed
treatment.
42 1
While some courts in applying Parham draw a line between commitment of
children and adults,' 24 other courts have found in Parham no principle sepa-
rating the two. In approving the short-term commitment of an adult alcoholic
on the authority of a doctor without a precommitment hearing, the Colorado
Supreme Court wrote:
In our view, a judicial hearing as a prerequisite to commitment of a clearly
dangerous intoxicated person would hinder the government's efforts in con-
trolling alcohol abuse without providing additional procedural safeguards.
Due process demands only that a neutral factfinder independently determine
that the statutory requirements for commitment and release are satis-
fied. . . .An independent factfinder strikes the proper balance between the
public's right to protection from alcohol related tragedies and the individ-
ual's right to be protected from unjustified commitment.'2
In similar fashion, courts have approved the short-term commitment of adults
where the adult could request a hearing through a court-appointed lawyer.42 6
[The New York Mental Hygiene Law] contains stringent requirements con-
cerning who may be subject to commitment, provides for multiple levels of
medical review, imposes a duty of review on a State agency, and invites the
involvement of the patient, his family and friends. All these safeguards cer-
tainly do not substitute for an individual's due process right to have an im-
experts is insufficient for plaintiffs to prevail), affd, 808 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1986).
421. Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 375 (4th Cir. 1986). In Thomas S.. the court stated:
"The presumption of validity accorded the professionals' decision about appropriate treatment has
not been rebutted. Consequently, in the absence of evidence that the decision is a 'substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards,' the district court was re-
quired to accept the recommendations of the qualified professional ..... Id. (quoting
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)).
422. E.g., Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983); see supra notes 211-12 and
accompanying text (explaining the least restrictive alternative analysis).
423. Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201, 1209 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Concerned Citizens for
Creedmoor v. Cuomo, 570 F. Supp. 575, 576-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (extending Romeo to finding
the requisite exercise of professional judgment in the accreditation decisions of the Joint Commis-
sion on the Accreditation of Hospitals).
424. E.g., Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1985), affid, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.
1986).
425. Carberry v. Adams County Task Force on Alcoholism, 672 P.2d 206, 210 (Colo. 1983)
(citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979)).
426. See Curnow v. Yarbrough, 676 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Colo. 1984).
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partial factfinder determine the propriety of his confinement. Due process
does not, however, require that the focus of State energies and moneys be
shifted from the evaluation and treatment of the mentally ill to strict com-
pliance with detailed procedural requirements.'
2 7
These same arguments led to court approval of a system whereby mentally
retarded adults were committed for long periods of time without any judicial
review. 428 Similarly, Parham and Romeo have combined to permit "review by
an independent medical expert" prior to compulsory treatment.429
This past Term, the Supreme Court advised lower courts that they were
moving in the right direction. In Washington v. Harper,'4 0 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Court, upheld the constitutionality of a state procedure formu-
lated to apply the Court's prior decision in Vitek 2 1 to the forcible medication
of prisoners with antipsychotic drugs.'32 The decision to medicate involuntarily
was approved where it was made by a panel consisting of a psychiatrist, a
psychologist, and the administrator of the facility, without any court
involvement.'
Harper not only confirmed the new line of authority, it expanded upon it. At
least under Romeo, one could theoretically ask the courts to see that profes-
sional judgment was, in fact, exercised. 48 4 At least in Parham, the parents
theoretically were a check on the discretion of the psychiatrist. 4 5 Harper may
also depart from Vitek. At first blush, Harper could be read as telling the
lower courts and the states what procedure is necessary for a decision by a
medical trier of fact to satisfy Vitek. The relatively extensive procedural pro-
tections provided by the prison's involuntary medication policy in Harper"8 6
427. Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298, 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), afid, 722 F.2d 960
(2d Cir. 1983) (citations oniitted).
428. In re Desmond, 381 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Civil libertarians can find no
solace in the context of this case; that is, the mentally retarded who will always be retarded, and a
hoped-for application of the Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), principle that the
nature and duration of confinement should bear some rational relationship to its purpose. The
expected duration of a condition warranting confinement is, after all, a matter within "profes-
sional judgment."
429. Project Release, 551 F. Supp. at 1309.
430. 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
431. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (holding that due process requires procedural guaran-
tees such as a hearing and notice before an inmate may be involuntarily transferred to a mental
hospital).
432. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1033.
433. Id.
434. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982).
435. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979). The Harper dissenters see this decision-as an
expansion of Parham. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1053 n.24 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
436. These included the right to advance notice of the intent to medicate, together with a state-
ment of the factual basis for the diagnosis and prescription, and rights at the hearing such as the
right to attend, present evidence, cross-examine, use a lay advisor, and appeal to the Superinten-
dent of the facility. Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 879, 759 P.2d 358, 362 (1988), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
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could form the floor below which the courts must not let the Constitution sink.
However, Justice Kennedy passed on the opportunity to formulate any consti-
tutional minimums, referring only vaguely to "fair procedural mechanisms.' 87
Remarkably, that reference is not tied to any citation to Vitek, but instead to
Parham and Romeo. 8 Moreover, Justice Kennedy's allusion to "fair proce-
dural mechanisms" is followed by a reference to Parham's concerns for mean-
ingless procedures restricting what the doctors must do anyway. 89
Justice Kennedy dwelled on the patient's argument that the hearing panel
cannot be impartial or independent since it consisted of institution doctors,
colleagues and even subordinates of the treating psychiatrist. In the Court's
view, due process was satisfied if the panel members were new to the inmate's
current treatment. 4 0 The members' history with the patient, their role in the
prison, and their relationship with the treating doctors all were left outside the
Court's circle.
More critically yet, the Court made plain its presumption that psychiatrists
always act in the patient's best interests, even where the patient is a prisoner.
The Court's presumption rested upon the ethical obligation of psychiatrists to
prescribe drugs only for the medical interests of the patient. 4 1 As the dissent
illustrated, this presumption would even exclude from the circle the prison's
own policy to permit coerced medication solely because the patient's behavior
could cause damage to institution property. 44 2 In his dissent, Justice Stevens
observed that Justice Kennedy had misread the policy:
[T]he patient's medical interest in reducing his own violence or in altering
his mental condition may be often outweighed by the risk or onset of severe
medical side effects. Finally, the qualitative judgment of what is a patient's
best interest cannot be made without reference to his own preferences. The
Policy does not account for either a physician's determination of medical
interest or the inmate's wishes.44 8
Harper may be limited to its facts, an impressive array of procedural pro-
tections directed by state law to a convicted felon, in a prison holding other
felons with "a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often vio-
lent, conduct."' 4"4 Justice Kennedy wrote that "[t]he extent of a prisoner's
right under the [due process clause] to avoid the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs must be defined in the context of the inmate's
437. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1042 (1990).
438. Id. (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979)).
439. Id.
440. Id. at 1043-44.
441. Id. at 1037 n.8 (citing the Hippocratic Oath).
442. Id. at 1049 n.1 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justice Stevens
dissented from the majority's evaluation of the merits, but concurred with the majority's analysis
of why the case was not moot).
443. Id. (citation omitted).




Nonetheless, in its frequent invocation of Parham, its discussion of the
trustworthiness of psychiatrists, and its curious misreading of the state policy,
the Harper Court threatens further developments." 6 From the understanda-
ble, but risky, reliance upon a union of interests between parent and child in
Parham, the Court has now leapt to find a similar union of interests between
convicted prisoner and prison doctor.
The distance covered by these cases suggests that the American Psychiatric
Association may have been too conservative in its reform proposals. 4 47 These
cases do not simply erode the liberty rights of mental patients; they are pro-
gressively privatizing liberty. It is important to note that the courts are not
445. Id. at 1037.
446. Harper has already had an impact. The Supreme Court, in Perry v. Louisiana, 59
U.S.L.W. 4007 (1990), recently ordered Louisiana courts to reconsider a state court ruling that a
psychotic inmate on death row could be forced to take medication to make him mentally compe-
tent before being executed.
In March of 1990, the Supreme Court in Perry agreed to decide the "question of whether a
state can, in effect, make a prisoner eligible for execution by administering anti-psychotic medica-
tion against his will." Perry v. Louisiana, 110 S. Ct. 1317, vacated 59 U.S.L.W. 4007 (1990).
However, in November of 1990, after listening to arguments from both sides on the issue, the
Supreme Court vacated the grant of certiorari and remanded Perry in light of Washington v.
Harper. Perry v. Louisiana, 59 U.S.L.W. 4007 (1990). The effect was that the Justices avoided "a
decision they had committed themselves to make." Greenhouse, New Hearing for Inmate on'
Forced Medication, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at A13, col. 1.
Surprisingly, Harper apparently was read to provide more protection for prisoners:
The reason the Court gave for its order made the action particularly puzzling. The
Justices instructed the Louisiana courts to reconsider the case in light of [Washington
v. Harper, which] established at least a limited constitutional right for prisoners to
refuse mind-altering drugs.
But that decision . . . was issued before the Court granted review in the Louisiana
case . ..
If the decision in the Washington case substantially changed the constitutional
landscape, that would presumably have been apparent to the Justices at the time, and
they could have sent the Louisiana case back to the state courts for reconsideration
then rather than accept jurisdiction themselves, as they did the next week.
Id.
The briefs filed in Perry differed "over how the Court should apply its ruling in Washington v.
Harper to the Perry case, in which the state's goal is not to attend to the inmate's medical needs
but to execute him." Id. at A13, col. 2.
According to the brief for the inmate, "'[u]sing forced medication solely as a means to groom
[Perry] for execution, without in any way limiting that order or considering [Perry's] interests and
medical needs, violates the limits set forth in Harper.'" Id. (quoting the inmate Perry's brief).
Not surprisingly, the brief for the Louisiana Attorney General came to the opposite conclusion.
According to the Attorney General, a death sentence justifies "'restrictions on liberty which are
required to effectuate the death penalty.' . . . ' In short, the Harper right to be free from involun-
tary medication was extinguished by Perry's sentence of death.'" Id. (quoting the Louisiana At-
torney General's brief).
447. Even where the courts simply review court commitment decisions, the principles of
Parham encourage them to approve lax procedural safeguards. See, e.g., W.J.C. v. County of
Vilas (In re W.J.C.), 124 Wis. 2d 238, 241, 369 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Ct. App. 1985) (psychiatrist
can testify in favor of commitment by telephone).
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saying that mental patients have no liberty rights. On the contrary, they ritu-
alistically cite the community mental health reform era cases for the proposi-
tion that commitment is a significant deprivation of liberty." 8 Rather than
extinguishing the right to liberty, the courts insist upon the traditional balanc-
ing of state and individual interests to devise an accommodation of those inter-
ests. However, the protection and interpretation of the patient's constitutional
right to liberty have been reassigned to the psychiatrists.'
49
Some might argue that delegation to psychiatrists of the traditionally judi-
cial power of interpreting and enforcing constitutional rights does not consti-
tute privatization since the psychiatrists are, for the most part, state employ-
ees. This reservation overlooks both the presence of private psychiatrists who
commit and treat, even at state facilities, and the absence of any such private/
public distinction in the cases. More importantly, the professional role of the
psychiatrist hired by the state remains essentially unchanged. Whatever the
source of the psychiatrist's remuneration, professional obligations to the pa-
tient insulate the psychiatrist from the direction of the state mental health
system. Ironically, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the private function
served by other state-employed professionals. In finding that public defenders
do not act under color of state law, the Supreme Court noted in Polk County
v. Dodson4 50 that while "[s]tate decisions may determine the quality of his law
library or the size of his caseload. . . . a defense lawyer is not, and by the
nature of his function cannot be, the servant of an administrative superior. '' 614
The lawyer's role of "advancing 'the undivided interests of his client' . . . is
essentially a private function .. ."'51 Similarly, the state-employed psychia-
trist, while feeling the influence of the state budget on his facilities and equip-
ment and the pressure of public demand on his caseload, has a primary obliga-
tion to the patient.4
53
448. E.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 971 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).
449. See United States v. Bryant, 670 F. Supp. 840, 844 (D. Minn. 1987) (right to refuse
treatment). The Bryant court stated that "it is necessary to balance [the patient's] liberty interest
against the competing governmental interests .... It is not the court's duty, however, to perform
the balancing." Id.; see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1980) (requiring an indepen-
dent decisionmaker to conduct an adversary hearing; that decisionmaker may be an institution
psychiatrist); cf. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984) (forcible medication only justifi-
able based upon professional judgment of treatment needs), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).
450. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
451. Id. at 321.
452. Id. at 318-19 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1974)).
453. THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS §§ 9-10 (American Medical Association 1973), re-
printed in Official Actions: The Principles of Medical Ethics, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1057, 1063-
64 (1973) (with annotations especially applicable to psychiatry). Section 9 states:
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the course of medi-
cal atiendance, or the deficiencie5 he may observe in the character of patients, unless
he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the
welfare of the individual or of the community.
Id. § 9. Section 10 states:
The honored ideals of the medical profession imply that the responsibilities of the
[Vol. 40:281
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not extended to doctors the same rec-
ognition given to lawyers in Dodson. A state hospital medical superintendent
"'owes no duty of undivided loyalty to his patients," because of the added obli-
gation to serve the public interest in safety."' The Supreme Court has not
found the commonality of professionalism shared by public defenders and
state psychiatrists a sufficiently persuasive analogy to exempt doctors from lia-
bility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 45" Instead, the Court distinguishes the public
defender on the basis of the adversariness of that function."6 Still, the profes-
sional obligation is not irrelevant, in the Court's view, if the actor is private
but acts in concert with the state.457
Whether or not a state psychiatrist can avoid liability under section 1983,
the function of the psychiatrist, like that of the lawyer, is "essentially a private
function."" " The burden of sorting out the competing interests for an adjudi-
cation of liberty rights has been added to the traditional medical function,
making it even less likely that doctors could avoid section 1983 liability." 9
Still, this governmental function, now folded within the practice of medicine,
operates without any government involvement or review. It is a privatized
function.
C. Drawing a Little Circle Around Reality
Historically, the courts accepted, implicitly if not explicitly, the factual as-
sumptions underlying the three great waves of reform and their three conse-
quent retreats. The Jacksonians thought lunacy was caused by the distur-
bances of civilization and increased as civilization inevitably spread.""0 They
were wrong."61 Just prior to the Progressive Era, Americans believed that in-
sanity was untreatable, 62 the Irish were more susceptible to insanity than na-
tive-born Americans, 63 and the asylum was demonstrably better than the
physician extend not only to the individual, but also to society where these responsibil-
ities deserve his interest and participation in activities which have the purpose of im-
proving both the health and the well-being of the individual and the community.
Id. § 10.
454. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320 (1981). Curiously, in a case in which the public
defender is sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by her client for actions taken consistent with her duty
as an officer of the court, the Supreme Court spoke of the state doctor as a double agent, but
continued to portray the lawyer's duty as simple and singular. Id. at 314-15.
455. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1988).
456. Id. at 52.
457. Id. at 52 n.10.
458. Id. at 46 n.6; Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1012 (1982).
459. In fact, however, the professional deference extended in Romeo will insulate them from
liability in almost all cases.
460. See supra text accompanying notes 25-41.
461. "[T]here has been no increase in the frequency of the psychosis during the past one hun-
dred years [from 1840 to 1940]." H. GOLDHAMER & A. MARSHALL, PSYCHOSIS AND CIVILIZATION
11 (2d ed. 1953) (studying period of 1840-1940).
462. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
463. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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prison." They were wrong. The Progressives hoped that individualized treat-
ment, based upon extensive case histories, would develop a range of commu-
nity treatments, with the state hospital only one option among many." They
were wrong. Early in this century, society thought insanity was genetic.466 So-
ciety was wrong.467 The community mental health movement expected anti-
psychotic medications to conquer mental illness and thought socioeconomic
disparities were attributable to mental illness. "8 They were wrong.46 Now,
the public believes that the community mental health movement has caused
the homelessness phenomenon.470 Again, the public is wrong. 71
These misperceptions, expressed in metaphors, shaped mental health policy
in all three branches of government. Jacksonians built asylums and courts de-
veloped new doctrine to commit people to them. 47 1 Post-Jacksonian society and
its courts tolerated abuses in the asylum.'17 Progressives quarantined and vac-
cinated, and the courts limited their oversight of the mental hospitals to com-
pensating those patients experiencing physical injury and, also, enthusiastically
approved of sterilization. 7 ' Deinstitutionalization courts took over the remain-
ing institutions as the nation waged war on its social problems, including
mental illness. 17 In recent years, along with much of the country, the courts
have abandoned the government's role as counter to the best of our tradi-
tions. 76 Certainly these reformers and their successors are entitled to their
time. Even equipped with the advantage of hindsight, we should not assess
their failures too harshly. Still, the courts of those times enforced policies con-
tradicted by facts lying outside the circle the courts drew around the problem
of mental illness as they defined it.
Likewise, the cooperation of the courts with the privatization reform like-
wise requires drawing a circle around the reality of mental illness in order to
justify the policies of this reform. The privatization reform, as articulated by
464. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
465. See supra text accompanying notes 101-08.
466. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
467. Available evidence, supporting a causal relationship between adverse social conditions and
mental illness, suggests some continuing relationship between genes and insanity, such as, perhaps,
genetic predispositions activated by hardship. See Kohn, Social Class and Schizophrenia: A Criti-
cal Review and a Reformulation, I SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 60, 69 (1973).
468. See supra text accompanying notes 164-68, 178.
469. If anything, mental illness may be attributable to socioeconomic inequalities. See infra
notes 531-40 and accompanying text.
470. See supra text accompanying notes 216-17, 229.
471. Not only did deinstitutionalization begin before the reform, see supra text accompanying
notes 163, 238, but the number of mentally ill patients among the homeless is commonly exagger-
ated. F. STEVENS, RESPONDING TO AMERICA'S HOMELESS: PUBLIC POLICY ALTERNATIVES 82
(1986).
472. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
473. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
474. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14, 138-54.
475. See supra text accompanying notes 193-215.
476. See supra text accompanying notes 241-60.
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the courts, rests upon five assumptions not supported, and even contradicted,
by the facts available to the courts. When distilled from the decisions, these
assumptions are:
1. that psychiatrists have the requisite skill to determine the necessity of
involuntary commitment and only they can interpret the material facts;
2. that psychiatrists may be counted upon to function as independent and
impartial triers of fact;
3. that involuntary treatment is necessary because the mentally ill will get
worse without treatment which they will not voluntarily seek;
4. that the adversarial process is meaningless and even harmful to the men-
tally ill;
5. that mental illness is a medical, not a social problem.
The error of each assumption will be considered in turn.
1. The Expertise of Psychiatry
Psychiatrists are plagued with differences of opinion on diagnostic stan-
dards.4 7 7 Their self-criticism should inspire doubts about their ability to arrive
at valid and reliable conclusions about mental illness. A sampling follows:
The need to improve diagnostic reliability in schizophrenia is so obvious as
to not require additional confirmation. . . . Improved diagnosis will almost
certainly not increase our understanding of what schizophrenia is. An in-
crease in reliability does not affect validity. We can standardize our miscon-
ceptions in such a way that the same person will be identically mislabeled
by an even larger number of colleagues.
4 78
Throughout the helping professions it is unfortunately true that diagnoses
are often made and therapy prescribed on the basis of inadequate case
study. That is, inadequate even in the light of our limited knowledge. [sic]
The major reason for this premature closure is the unwarranted belief that
an arbitrary stereotyped formulation implies dynamic understanding. Such
formulations served as ritualistic guardians of ignorance for those who can-
not stand the anxiety engendered by the ambiguity inherent in our present
ignorance.7
Any number of studies have indicated that psychiatric diagnosis at present
is so unreliable as to merit very serious question when classifying, studying,
and treating patients' behavior and outcomes.
• . . Clinicians . . . may be selectively perceiving and emphasizing only
477. See 1 J. ZISKIN & D. FAUST, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTI-
MONY 160-81 (4th ed. 1988) (reviewing the literature discussed in this section along with many
others).
478. Cancro, Increased Diagnosis Reliability in Schizophrenia: Some Values and Limitations,
11 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 53, 54-55 (1973).
479. 1 J. ZISKIN & D. FAUST, supra note 477 (quoting Thorne, Clinical Judgment, in CLINICAL
ASSESSMENT IN COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 12 (R. Woody & J. Woody 1972)).
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those characteristics and attributes of their patients which are relevant to
their own preconceived system of thought. As a consequence, they may be
overlooking characteristics which would be considered crucial by colleagues
who are otherwise committed. This makes it possible for one psychiatrist to
diagnose nearly all patients as schizophrenic while another equally compe-
tent clinician diagnoses a comparable group as psychoneurotic. 8 0
Other studies similarly conclude that there is no accuracy among psychia-
trists.48 Nor does the diagnostic standard for the profession, the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual III Revised ("DSM-IIIR"), 82 provide security. 83
Nonetheless, the trial judge may insist that whether or not psychiatrists can
diagnose with any degree of validity or reliability, they are still better
equipped than courts to assess the material facts to see if the individual suffers
from some kind of mental illness, however vaguely defined and poorly diag-
nosed. The literature does not support that insistence. In the famous Rosenhan
Study, nonpsychotic people presented themselves at the doors of mental hospi-
tals faking hallucinations. 84 After their admission with the diagnosis of schiz-
ophrenia, they stopped simulating symptoms, but continued to bear the diag-
nosis and to be hospitalized for periods of time ranging from seven to fifty-two
days. While only one study, the error rate was an impressive one hundred
percent. 85
The studies suggest that a psychiatrist's superior experience does not relate
480. Pasamanick, Dinitz & Lefton, Psychiatric Orientation and Its Relationship to Diagnosis
and Treatment in a Mental Hospital. 116 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 127, 127, 131 (1959).
481. Temerlin & Trousdale, The Social Psychology of Clinical Diagnosis. 6 PSYCHOTHERAPY:
THEORY, RESEARCH & PRACTICE 24, 26-29 (1969). The author conducted an experiment in which
a mentally healthy man (a professional actor) was diagnosed by psychologists and psychiatrists
after a well-known psychologist suggested (according to the experiment's instructions) that the
patient looked psychotic. Id. at 24-25. Even though they observed a perfectly healthy man, 88%
of the psychologists and 100% of the psychiatrists diagnosed the man as having "mental illness."
Id. at 27. The authors agreed with Thomas Szasz that "psychiatric diagnosis is a process of label-
ing social behavior." Id. at 28-29.
482. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS,
DIAGNOSIS AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed., revised 1987). The Diag-
nosis and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Revised ("DSM-IIIR") provides a "medical
model" for many behavioral disturbances and also circumstantially defines mental disorders. Mc-
Reynolds, DSM-I1I and the Future of Applied Social Science, 10 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 123, 123
(1979). DSM-IIIR also provides diagnoses according to many separate categories of disturbances.
Id.
483. McReynolds, supra note 482, at 125. McReynolds criticizes the manual:
No recognizable process of scientific discovery is evident with regard to the scores of
new disorders in DSM-III. ...
• ..The processes whereby they have come to occupy a new place in psychiatric
nosology are social and political, not scientific, in nature. It is just these defining and
labeling processes that social scientists should study and explain.
Id. at 125-26.
484. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250, 251 (1973).
485. Id. at 252.
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at all to the accuracy of his or her conclusions.'86 Nor does the available re-
search indicate that psychiatrists possess any superior qualifications to discern
credibility. 8 ' Given the reliance of psychiatric opinion on stale and multi-au-
thored case histories and the untested reports of family, the psychiatrist is
substantially disadvantaged in determining the truth of a patient's situation.
Psychiatry claims even less expertise in predicting dangerous conduct. The
journals are replete with studies confirming the unreliability of psychiatrist's
predictions as to dangerousness. 88 The American Psychiatric Association's
486. Goldberg, The Effectiveness of Clinicians' Judgments: The Diagnosis of Organic Brain
Damage from the Bender-Gestalt Test, 23 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 25, 32 (1959) ("diagnos-
tic accuracy . . . does not depend on experience or training in psychology" (emphasis in origi-
nal)); Goldsmith & Mandell, The Dynamic Formulation-A Critique of a Psychiatric Ritual,
125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1738, 1738, 1741 (1969) ("The ability to select the correct diagnosis was
not significantly influenced by the participants psychiatric experience.").
Another commentator has stated:
[C]linical judges tend to handle information differently and . . . many are purely
idiosyncratic in their decisions as to weighting and assessing cues. The general re-
search finding is that there will be almost as many judgments as there are clinicians.
This is a deplorable state of affairs from the standpoint of establishing clinical prac-
tice as being "scientific." Until higher reliabilities may be demonstrated among
clinical judges interpreting the same data it must be concluded that most clinicians
are in a prescientific state of professional ompetency.
Thorne, Clinical Judgment, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT IN COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 61
(R. Woody & J. Woody 1972).
487. Albert, Fox & Kahn, Faking Psychosis on the Rorschach: Can Expert Judges Detect
Malingering?, 44 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 115, 118 (1980); Goldstein, Credibility and Incred-
ibility: The Psychiatric Examination of the Complaining Witness, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1238,
1240 (1980).
488. Monahan, Risk Assessment of Violence Among the Mentally Disordered: Generating Use-
ful Knowledge, 11 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 249, 250 (1988); Monahan, The Prediction of Vio-
lent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10,
10-11 (1984); Shah, Dangerousness and Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill. Some Public
Policy Considerations, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 501, 504 (1975); Steadman, The Right Not to Be
a False Positive: Problems in the Application of the Dangerousness Standard, 52 PSYCHIATRIC Q.
84, 90-91 (1980); Werner, Rose & Yesavage, Reliability, Accuracy, and Decision-making Strat-
egy in Clinical Predictions of Imminent Dangerousness, 51 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 815, 822 (1983); see also J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BE-
HAVIOR 41-62 (1981) [hereinafter J. MONAHAN, CLINICAL PREDICTION] (explaining that research
on clinical prediction of violent behavior has been criticized because the research did not actually
test the accuracy of the prediction, the predictions tested were out of date, and much of the
violence that occurred was not detected); H. STEADMAN & J. COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMI-
NALLY INSANE 175-76 (1974) (explaining that relying on dangerousness as a justification for in-
voluntary civil hospitalization is based on the apparent assumption that psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists are capable of making such predictions); Haynes, The Predictive Value of the Clinical
Assessment for the Diagnosis, Prognosis, and Treatment Response of Patients, in DANGEROUS-
NESS, PROBABILITY AND PREDICTION, PSYCHIATRY AND PUBLIC POLICY 54-55 (C. Webster, M.
Ben-Aron & S. Hucker eds. 1985) ("[T]he reliability and predictive value of many clinical assess-
ments are unknown, a sad state of affairs when one considers the potential value of some clinical
findings."); cf McNiel & Binder, Predictive Validity of Judgments of Dangerousness in Emer-
gency Civil Commitment, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 197, 197-200 (1987) (finding a relatively high
degree of short-term predictive validity of judgments of dangerousness made in the context of
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Task Force on Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual issued a report in
1974 which agreed.'89 The APA has consistently taken the official position
that its members cannot predict long-term dangerousness. 90 Still, the APA
has filed amicus briefs which distinguished between predicting long-term and
short-term dangerousness, declining to admit that they could not offer expert
testimony in civil commitment cases.' 9 ' Even the more recent psychiatric liter-
ature, however, places a "ceiling on the level of accuracy" of these short-term
predictions of approximately fifty percent. 92 John Monahan, after reviewing
the more recent literature, concluded that "[w]e may be of some help in as-
sessing the probability of future violence, at least in some cases. But whether a
person is dangerous 'enough' to justify preventive confinement is not for us to
say. That. buck should stop at the judge's bench, not at the witness box."'' 9
For any expected improvement in the capacity to predict dangerous behavior,
we should look to statistical and actuarial techniques relating to family envi-
ronment, work environment, and peer group environment.' 9' However, psychi-
emergency civil commitment). Saleem Shah succinctly summarized the psychiatrist's inability to
predict dangerous behavior as follows:
Given the numerous court proceedings in which the dangerousness of a mentally ill
person is at issue and the very serious decisions affecting life and liberty that must be
made, one might assume that some reasonably accurate means of predicting danger-
ous behavior are available. This assumption would be false. No instrument has yet
been developed that can predict violent and other dangerous behavior in a reasonably
accurate and satisfactory manner.
Shah, supra, at 504.
489. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE REPORT No. 8, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF
THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 23-30 (1974).
490. The APA takes this position in cases where psychiatrists may be held liable for failing to
make the prediction, Brief for Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 7-9,
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974)
(No. S.F. 23042), and in death penalty cases, Brief for Amicus Curiae for the APA at 12, Bare-
foot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080); Brief for Amicus Curiae for the APA at 11,
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (No. 79-1127). The Supreme Court has accepted their
argument, but refuses to stop relying on the testimony. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472
(1979).
491. The APA's briefs cited to Monahan, Prediction Research and the Emergency Commit-
ment of Dangerous Mentally Ill Persons: A Reconsideration, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 198 (1978).
But this article does not support a conclusion of greater accuracy for short-term predictions.
Monahan, in this article, offered only theoretical possibilities for a greater accuracy in predicting
short-term dangerousness, without any data. Id. at 198, 200. "Whether [short-term predictions]
are in fact better and, if so, how much better, is not now known." Id. at 200. Monahan also
asserts that "[tihere is no a priori reason to assume that psychiatrists or psychologists would be
any better at prediction in emergency situations than other observers or participants (e.g., a police
officer or a potential victim)." Id.
492. J. MONAHAN, CLINICAL PREDICTION, supra note 488, at 11. One of the principal studies
discussed by Monahan is Rofman, Askinazi & Fant, The Prediction of Dangerous Behavior in
Emergency Civil Commitment, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1061 (1980), which, while it does find a
greater level of accuracy, still concludes that psychiatric predictions are more often wrong than
right. Id. at 1063.
493. J. MONAHAN, CLINICAL PREDICTION, supra note 488, at 14 (citation omitted).
494. Id.; R. SIMON, supra note 73, at 185.
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atrists possess no special qualifications to conduct such statistical analyses.
Courts, at least implicitly, have considered psychiatrists better equipped to
balance the legal interests involved. Grant Morris found that legally trained
hearing officers were more inclined than clinical factfinders to consider legal
issues such as burden of proof, to care about procedural matters, and to extend
credibility to the patient's testimony. 95 This is not surprising. The profession's
own literature suggests the severe limitations of psychiatrists' ability to make
these critical liberty determinations. One psychiatrist has argued against the
special qualifications of his profession:
The physician is not essentially different from other authorities, such as
the clergyman or the lawyer . . . .I see no justification for physicians in
general, or psychiatrists in particular, to have more power than such other
experts to override the expressed wishes of people or to have greater respon-
sibility for harm to self or the public caused by the intemperate behavior of
clients." 6
The Supreme Court in Addington acknowledged the "lack of certainty and
the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis."""' But rather than scrutinize the use-
fulness of the diagnoses in applying legal standards, the Court changed the
standards to accommodate the uncertainty and fallibility. 98
2. The Impartiality of Psychiatrists
No more or less than any other profession, psychiatrists see and react to
individuals through a filter of biases. Accordingly, they make decisions about
patient care for a variety of reasons, only some of which derive from the needs
of the patient. The danger to liberty posed by the biases and mixed motiva-
tions of psychiatrists arises from both the presumption that psychiatrists re-
main somehow immune to biases and the lack of opportunity to test the credi-
bility of their opinions through cross-examination.
Even when testifying as expert witnesses and not as litigants, psychiatrists
are susceptible to responding as advocates for one side or the other in ways
that are hard to detect given the murky basis of their opinions.' 99 As a general
495. Morris, Civil Commitment Decisionmaking: A Report on One Decisionmaker's Experi-
ence, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 291, 345-51 (1988). Another attitudinal study of psychiatrists found
them impatient with procedural requirements and confident that their clinical judgments were
sufficient to make the commitment decision. ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFOR-
NIA's NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW 210-11 (ENKI Corp., California 1972) cited in Ennis &
Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62
CALIF. L. REV. 693, 729 n.126 (1974).
496. Reiser, Refusing Treatment for Mental Illness: Historical and Ethical Dimensions, 137
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 329, 331 (1980).
497. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
498. Id.
499. Diamond, The Psychiatrist As Advocate, I J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 18-19 (1973); Pollack,
Psychiatric Consultation for the Court, in 3 MEDICAL & PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL
CASES 177, 187-88 (Practising Law Institute Vol. 3 1968).
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matter, psychiatrists are more authoritarian than nonmedical mental health
professionals and more comfortable with compulsory commitment.500 Factors
other than the apparent symptoms of possible mental illness frequently lead to
underdiagnosis and overdiagnosis of mental illness.501 To spare patients the
stigma of psychosis, nonmedical mental health professionals commonly diag-
nose a condition as a so-called "adjustment disorder."5 02
On the side of overdiagnosis, fifty-five percent of the respondents to a recent
survey of mental health professionals reported that patients frequently re-
ceived a psychiatric diagnosis when the patient's primary problem was in the
family; twenty-seven percent reported that patients frequently received a more
serious diagnosis than clinically indicated; twenty-five percent reported that a
psychiatric diagnosis was frequently made when clinically unwarranted.503 The
reason driving the overdiagnosis was the need of mental health care providers
to obtain reimbursement from insurance providers for the treatment.50'
Overdiagnosis is also a common problem for the prediction of dangerous be-
havior. An APA Task Force Report noted that "[p]sychiatrists, in order to be
safe, too often predict dangerousness, especially in the case of the mentally ill
offenders. Absence of treatment resources, administrative oversights, and ex-
cessive reliance on conservative release policies have rather clearly resulted in
severe injustice being done to such persons."505
Sadly, psychiatrists also encounter socioeconomic and even racial barriers to
truthful and impartial assessment of patients. Studies reflect that black women
are more often diagnosed as schizophrenic than white women, and therefore,
500. Mendel & Rapport, Determinants of the Decision for Psychiatric Hospitalization, 20
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 321, 327 (1969) (finding that psychiatrists are more likely than so-
cial workers to commit patients and over longer periods of time).
501. Id. at 327-28 (finding that many psychiatrists are influenced by factors other than the
patient's symptoms, such as their professional background and like or dislike of the patient).
502. Kirk & Kutchins, Deliberate Misdiagnosis in Mental Health Practice, 62 Soc. SERV.
REV. 225, 229 (1988) (finding that 82% of the social workers surveyed admitted that they diag-
nosed patients as having "adjustment disorders" when in fact they knew that a more serious diag-
nosis would be more appropriate).
503. Id. at 231 (Table 2).
504. Id. at 230 ("Seventy-two percent of the respondents [to the survey were] aware of cases
where more serious diagnosis [were] used to qualify for reimbursement."). The authors further
argued:
In particular, misdiagnosis is used so that the therapist's services will qualify for
third-party reimbursement. Here the rationale is also nonclinical, but the argument
that the therapist is acting only for the client's benefit is strained. The rationale that
it is being done so that the client can obtain needed service is colored by the obvious
self-interest of the therapist. Agencies, both public and private, also benefit when they
obtain reimbursement as a result of such diagnostic practices.
Id. at 232. Also, the commitment decision may be influenced by the psychiatrist's desire to con-
tinue a treatment regimen to see if it works. See Law's Labor Lost, 40 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 150, 156
(1966) (editorial comment) ("Research in psychiatry depends upon enough hospital population to
provide statistical validity with matched subjects, controlled in a variety of ways. ... ).
505. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE REPORT No. 8, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF
THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 25 (1974).
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are more likely to be hospitalized; 506 black patients admitted to an institution
were diagnosed as schizophrenic more often than white patients;50 and rehos-
pitalization of black patients is predicted more often than for white patients,
reversing the reality. 50 8 The force of culture also displays its power in influenc-
ing psychiatric determinations.
5 0 9
Finally, as the arbiter of liberty interests, the psychiatrist will likely view
the patient's insistence on liberty as resistance to treatment and use that to
darken the diagnosis and prognosis.5 10 While doctors may characteristically
assume that those patients who exercise their right to refuse treatment are
actually the sickest,5 1' the studies also suggest that "the more persistent refus-
ers may retain a greater sense of control over their lives" and thus have "a
better prognosis for treatment. ' 51 2 Nonetheless, where the decision to honor or
deny the refusal of medication rests in nonmedical hands, more refusals are
honored than when doctors make the decision. 513
3. The Necessity for Compulsory Hospitalization
The assumptions underlying compulsory treatment-that patients will dete-
riorate without hospitalization and will not enter the hospital voluntarily-are
not supported by the literature.11 4 The few studies of the homeless mentally ill
506. Gross, Herbert, Knatterud & Donner, The Effect of Race and Sex on the Variation of
Diagnosis and Disposition in a Psychiatric Emergency Room, 148 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DIs-
EASE 638, 640-41 (1969).
507. Watkins, Cowan & Davis, Differential Diagnosis Imbalance as a Race-related Phenome-
non, 31 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 267, 268 (1975).
508. Stack, Lannon & Miley, Accuracy of Clinicians' Expectancies for Psychiatric Rehos-
pitalization, 11 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 99, 107-08 (1983) (finding that white patients
are actually readmitted more often than black patients, even though black patients are expected
to be readmitted more often than white patients).
509. Phillips & Draguns, Classification of the Behavior Disorders, 22 ANN. REv. PSYCHIATRY
447, 467 (1971).
[T]he influence of the client's socioeconomic class in facilitating the attribution of
some, and impeding the application of other, nosological designations is particularly
well documented . . . . [T]he findings converge in suggesting social distance is the
mediating variable. Across socioeconomic or other subcultural lines, the middle class
diagnostician is prone to assign categories of severe psychopathology ....
Id. (citations omitted); see also Lee & Temerlin, Social Class, Diagnosis, and Prognosis for
Psychotherapy, 7 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH & PRACTICE 181 (1970) (lower socioeco-
nomic class means more severe diagnosis and bleaker prognosis independent of clinical features).
510. Wallach & Strupp, Psychotherapists' Clinical Judgments and Attitudes Toward Patients,
24 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 316, 322 (1960).
511. Appelbaum & Gutheil, Drug Refusal.: A Study of Psychiatric Inpatients, 137 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 340, 343, 345 (1980).
512. Appelbaum & Hoge, Empirical Research on the Effects of Legal Policy on the Right to
Refuse Treatment, in THE RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION 90 (American Bar
Association Commission on the Mentally Disabled 1986).
513. See Zito, Lentz, Routt & Olson, The Treatment Review Panel: A Solution to Treatment
Refusal?, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 349, 355-57 (1984).
514. Arce, Tadlock, Vergare & Shapiro, A Psychiatric Profile of Street People Admitted to an
Emergency Shelter, 34 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 812, 812 (1983); Morse & Calsyn,
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reflect a general willingness to obtain therapy, especially among those with
chronic illness, 615 although psychiatrists commonly assume otherwise. The bar-
riers keeping most of the homeless mentally ill population from receiving
treatment lie less in rigorous commitment standards 16 than in patients' fears
of involuntary confinement, over-medication, the stigma associated with
mental hospitals, 517 and the systemic unavailability of services. " 8 One of these
same studies reports a high rate (eighty-six percent) of compliance with
medication. " 9
Once committed, the therapeutic value of involuntary treatment is unclear.
While there is empirical evidence of modest benefits from psychotherapy,2 0
few mental hospitals provide psychotherapy since patient numbers overwhelm
the numbers and qualifications of staff.52" ' Similarly, studies of drug therapy
report widely varying but generally positive results." The principal limitation
of all these studies is their failure to specify their population as voluntary or
involuntary patients." Although the efficacy of involuntary commitment re-
mains cloudy, one fact appears rather clear. Even among those receiving care
in hospitals, most patients voluntarily cooperate with treatment.52 '
Studies indicate that long-term hospitalization is of little help and, in fact,
enhances the probability of more hospitalization. 25 Conversely, the literature
Mentally Disturbed Homeless People in St. Louis: Needy, Willing, But Underserved, 14 INT'L J.
MENTAL HEALTH, Winter 1985-1986, at 74, 80 (finding that vast majority of chronic mentally ill
patients indicated willingness to receive mental health care); Morse, Shields, Hanneke, McCall,
Calsyn & Nelson, St. Louis' Homeless: Mental Health Needs, Services and Policy Implications,
9 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION J. 39, 40, 47 (1986) [hereinafter Morse, St. Louis' Homeless]
(finding that 57.7% of mental patients surveyed were willing to receive mental health services).
515. See, e.g., Putnam, Cohen & Sullivan, Innovative Outreach Services for the Homeless
Mentally Il1, 14 INT'L J. MENTAL HEALTH, Winter 1985-1986, at 112, 114 (describing a mobile
psychiatric outreach team for the chronically mentally ill which would provide housing medical
care, food, and clothing while avoiding the stigma of the medical hospitals; this outreach team was
the backdrop for the Boggs case).
516. See id. at 123.
517. Morse, St.Louis' Homeless, supra note 514, at 45; Putnam, Cohen & Sullivan, supra note
515, at 123.
518. Bachrach, The Homeless Mentally Ill and Mental Health Services: An Analytical Review
of the Literature, in THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 32-33 (H. Lamb ed. 1984); Morse, St.Louis'
Homeless, supra note 514, at 47-48;
519. Arce, Tadlock, Vergare & Shapiro, supra note 514, at 816.
520. See Durham & Lafond, A Search for the Missing Premise of Involuntary Therapeutic
Commitment: Effective Treatment of the Mentally 11, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 303, 330-41 (1988)
(reviewing literature discussing the benefits of psychotherapy).
521. In a study discussed by Durham and Lafond, only 10% of patients received any psycho-
therapy. Id. at 341 n.158.
522. Id. at 346.
523. Id. at 348.
524. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 511, at 342 (finding that 22% of patients refused
treatment); Appelbaum & Hoge, supra note 512, at 87-89 (surveying several studies and conclud-
ing that approximately five percent of patients consistently refused treatment).
525. Mattes, The Optimal Length of Hospitalization for Psychiatric Patients: A Review of the
Literature, 33 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 824, 827 (1982).
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suggests that patients receiving care in the community have fared at least as
well as those hospitalized.5 26
4. The Meaninglessness of Due Process
The premise is as follows: since all the nonpatient participants think an ad-
versarial commitment process is meaningless, they respond in nonadversarial
ways, rendering the process meaningless; therefore the process is meaningless.
The patent circularity of the premise should end the discussion. Such logic has
doomed many ventures. Fortunately, research contradicts this premise as well.
For example, the mere presence of a lawyer for the patient dramatically
reduces the likelihood of commitment, 2 7 particularly when the lawyer func-
tions as an advocate, rather than a self-appointed guardian ad litem.5 2 8
Additionally, there is reason to think that insistence upon the adversary pro-
cess may afford some therapeutic benefit to the patient. This type of process
allows the patient to retain some role in the decisions affecting him or her in
such significant ways. 29 "[T]he hearing should be a confrontation with reality
[for the patient]. It should be an occasion where he can see something of the
social reaction to his behavior. As such, it should be a learning experience. ' 530
5. The Medical Nature of Mental Illness
Certainly, the moderate success of medication in controlling symptoms sug-
gests some biological basis for psychosis. Now that societal causal agents are
discounted in favor of individual medical agents, psychiatry has acquired a
powerful motivation to prove that insanity is illness. Research supporting bio-
526. Braun, supra note 227, at 747; see also Searight & Handal, Psychiatric Deinstitutional-
ization: The Possibilities and the Reality, 58 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 153, 154 (1986) (finding commu-
nity treatment to be associated with less hospital recidivism and to be less expensive than hospital
care).
527. Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to Chief Justice Warren Bur-
ger's "'Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets" Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 149, 161 (1981) ("clear that counsel plays a critical, and in some cases, nearly
dispositive role"); Wenger & Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counsel on Admissions to a State
Mental Hospital: A Confrontation of Professions, 10 J. HEALTH SOC. BEHAVIOR 66, 69-70 (1969)
(finding that 91 % of patients without lawyers were committed, while only 26% of patients with
lawyers were committed).
528. Durham & La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of Broadening
the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395, 440 (1985); Miller
& Fiddleman, Involuntary Civil Commitment in North Carolina: The Result of the 1979 Statu-
tory Changes, 60 N.C.L. REV. 985, 1002-04, 1007-09 (.1982).
529. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 511, at 344-45; Cumming & Goyer, Therapeutic Con-
sequences of the Involuntary Commitment Process, 1 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 37 (1979);
see Perlin, supra note 527, at 157.
Further, if Melvin Kohn, supra note 467, at 73, is correct, then the due process hearing can
afford the poor mental patient an avenue for influencing the previously uncontrollable forces that
dominate his life.
530. Ensminger & Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance of the Civil Commitment Hearing:
An Unexplored Potential, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 12 (1978).
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logical theories of insanity should dominate the professional journals. Still, the
high correlation between poverty and mental illness demands reconsideration
of the medical nature of insanity.
Hollingshead and Redlich, in their classic study,51 demonstrated the close
relationship between social status and mental illness: the lower the socioeco-
nomic status, the greater prevalence of identified mental illness and the
greater severity of illness. 32
There are a variety of possible explanations for these findings. One is that
psychiatrists are more likely to diagnose the lower classes as indicating serious
psychosis, as illustrated earlier.533 A second explanation is that treatment
modes vary by class as well, with psychotherapy more available as one climbs
the social ladder, leaving the less successful therapies for the lower classes.
Hollingshead and Redlich confirm that possibility.534 A third explanation is
that mental illness makes people poor, since the mentally ill are less capable of
succeeding economically. Although this possibility undoubtedly explains the
situation of some patients, this "drift hypothesis" is not supported by the avail-
able evidence.535
Hollingshead and Redlich suggest a fourth possibility: that poverty contrib-
utes to the onset of mental illness.5 86 However, this possibility could not be
established based on the research at that time. More recent research confirms
the durability of the correlation and lends support to this causal relation-
ship. 587 Melvin Kohn concludes that "these life conditions [of poverty] may
adversely affect people's ability to deal, not only with situations that . . . are
stressful, but also with many other dilemmas and uncertainties in a rapidly
531. A. HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1958) (research
study conducted by social scientists and psychiatrists on the "interrelations between social stratifi-
cation and mental illness in the urbanized community").
532. Id. at 216-17, 248-49; see also Gift, Strauss, Ritzler, Kokes & Harder, Social Class and
Psychiatric Outcome, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 222, 223-24 (1986) [hereinafter Gift] (summariz-
ing literature on the effect of socioeconomic status on mental illness); Wheaton, The Sociogenesis
of Psychological Disorder: Reexamining the Causal Issues with Longitudinal Data, 43 AM. Soc.
REV. 383, 383, 402-03 (1978) (same).
533. See supra text accompanying notes 506-08.
534. A. HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLICH, supra note 531, at 300-02; see also Mollica, From
Asylum to Community: The Threatened Disintegration of Public Psychiatry, 308 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 367, 370, 372 (1983) ("Most notably, the state hospital continues to be the principal facility
for the acute inpatient care of the lower-class patient. . . .This situation is alarming, since state
hospitals continue to bear the brunt of fiscal cutbacks and professional neglect.").
535. Kohn, supra note 467, at 64.
536. See A. HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLICH, supra note 531, at 359, 366.
537. Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, Social and Cultural Differences in Psychopathology, 25
ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 417, 418 (1974); Fried, Social Differences in Mental Health, in Pov-
ERTY AND HEALTH: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 135, 135 (Kosa & Zola eds. 1975); Gift, supra
note 532, at 224; Kohn, The Interaction of Social Class and Other Factors in the Etiology of
Schizophrenia, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 177, 178 (1976); Lee, The Causal Priority Between So-
cioeconomic Status and Psychiatric Disorder: A Prospective Study, 22 INT'L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY
1, 1 (1976); Wheaton, supra note 532, at 398-99.
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changing, complex society."5 88 These life conditions include the poor person's
value system, which emphasizes conformity to external authority and the in-
flexibility that such conformity implies.539 At the same time, the poor person
constantly confronts the unpredictable and uncontrolled nature of life on the
street. Another psychiatrist vividly describes the dynamics:
I do not believe it is possible to pursue the concept of madness until we
understand what adversity can do to human beings.
• . . The poor have no control over the events of their lives.
There is more illness, more injury, more death, more pollution, more fam-
ily disruption, more unemployment, more homelessness, more harassment,
more alienation, more crowding and more danger among them. Living in
urban poverty is like living in a turbulent ocean, trying to hang on to a child
with one hand and a sodden piece of driftwood with the other. There is a
whole ecology of bitterness, envy and suspicion.
Every assault from the environment increases the intensity and frequency
of other assaults." 0
The medical model does not lack for eager defenders. Professor Gerard is
typical in his defense; he essentially asserts that the medical model has utility
to legal decisionmaking, specifically decisions about civil commitment.5 1 Ge-
rard claims the model's value only for a judicial decision that the person to be
committed has a mental illness, not the separate decision that the person poses
a danger to self or others.542 His defense argues that the model provides a
scientific basis for sifting through the numerous diagnoses available in the psy-
chiatric profession's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ("DSM-III"). 4 3
The limitations of the defense are two. First, it has little to do with the law
of civil commitment as it operates. The defense does not answer the danger-
ousness question, which remains, for the time being, critical to the commit-
ment decision. More importantly, while the medical model may eliminate
538. Kohn, supra note 467, at 71.
539. Id. at 73.
540. H. DRUMMOND, DR. DRUMMOND'S SPIRITUAL GUIDE TO HEALTH CARE IN A DYING EM-
PIRE 99, 101 (1980). Kohn puts it less graphically:
People at the bottom of the class hierarchy experience great economic insecurity and
far more than their share of serious ill health, degradation, and the afflictions attend-
ant on inadequate, overcrowded housing, often in overpopulated, underserviced areas.
... [A]t any given level of stress, people of lower social class position are more
likely to become mentally disturbed than are people of higher social class position. In
fact, the more sources of stress, the greater the class difference in the proportion of
people who manifest psychotic symptoms.
Kohn, supra note 467, at 70-71.
541. Gerard, The Usefulness of the Medical Model to the Legal System, 39 RUTGERS L. REV.
377, 402 (1987).
542. Id. at 379.
543. Id. at 400.
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ninety percent of DSM-III diagnoses,"" the model leaves the vaguely defined
and ubiquitous diagnosis schizophrenia"" as a basis for commitment.564 Sec-
ond, the defense misapprehends the criticisms of the medical model by assum-
ing that the critics demand unreachable certainty. 57 Since certainty from psy-
chiatry is impossible, so the argument goes, we must settle for what psychiatry
has to offer."" This Article does not expect certainty, nor does it deny the
usefulness of the medical model as one means of attempting to understand and
respond to the mysteries of mental illness. This Article simply insists that
before we defer to expert opinion in the denial of individual liberty, we must
have more confidence in that expert opinion from the community of those ex-
perts than psychiatry can provide.
6. The Example of Billie Boggs
The epidemic of homelessness in New York City so troubled some quarters
that a new program, Project HELP, began policing the streets for the home-
less mentally ill, taking them to shelters and mental institutions.4 9 One such
homeless person was Billie Boggs. Her case serves as an apt example of the
operation of the premises of the privatization reform.550
At the hearing on Billie Boggs' petition to be released from the hospital,
eight psychiatrists testified; five from the hospital and three from the New
York Civil Liberties Union ("NYCLU"). As the trial judge noted, the diagno-
ses of the two teams of psychiatrists stood "nearly at complete variance" with
each other.551 The hospital psychiatrists supported their commitment recom-
mendation with examples of her behavior and delusions: tearing up money
given to her by passersby, urinating and defecating outside with stains from
both on her clothing, refusing food offered to her .by Project HELP, running
544. Id. at 402.
545. As E. Fuller Torrey has stated:
This [number of those diagnosed with schizophrenia, i.e., 1.2 million people] is the
same number of persons who live in Nebraska or Utah, or who live in Alaska, Dela-
ware, and Wyoming put together. Every year another 43,000 persons are diagnosed
with schizophrenia for the first time. Every day another 118 persons are diagnosed
with schizophrenia for the first time.
E. TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA 4 (1988).
546. Gerard, supra note 541, at 407 (describing "schizophrenia" as a qualifying disorder for
commitment).
547. Id. at 405.
548. Id.
549. See generally Putnam, Cohen & Sullivan, supra note 515 (describing a New York mobile
psychiatric outreach team for the chronically mentally ill, called "Project HELP," which would
provide housing, medical care, food, and clothing while avoiding the stigma of the medical
hospitals).
550. In re Boggs, 136 Misc. 2d 1082, 522 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd sub nom. Boggs v.
New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1987), appeal dis-
missed sub nom. Anonymous v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 972, 520
N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988).
551. Id. at 1084-86, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 408-09.
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into the street, suffering from delusions about other people, evidencing hostil-
ity to the doctors, and finally refusing to voluntarily seek treatment.*2 The
opposing psychiatrists from the NYCLU interpreted the refusal of food and
destruction of money as efforts to maintain some dignity and control over her
life, as well as a security measure against carrying too much money on the
dangerous streets. The lack of public restrooms accounted for the urination
and defecation. Her running into the streets without injury, in New York,
where jaywalking is not uncommon, testified to her survival skills. What the
hospital doctors viewed as a delusion, the opposing psychiatrists regarded as a
simple lie. 53
The trial court chose to rely upon its own appraisal of Boggs' testimony and
demeanor. 54 The court found her to be lucid and rational. Boggs' hostility to
the doctors and refusal to submit to treatment or shelter "may reveal more
about conditions in shelters" than about her and "might, in fact, prove that
she's quite sane."5 55 The court found partial explanation for the experts' disa-
greement in the different ways they viewed Boggs: "the hospital psychiatrists
and staff treated a coerced, uncooperative, agitated patient, and a filthy one as
well. On the other hand, when examined by psychiatrists . ..whom she did
not view as enemies, she was, as described by them, 'warm,' coherent, and
logical." 5 The trial court wrote that the "logical inference to be drawn from"
her filthy clothes "is that she is poor.' 57 For the dilemma of the homeless
mentally ill, "[t]he blame and shame must attach to us, not to them. The
predicament of .. . the countless homeless raises questions of broad social,
economic, political and moral implications not within the purview of this
court. . . .There must be some civilized alternatives other than involuntary
hospitalization or the street." '558
The trial court's opinion touched all five of the premises underlying the re-
action of other contemporary courts to the mentally ill: the decision recognized
the lack of either specialized expertise or impartiality among psychiatrists, it
acknowledged the pointlessness of coerced treatment and the relationship be-
tween poverty and mental illness, and it affirmed the value of the adversary
method in arriving at the truth of a problem. Still, the court found itself lim-
ited in its solutions to the little circle drawn around the hospital and Boggs.
Consequently, the court was powerless to devise a solution consistent with the
realities of the problem.
The court of appeals reversed, abandoning the traditional deference to the
trial court's findings of fact.559 The court curiously chastised 'the trial court for
552. Id. at 1084-85, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 408-09.
553. Id. at 1085-86, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
554. Id. at 1086, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
555. Id. at 1091, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
556. Id. at 1089, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
557. Id. at 1090, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
558. Id. at 1090-91, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 412-13.
559. Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 362, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71,
84 (1987), appeal dismissed sub nom. Anonymous v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 70
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placing great weight on Boggs' testimony because there had been no determi-
nation that her demeanor in court resembled her behavior on the street, ac-
cording to descriptions from the hospital psychiatrists. The court of appeals
deferred to the hospital psychiatrists' testimony in its entirety and rejected the
competing testimony of the patient's doctors. 610 Concluding, the court wrote:
We reject, as against the weight of the evidence, the Hearing court's conclu-
sion that, in substance, Ms. Boggs' homelessness is not a result of serious
mental illness, but, rather, is the result of New York's lack of housing for
the poor. . . . The sole issue before us is whether Ms. Boggs is so severely
mentally ill that, unless she continues to receive hospital treatment, she is in
danger of doing serious harm to herself. 11
The appellate court's decision represents the triumph of the privatization re-
form-abdicating responsibility for social problems, limiting the issue to the
medical problem before it, totally deferring to the hospital psychiatrists, and
trusting in their expertise and impartiality. All that is left is for courts to stop
hearing such cases altogether.
D. Bending Doctrine as it Turns
The courts reformulated the rights of the mentally ill with each wave of
mental health reform and retreat. The Jacksonian courts construed the parens
patriae power of the state to authorize commitment to the new asylums."" As
the asylums failed, the courts began articulating a basic right to safety.563
With the arrival of the Progressive era, the courts discovered a right not to be
in the state hospital. 564 As the reform again failed, the courts found new police
power to eliminate insanity by sterilizing and "quarantining" the mentally ill
in institutions.65 In the community mental health era, the courts found a pan-
oply of rights: to treatment and to refuse treatment, to be deinstitutionalized,
and to receive rigorous due process before commitment. "6 Hardly before the
ink dried on those opinions, the courts narrowed or eliminated each of those
rights.5 67
In each era, the shift in doctrine followed a shift in the social and political
agenda, not the logic of doctrine. Until recently, the manipulation of doctrine
N.Y.2d 972, 520 N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988).
560. Id. at 364-65, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
561. Id. at 365, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 86-87. Boggs had testified that she would live in an apart-
ment, rather than the street, if she had such an apartment. In re Boggs, 136 Misc. 2d 1082, 1087-
88, 522 N.Y.S.2d 407, 410 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd sub nom. Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosps.
Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1987), appeal dismissed sub nom. Anonymous v. New
York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 972, 520 N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988).
562. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
563. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
564. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15.
565. See supra text accompanying notes 138-54.
566. See supra text accompanying notes 181-215.
567. See supra text accompanying notes 241-60.
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and precedent had not reached the level of Ryan v. New York Central Rail-
road 68 in cynicism and transparency.
For instance, in Addington,5 9 the Supreme Court recalled, as it had several
times in the past, the near total unreliability of psychiatric opinion.570 In other
times, such unreliability might lead a court to insist upon greater legitimacy to
psychiatric testimony before finding it sufficient to carry the burden of proof.
In this time, however, the Supreme Court lowered the commitment standards
to a level attainable by the state of the psychiatric art, explicitly to allow the
process of involuntary institutionalization to continue . 7 1
In Parham,572 the Supreme Court found that the stigma previously recog-
nized as attendant to commitment573 attaches not because of commitment, but
because of the mental illness itself.574 This devalued stigma clinging to com-
mitted children helped Chief Justice Burger dilute the procedural protections
for children.5 75 Yet, in the next Term, commitment to a mental hospital was
perceived as so stigmatizing to a convicted felon, whose liberty interest had
already been essentially extinguished, that Justice White insisted upon notice
and an adversary hearing prior to commitment.576 In Vitek v. Jones,577 the
Court refused to allow a psychiatrist to serve as decisionmaker, stating that
"Nebraska's reliance on the opinion of a designated physician or psychologist
for determining whether the conditions warranting a transfer [to a mental hos-
pital from prison] exist neither removes the prisoner's interest from due pro-
cess protection nor answers the question of what process is due under the
Constitution. 578
The specialized expertise of psychiatrists envied by the Court in Parham
was less significant in Vitek. After recalling the observation in Addington that
these essentially medical decisions involve facts that can only be interpreted by
the psychiatrist, Justice White nonetheless wrote in Vitek that "[t]he medical
nature of the inquiry, however, does not justify dispensing with due process
requirements. It is precisely '[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diag-
noses' that justify the requirement of adversary hearings. 579 The adversary
process, meaningless in Parham, was essential in Vitek. While the Court was
satisfied with an independent decision by another psychiatrist,580 it nonetheless
568. 35 N.Y. 210 (1866); see supra notes 303-11 and accompanying text (discussing Ryan).
569. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
570. Id. at 429-30.
571. Id.
572. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
573. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424-26.
574. Parham, 442 U.S. at 600.
575. Id. at 601.
576. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1980).
577. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
578. Id. at 491.
579. Id. at 495 (second set of brackets by Vitek court) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 430 (1979)).
580. Id. at 485, 495.
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cautioned against the unfettered exercise of medical judgment effectively un-
loosed in Parham.5 81
The Court did not even attempt a doctrinal reconciliation of Vitek and
Parham. None is possible.5 82 Parham stood on empty precedent, citing a num-
ber of cases emphasizing the flexibility of due process, all of which insisted
upon more due process than that afforded in Parham, some of them for lesser
interests.5 83 In Parham, the gravity of the liberty interest involved and the risk
of error from uncertain psychiatric diagnosis-the very factors traditionally
leading to more rigorous due process-all failed to convince the Burger Court
of the necessity for greater limits on the psychiatrist's power. The reason was
made explicit:
[A]s most states have expanded their efforts to assist the mentally ill, their
actions have been subjected to increasing litigation and heightened constitu-
tional scrutiny. Courts have been required to resolve the thorny constitu-
tional attacks on state programs and procedures with limited precedential
guidance ...
The State also has a genuine interest in allocating priority to the diagnosis
and treatment of patients as soon as they are admitted to a hospital rather
than to time-consuming procedural minuets before the admission. 6 "
In Romeo,5 85 the Court legitimized the psychiatric opinion under suspicion
and deferred to psychiatry, with none of the Vitek safeguards in place. In that
portion of the Court's Romeo decision defining the deferential standard, Jus-
tice Powell cited no law other than Parham.588 No authority was cited for the
new presumptive validity given to psychiatric opinion. For authority, the Court
581. Id. at 495.
582. The cases cannot be distinguished on the basis of the minority status of the children in
Parham. After discussing the possible unity of interests between parents and children, Chief Jus-
tice Burger noted the possibility of conflict and assumed a separate liberty interest vested in the
children. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
583. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (finding due process satisfied, in
the context of disability benefits, by notice, evidentiary hearing, and appeal opportunities); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (demanding a notice and some meaningful opportunity to be
heard prior to a ten-day school suspension); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562-70 (1974)
(providing prisoners facing loss of good time credits for rule infractions a written notice and a
hearing with the right to call witnesses, and, if the prisoner suffers from some deficit, to lay
representation to help prepare his defense); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1972)
(insisting upon prior written notice and a hearing offering the right to confront adverse witnesses
at parole violation hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970) (protecting welfare
benefits with a written notice and pretermination evidentiary hearing with the right to confront
and cross-examine as well as present evidence).
584. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599, 605 (1979) (citation omitted).
585. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
586. Id. at 322-23 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979)). Justice Powell also cited
the cases directing a deference to prison administrators, id. (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 352 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
556 (1974)), but stepped far beyond requiring deliberate indifference to constitutional rights
before warranting court intervention.
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offered only the following logic: since there "is no reason to think judges or
juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such deci-
sions," 8' there is a reason to think the appropriate professionals are so much
better qualified to make those decisions as to render their decisions virtually
unimpeachable. 88
The Court in Romeo invoked the tenuous authority of Rhodes v. Chap-
man5 89 and Bell v. Wolfish5. for the proposition that courts are to leave state
institutions to the state's administration. 91 While those cases do stand for that
sweeping proposition, those cases cannot span the difference between letting a
prison warden decide the necessary square footage for the cells of those con-
victed by a criminal court and letting a psychiatrist commit, treat or refuse to
protect whomever he or she sees fit. That expanse cannot be sustained, espe-
cially after Vitek.
Romeo also made the Court's agenda clear: "Such a presumption is neces-
sary to enable institutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded and
understaffed-to continue to function. ' 92
While Romeo repeated familiar dogma that the mentally ill are entitled "to
587. Id. at 323.
588. Id. This assumption also marks a substantial departure from medical malpractice law, in
which the opinion of a treating psychiatrist may be challenged by the opinion of the plaintiffs'
expert, and the court, through judge or jury, will choose who is correct, rather than defer. E.g.,
Dillman v. Hellman, 283 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Pettis v. State, 336 So. 2d
521, 528 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 379-80, 165 N.E.2d 756, 757,
198 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66-67 (1960). The malpractice claim is not an avenue around the barriers of
Romeo for those confined in state hospitals, since state laws commonly wrap their psychiatrists in
immunity. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 537.600, 632.440 (1986 & Supp. 11 1990).
Recently, some have proposed judicial deference to physicians in medical malpractice cases as
well. See generally Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for
Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1483 (1989).
589. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). In Rhodes. several prisoners brought a class action § 1983 claim
against state officials alleging that confining two prisoners in a single cell violated the Constitu-
tion. Id. at 339-40. The district court ruled that "double ceiling" was unconstitutional, in part
because it provided each prisoner with less square feet of cell space than was recommended by
several studies. Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1977), affd, 624 F.2d
1099 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
"restrictive and even harsh" conditions of the cells did not rise to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
590. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The facts of Bell closely resemble those in Rhodes. Inmates brought
a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of the conditions at a short-term custodial
facility which housed pretrial detainees. Id. at 523. The district court found a constitutional viola-
tion in the facility's practice of housing two inmates in a single room. United States ex rel. Wolf-
ish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd sub nom. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118
(2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The Supreme Court held
that the practice of "double-bunking" pretrial detainees did not violate the fifth amendment. Bell,
441 U.S. at 542-43.
591. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at
352; Bell v. Wolfish,, 441 U.S. at 539)).
592. Id. at 324.
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more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals,5 98
the decisions in Romeo and Parham deny to the mentally ill a basic right
modestly protected for felons in Vitek: liberty from psychiatry.
The decision in Washington v. Harper9" does not resolve this anomaly.
Vitek's concern for the "subtleties and nuances" of psychiatry, recognized by
the Washington Supreme Court, 95 is forgotten by the Supreme Court. Even
greater trust is placed in psychiatrists to follow their ethical obligation to treat
in the patient's best interest, " ' despite procedures which allow them to treat
for the prison's best interests, that is, in control.5 9 The Washington state pro-
cedures mean little to the decision other than as examples of how a state can
exceed the constitutional minimums. Since due process procedures are mean-
ingless rituals, psychiatric judges are relieved of their burden.
IV. UNMIXING METAPHORS, AGENDAS, FACT, AND LAW
To develop sound doctrine, the courts must lay bare our metaphors to ex-
pose the reality hidden inside them: the facts the metaphors distort and the
agendas they reflect. We must not underestimate the power of our metaphors:
"[o]ur behavior is a function of words we use. More often than not, our
thoughts do not select the words we use; instead, words determine the thoughts
we have. We can say with some assurance that language develops out of social
conditions and in turn influences social behavior."598
Variously called lunacy, insanity, and mental illness, the phenomena of
madness functioned metaphorically to express the nation's fears, of civiliza-
tion, 599 social dislocation following war,600 corruption,"0 1 social dislocation fol-
lowing a depression,602 stagnation and social injustice, 08 and finally failure
from ill-advised government adventures perverting the marketplace.10 4 The
593. Id. at 322.
594. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
595. Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 880, 759 P.2d 358, 363 (1988), rev'd sub nom. Wash-
ington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
596. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1037 n.8.
597. Id. at 1049 n.l 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justice Stevens
dissented from the majority's evaluation of the merits, but concurred with the majority's analysis
of why the case was not moot).
598. Embler, Metaphor and Social Belief, in LANGUAGE, MEANING AND MATURITY 125 (S.
Hayakawa ed. 1954).
599. This was the view of the Jacksonians. See supra text accompanying notes 25-41.
600. This was the prevailing view during the post-Jacksonian era. See supra text accompanying
notes 48-52.
601. This was the view of the Progressives and their contemporaries, the nativists. See supra
text accompanying notes 80-111.
602. This was the prevailing view during the early part of this century (1900-1940). See supra
text accompanying notes 116-37.
603. This was the prevailing view during the New Frontier and the Great Society eras (1945-
1970). See supra text accompanying notes 164-80.
604. This was the prevailing view in the period after the Great Society era (1970-1980). See
supra text accompanying notes 216-40.
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phenomena of madness functions as a metaphor even today.6 05
The presumed power of medically trained and professionally cultured psy-
chiatrists to define mental illness for the rest of society does not remove psy-
chiatrists' conceptions beyond the reach of social beliefs about insanity,
whatever their origin. Psychiatrists live in this society and reach adulthood and
professional status while in communion with the greater culture around them.
In 1861, Doctor Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote:
The truth is, that medicine, professedly founded on observation, is as sensi-
tive to outside influences, political, religious, philosophical, imaginative, as is
the barometer to the changes of atmospheric density. Theoretically it ought
to go on its own straightforward inductive path, without regard to changes
of government or fluctuations of public opinion. [Actually there is] a closer
relation between the Medical Sciences and the conditions of Society and the
general thought of the time, than would at first be suspected 60
As a metaphor, mental illness explains that what is wrong with America
today is not its soul or its structure, not its mission or its power. The trouble is
the weakness of the few, drawing on the strength of the many. The many can
survive and prosper if they do not suffer the limits the few would impose on
their growth.6 0 7 While Sontag is undoubtedly correct in her assertion that
"[i]llnesses have always been used as metaphors to enliven charges that a soci-
ety was corrupt or unjust," 60 8 mental illness now has its most metaphoric vital-
ity, even as we currently pretend to disassociate it from its political and social
connections and reduce it back to a medical problem:
Order is the oldest concern of political philosophy, and if it is plausible to
compare the polis to an organism, then it is plausible to compare civil disor-
der to an illness. The classic formulations which analogize a political disor-
der to an illness-from Plato to, say, Hobbes-presuppose the classical med-
ical (and political) idea of balance. Illness comes from imbalance.
Treatment is aimed at restoring the right balance-in political terms, the
right hierarchy. The prognosis is always, in principle, optimistic. Society, by
605. Susan Sontag writes of insanity as a metaphor for "the contemporary prestige of irrational
or rude (spontaneous) behavior (acting-out), of that very passionateness whose repression was
once imagined to cause (tuberculosis], and is now thought to cause cancer." S. SONTAG, supra
note 2, at 36. This may reflect the time the first edition of her book was written, the mid-1970s. It
hardly seems true today, at least with respect to mental illness.
606. 0. HOLMES, CURRENTS AND COUNTER-CURRENTS IN MEDICAL SCIENCE 7 (1861).
607. Recall the quote from President Reagan: "Our optimism has once again been turned loose.
And all of us recognize that those people who keep talking about limits are really talking about
their own limitations, not America's." P. ERICKSON, supra note 288, at 100 (quoting a Ronald
Reagan 1984 campaign speech). Recall as well that the Irish were blamed for the failure of moral
treatment, see supra text accompanying note 65, the genetically insane were blamed for sapping
the state of its reform efforts, presumably including civic medicine, see supra text accompanying
notes 157-60, and the discharged mentally ill have been blamed for the failure of the welfare
"safety net," see supra text accompanying note 278.
608. S. SONTAG, supra note 2, at 72.
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definition, never catches a fatal disease."
Mental illness is no longer a metaphor for what is wrong with this country. It
is a metaphor for what would be wrong if we upset the natural order. Holding
to our traditional principles-order, limited government, and the rule of the
marketplace-promises the best treatment and prevention. The efficacy of this
metaphor demands that mental illness be viewed not as a social problem, with
causal connections to poverty or inequality to which government might re-
spond. Rather, it demands that mental illness remain just that, an illness af-
flicting individuals,, for which "doctor knows best."
The courts' limited role of resolving private disputes, even where it means
reducing public issues to private disputes between specific litigants,1 0 serves as
a perfect vehicle for this metaphor's communication to society and its imple-
mentation. The court draws the customary little circle around the litigants,
here the psychiatrist and the patient or would-be patient. Within that circle
the court defines the problem and "resolves" it. Given the circle, the court's
judgment should come as no surprise. Of the two players inside, only one is
believed and has power. Since society's surrogate (the psychiatrist), cannot be
crazy, someone else must be. And that someone must be treated. As long as
we treat the patient, America stays healthy. The court's circle guarantees that
the victim will be blamed for his or her own mental illness. The victim will be
blamed at least in the sense that society remains blameless, unjust social con-
ditions are irrelevant, and treatment is imposed on the patient. " There is no
one else to blame.61 2
We must expose the metaphor's hidden agenda of social control. The appeal
of the metaphor and the popularity of the privatization reform cannot be ex-
plained away as simply a belief in the power of science. An ideology or culture
of science fails to explain why, when we defer to medical expertise, we defer
only to the expertise of the institutional psychiatrist, not to those the patient
might enlist to support her release. Widening the circle to include the context
of mental illness can help our understanding. 618 A renewed investigation of the
609. Id. at 76-77.
610. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1295
(1976).
611. This variant of "blaming the victim" is consistent with other approaches to public health
problems, such as changing the patient, not the patient's illness-inducing environment. W. RYAN,
supra note 277, at 5, 8.
612. Clearly, we have evolved past blaming the patient, in the moral sense. Insanity is, presum-
ably, no longer a sign of moral deficiency. Still, our marketplace metaphor's insistence upon indi-
vidual causes and consequences leaves us with few choices-the problem must be in the individual,
if not in the soul, then in the body.
613. W. RYAN, supra note 277, at 147. The author states:
[T]he investigation of the mental health problems of the poor was distorted and, as a
result, the facts were subtly reformulated in a way that permits and encourages the
oversimplification: the problems of the poor are, at bottom, manifestation of neurosis
or character disorder. That is, they are intrapsychic problems that can only be cor-
rected by therapeutic intervention in the psychic processes of the poor person himself.
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problem must account for the relationship of poverty and inequality to mental
illness. Hollingshead and Redlich concluded that while the mentally ill affluent
were induced to seek treatment in "gentle and 'insightful' ways,"', the men-
tally ill poor were subjected to "direct, authoritative, compulsory, and, at
times, coercively brutal methods. 6 15 Today still, mostof the mentally ill poor
receive treatment, if at all, in overcrowded and underfunded state hospitals.6"6
Most of the rest are in nursing homes, shelters, jails, or on the street. 617 The
treatment choices are simple: no treatment on the streets or coerced treatment
in the institution. Failure to examine this reality legitimizes the use of mental
health law for the agenda of social control.
Just as critically, we must examine the agenda of the other player in the
circle, the psychiatrist. If it is true that psychiatrists have not generally com-
mitted to care for the poor or the marginal members of our society,' 18 the
explanation for the APA's commitment proposals may lie in their ideological
view of the world:
[M]ost psychiatrists . . . see[] social stratification, not so much in terms of
inequality of power and money, but in terms of status, prestige, and such
questions as life style, values, 'behavior patterns, and child-rearing practices.
This view is highly compatible with a psychodynamic and psychopathologi-
cal outlook ...
In terms of delivery of care, the intrusion of this ideology into the mental
health field creates a situation of gross injustice. Through excessive concern
with the classical questions of "motivation," "suitability for treatment," and
"ability to profit from therapy," the poor person with genuine intrapsychic
problems is blithely screened out and does not have anything like equal ac-
cess to mental health resources. . . . It almost seems to boil down to the
simple fact that middle class and upwardly mobile professionals don't like
the poor, don't intend to help them, and do intend to husband mental health
resources for their own kind. 6
Perhaps the explanation is simpler yet; an explanation that reconciles the
APA's position that psychiatrists cannot predict dangerous conduct and so
should not be held liable for releasing patients from institutions6 20 and the
APA's other position that they can predict dangerous conduct and so should
be able to involuntarily commit patients to those same institutions. Such a
Id. (emphasis in original).
614. A. HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLICH, supra note 531, at 192.
615. Id.
616. Mollica, supra note 534, at 370; Rubenstein, Access to Treatment and Rehabilitation for
Severely Mentally Ill Poor People, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 382, 384 (1986).
617. MISSOURI ASSOCIATION FOR SOCIAL WELFARE TASK FORCE REPORT, THE HOMELESS
MENTALLY ILL IN MISSOURI 11 (1988).
618. Estroff, Medicalizing the Margins: On Being Disgraced, Disordered, and Deserving, 8
PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION J. 34, 37 (1985); Mollica, supra note 534, at 372.
619. W. RYAN, supra note 277, at 147-48 (emphasis in original).
620. See supra note 490 and accompanying text.
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simpler explanation might implicate psychiatry's need to retain power.6"
That power should concern more than just mental patients. Chodoff, in one
of the two articles on which the Supreme Court premised Addington22 and
Parham,6 28 would expand the regulatory scope of the medical model beyond
disease to other social conduct:
Sophisticated definitions of the medical model do not require only the dem-
onstration of unequivocal organic pathology. A broader formulation . . . ex-
tends the domain of illness to encompass certain forms of social deviance as
well as biological disorders. According to this definition, the medical model
is characterized not only by organicity but also by being negatively valued
by society, by "nonvoluntariness," thus exempting its exemplars from blame,
and by the understanding that physicians are the technically competent ex-
perts to deal with its effects.02 4
The medical profession has succeeded in "medicalizing" a variety of behaviors
previously considered antisocial or immoral, such as alcoholism, eating disor-
ders, and "everything from cigar smoking to love."'62  When this success con-
verges with deference to medical judgment, a number of inevitable conse-
quences result. While an end to the unnecessary punishment of alcoholics and
other substance abusers may be one of those consequences, the threat to indi-
vidual liberty is yet another.
V. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE COURTS: CLEARING THE AIR
The courts cannot and perhaps should not lead reform movements. In
mental health policy, they never have. Rather, they reflected their times and
espoused the metaphors of their times, metaphors of reform and of defeat.
Still, if courts simply reflect the realities of their times, perhaps we still can
and should expect more than the distorted reflection of a funhouse mirror. 26
621. Embler argues that psychiatrists are also subject to the power of metaphor and have taken
literally Freud's metaphor of the Id, Ego and Super-Ego. Embler, supra note 598, at 135.
622. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
623. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601 (1979).
624. Chodoff, supra note 385, at 498.
625. The quoted material is from an editorial in a psychoanalytic journal criticizing the "recent
forceful biologicization of everything from cigar smoking to love (a deficiency of phenylalanine
treatable by chocolate in the absence of a loved person)." Editorial, 37 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYSIS A.
3, 4 (1989); see also Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 538 n.2 (1988) (recognizing that second-
ary alcoholism is not willful misconduct but rather a psychiatric disorder); Morrow, Doctors
Helping Doctors, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1984, at 32, 32-33 ("medicalizing" the prob-
lem of alcoholism among the medical profession).
626. Both law and psychiatry deal with reality indirectly, with a constructed reality. For law,
this means defining what is true by what other people say is true, for example, in the opinions of
other lawyers now sitting as judges, and by what is admitted into evidence. For psychiatry, this
means diagnosis based upon the reports of other doctors found in the patient's chart and upon the
reports of other lay witnesses. The "rights" and the "illness" commonly are not observed or exper-
ienced directly. This feature, which distinguishes both from sociology or the hard sciences might
result in a natural affinity between the two professions, or at least a shared affinity for metaphor.
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Society has yet to accept Sontag's point "that illness is not a metaphor, and
that the most truthful way of regarding illness-and the healthiest way of
being ill-is one most purified of, most resistant to, metaphorical thinking. 627
Still, there is more available to the court's investigation than metaphor. There
is the reality of mental illness, psychiatry, the history of mental health policy,
and the courts' own role in that history.
The court is in a perfect place to look at mental illness in "the most truthful
way." Our traditional perception of the role of the court puts it in that loca-
tion of independence and integrity where truth can be looked at plainly. The
dispelling of social metaphors which interfere with the task of just government
is precisely the function of the courts in our system. Alexander Hamilton
wrote that "the independence of judges may be an essential safeguard against
the effects of occasional ill humors in the society. 2 8
Until recently, the determination of facts material to the question of liberty
belonged in the courts. Those facts are not simple medical judgments. Psychia-
trists, after all, base their judgments upon facts, for example, information
about the patient's behavior beyond the senses of the psychiatrist but con-
tained in the reports of others, family and friends, and strangers. Nor are the
material facts simply those related to the individual's mental illness. The facts
include the conditions under which people acquire the symptoms of what we
continue to call, in metaphor, mental illness, as well as the conditions under
which people might be freed from them. They include the manner in which
people bearing the metaphor's label are treated-the powerlessness of those
deprived of free movement and control over their lives.
This Article calls for a return to the traditional role of the court, as the
arena for the adversary process and its great engine for truth, cross-examina-
tion.6 29 It calls for putting the fallibility and uncertainty of psychiatry to the
Given that predilection, it might be necessary to call upon other metaphors, for example, the clean
air or the Republic's cave walls mentioned below, in order to expose the power of the targeted
metaphor and open it up for examination. The dilemma is not in using metaphors, but in forget-
ting that they are only metaphors.
One commentator has stated:
Figures of speech, when they are fitting and felicitous, and especially when they occur
in print, give poetic sanction, as it were, to hitherto dimly felt, inarticulated beliefs.
When metaphor is new, and when the reader does not enjoy the perspective vouch-
safed by time, the metaphor is taken literally, and its function is not that of rhetorical
device, but of statement of fact, prescribing certain kinds of behavior. Indeed, it may
be said that the habit which sees the germane metaphor as a statement of identity is a
habit which changes the character of civilizations.
Embler, supra note 598, at 128 (emphasis omitted).
627. S. SONTAG, supra note 2, at 3 (emphasis in original).
628. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 494-95 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
629. The courts might also again endorse another wave of reform in a future time, one shaped
by a metaphor, perhaps, of community instead of competition. Still, a new communal metaphor
might promise little change. Our history has reflected a tension between individualism's val-
ues-with the consequence of an atomized society allowing each to participate, compete, and to
assume responsibility only for one's own life-and communal values, which permit the group to
dictate individual conduct, for example, a duty to be well.
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test before allowing this pre-science to deprive anyone of liberty. The Supreme
Court seemed to understand this role of the courts in Vitek,630 a case which
appeared briefly after Parham""1 and seemingly disappeared before Romeo.6 2
The Vitek Court wrote that "[t]he medical nature of the inquiry, however,
does not justify dispensing with due process requirements. It is precisely '[t]he
subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses' that justify the requirements
of adversary hearings."638 Although this insight only led the Court to require
an independent prison psychiatrist as decisionmaker, such limited due process
is consistent with scores of precedent defining minimal due process protections
for those whose liberty interest has been effectively extinguished by conviction
and sentencing for crime. 34 As even Romeo acknowledged, the mentally dis-
abled have rights superior to those convicted of crimes.635 The mentally dis-
abled enjoy the full protection of the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution; it
is to be denied or limited only in accord with traditional principles of due
process.
The original understanding of the rights of the mentally ill recognized by
the Supreme Court in Humphrey v. Cady has not lost its truth: "In making
this determination [of the rights of the mentally ill], the jury serves the critical
function of introducing into the process a lay judgment, reflecting values gen-
erally held in the community, concerning the kinds of potential harm that jus-
tify the State in confining a person for compulsory treatment." 636 If metaphors
distort those community values, the courts must sift through them and sepa-
rate out fact from metaphor from agenda. Whether drawn by jury or judge,
any circles drawn must encompass reality, not exclude it. While government
by the Platonic guardians, feared by plaintiff's counsel in Buck v. Bell,63 7 may
decide the fate of liberty after simply examining shadows on the walls of
caves, the "constitutional government of the fathers" insists upon no depriva-
tion of liberty not justified by facts.
After recognizing the realities of the problem, the courts may decide to re-
lease the patient or to commit the patient who requires safe confinement and
care, depending upon the court's analysis of the facts. Those facts must in-
clude the impact of poverty, the benefits of treatment, the limitations of psy-
chiatry and the preferences of the patient. Those facts may justify the courts'
injunction to the mental health system to create an alternative to the institu-
630. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1980).
631. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
632. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
633. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 495 (second set of brackets by Vitek court) (quoting Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979)).
634. E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562-70 (1974) (holding that state jails must
provide certain minimal due process requirements to prisoners in disciplinary proceedings, such as
advance written notice, written statements by factfinders as to evidence, and the ability to call
witnesses).
635. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 321-22.
636. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
637. 274 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1927); see supra note I and accompanying text.
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tion. Courts have done it before."
Even if our system will no longer tolerate this degree of judicial activism,
the court that cannot devise a proper remedy need not distort the analysis to
lead away from the truth. The trial court in Boggs6"" felt constrained by the
rules of our system in devising a solution to the dilemma of Billie Boggs, but
did not surrender its role as arbiter of truth. Boggs needed a home in the
community, and neither confinement in the hospital nor freedom on the streets
offered any answers. The need to arrive at a particular result, such as the
protection of the railroads in Ryan v. New York Central Railroad"° or the
protection of the institution in Romeo,641 does not justify cynical manipulation
of doctrine and concealment of facts.
The alternative of government by metaphor is unacceptable, even with the
comfort that the medical metaphor gives the rest of us, and even if the meta-
phor's pervasiveness persuades its victims:
The grimmest aspect of this whole grim scene is the willing acceptance of
the label ["psychotic"] by those already beaten down by the world. It is the
final violence, the victims blaming themselves for their own powerlessness.
The circle closes; lawyers, cops and doctors drive off, convinced that they
have made society work. But the air smells bad.
64 2
Law, if and as it changes, must move in response to reality. If the courts can't
change the reality, at least they can clear the air. Bad metaphors make for
worse law.
638. E.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 500 (D. Minn. 1974); see supra note 195 and
accompanying text.
639. In re Boggs, 136 Misc. 2d 1082, 522 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd sub nom. Boggs v.
New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1987), appeal dis-
missed sub nom. Anonymous v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 972, 520
N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988).
640. 35 N.Y. 210, 216 (1866); see supra note 309 and accompanying text.
641. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982); see supra note 419 and accompanying
text.
642. H. DRUMMOND, supra note 540, at 89.
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